基于仿真的多人自私采矿分析

Shiquan Zhang, Kaiwen Zhang, Bettina Kemme
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引用次数: 3

摘要

工作量证明(PoW)是包括比特币在内的当前主流区块链系统中最流行的共识协议的核心。自私挖矿攻击是对基于pow的系统的潜在威胁,最近的研究表明,如果一个矿工拥有超过25%的总挖矿能力,那么他就可以利用自私挖矿获利。在本文中,我们提出了一个基于马尔可夫过程模型的模拟器,可以分析存在多个独立工作的自私矿工的场景。在我们的评估中,我们提供了两个攻击者的详细结果,表明在这种情况下,有利可图的自私挖矿的阈值降低到21%。
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A Simulation-Based Analysis of Multiplayer Selfish Mining
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the core of the most popular consensus protocol among current mainstream blockchain systems including Bitcoin. Selfish mining attacks are a possible threat towards PoW-based systems and recent works have shown that a miner can profit using selfish mining if it has more than 25% of the overall mining power. In this paper, we present a simulator based on a Markov Process model that can analyze scenarios where there are multiple, independently working selfish miners. In our evaluations, we present detailed results with two attackers showing that the threshold for profitable selfish mining decreases to 21% in this case.
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