赞助与权力下放:印度的贫困政治

Anoop Sadanandan
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引用次数: 35

摘要

权力下放以不同的方式推进了庇护政治。首先,在权力下放的州,中央和地方政客都分配赞助,以增强他们的政治支持。其次,地方选举向中央领导人揭示了选举中重要选民的地理分布信息。中央领导人可以利用这些信息为这些选民提供特殊利益。第三,当选的地方政客有个人的策略来分配赞助,尽管或除了他们所代表的政党的庇护策略之外。来自印度的证据表明,权力下放有助于在权力下放的邦更广泛地分配惠顾。来自印度各邦和各村的数据表明,邦和地方各级的激励机制决定了赞助的分配。
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Patronage and Decentralization: The Politics of Poverty in India
Decentralization advances patronage politics in distinct ways. First, in decentralized states both central and local politicians distribute patronage to enhance their political support. Second, local elections reveal information to central leaders about the geographic distribution of electorally salient voters. Central leaders can use this information to target particularistic benefits to these voters. Third, elected local politicians have individual strategies to distribute patronage, in spite of or in addition to the clientelistic strategies of the political parties they represent. Evidence from India indicates that decentralization has contributed to more extensive distribution of patronage in decentralized states. Data from Indian states and villages illustrate the incentives at the state and local levels that shape the distribution of patronage.
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