{"title":"并购审查中的密切竞争对手","authors":"Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPT024","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The analysis of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers — especially on markets for differentiated goods — can take into consideration the extent to which the merging firms are close competitors. The elimination of a close competitor can result in an upward pricing pressure (UPP) on the merged firm which can harm consumers. Although a quantitative UPP analysis is an important enhancement of substantive merger appraisal, it should not be considered sufficient in itself for the finding of a significant impediment to effective competition in terms of Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Rather, market definition and the analysis of the market structure including market shares should generally constitute the backbone of any theory of harm.","PeriodicalId":345107,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Close Competitors in Merger Review\",\"authors\":\"Stefan Thomas\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/JECLAP/LPT024\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The analysis of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers — especially on markets for differentiated goods — can take into consideration the extent to which the merging firms are close competitors. The elimination of a close competitor can result in an upward pricing pressure (UPP) on the merged firm which can harm consumers. Although a quantitative UPP analysis is an important enhancement of substantive merger appraisal, it should not be considered sufficient in itself for the finding of a significant impediment to effective competition in terms of Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Rather, market definition and the analysis of the market structure including market shares should generally constitute the backbone of any theory of harm.\",\"PeriodicalId\":345107,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSN: Antitrust (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-07-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSN: Antitrust (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPT024\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Antitrust (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPT024","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The analysis of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers — especially on markets for differentiated goods — can take into consideration the extent to which the merging firms are close competitors. The elimination of a close competitor can result in an upward pricing pressure (UPP) on the merged firm which can harm consumers. Although a quantitative UPP analysis is an important enhancement of substantive merger appraisal, it should not be considered sufficient in itself for the finding of a significant impediment to effective competition in terms of Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Rather, market definition and the analysis of the market structure including market shares should generally constitute the backbone of any theory of harm.