库恩科学哲学的语境实在论视角

I. E. Pris
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摘要

我们将库恩的科学哲学与我们所理解的维特根斯坦的语境现实主义联系起来,并用后者来解释前者的基本概念。特别地,我们用生命形式的概念来解释科学范式的概念。例如,我们说牛顿力学和量子力学是生命的相应形式的语法。范式的不可通约性是由于采用了不同的规范(语法)。它不是绝对的,因为语法语句可以改变它们的状态,变成事实,反之亦然。规范本身也在进化。我们支持库恩反对波普尔证伪原则的论点,我们将一个既定的科学理论解释为衡量现实的维特根斯坦规范(规则)。规范既非真也非假;它的证伪是没有意义的。我们将库恩所使用的维特根斯坦的家族相似性概念解释为一个共同的显性或隐性维特根斯坦规则(规范)的存在。我们解释库恩的历史例子,特别是那些与托勒密和哥白尼的系统,相对论和量子力学,以及库恩的观点,即不同范式的参与者以不同的方式看待世界,观察依赖于理论,在我们的论文中,本体论对环境敏感。因此,我们抵制对库恩立场的相对论和建构主义解释,并说明为什么它与科学进步的观念和科学理论之间的对应原则并不矛盾。我们还简要地比较了库恩的立场与拉卡托斯、张(实用现实主义)和麦克法兰(评价相对主义)的立场,并将我们对库恩的解释与马西米提出的自然化先验主义的解释进行了比较。
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Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science from the point of view of a contextual realism
We establish a connection between T. Kuhn’s philosophy of science and a Wittgensteinian contextual realism, as we understand it, and interpret the basic concepts of the former in terms of the latter. In particular, we interpret the notion of a scientific paradigm in terms of the notion of a form of life. For instance, we speak of Newtonian and quantum mechanics as grammars of the corresponding forms of life. The incommensurability of paradigms is due to the adoption of different norms (grammars). It is not absolute, as grammatical statements can change their status and become factual, and vice versa. Norms themselves evolve. We support Kuhn’s argument against Popper’s falsification principle with our interpretation of an established scientific theory as a Wittgensteinian norm (rule) for measuring reality. The norm is neither true nor false; its falsification makes no sense. We interpret Wittgenstein’s notion of a family resemblance, used by Kuhn, as the presence of a shared explicit or implicit Wittgensteinian rule (norm). We interpret Kuhn’s historical examples, in particular those with the systems of Ptolemy and Copernicus, relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and Kuhn’s view that participants in different paradigms see the world differently and that observation depends on theory, in terms of our thesis that ontology is sensitive to context. We thus resist the relativistic and constructivist interpretations of Kuhn’s position and show why it does not contradict the idea of scientific progress and the principle of correspondence between scientific theories. We also briefly compare Kuhn’s position with those of I. Lakatos, H. Chang (pragmatic realism) and J. MacFarlane (evaluative relativism), and compare our interpretation of Kuhn with his interpretation in terms of a naturalized transcendentalism proposed by M. Massimi.
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