当协议崩溃

Yitzhak Benbaji, D. Statman
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摘要

如果战争合同的一方故意忽视它会发生什么?这种情况通常发生在一方违反战时法规则,轰炸平民目标,谋杀战俘等。本章认为,违反战争契约的规范含义本身就是契约的一部分。在没有一个国际机构可以对违反合同的人执行合同的情况下,当事各方有权对违反战时规则的行为作出反应。这些补救措施——这些反违规行为——应该是谨慎和克制的,并始终着眼于重建各方对违规行为的承诺。需要报复的战时违反行为一般有三种:(a)违反纯粹出于常规的禁令,例如禁止某些武器的禁令;(b)在受到攻击的平民对敌人的战争努力负有责任的情况下,例如政治家或党员,违反禁止以平民为目标的规定;(c)不分青红皂白地攻击平民。本章认为,在所有三种情况下,战争合同都允许进行实物报复。在此之前,体面的和偏袒的各方将看到有必要阻止不服从的各方,并使他们认识到,他们将为违反战争协定付出过高的代价。因此,本章提出的那种战争伦理将使世界成为一个更安全的生活场所。
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When the Agreement Collapses
What happens when one of the parties to the war contract deliberately ignores it? This typically occurs when one of the parties violates the jus in bello rules by bombing civilian targets, murdering POWs and so on. This chapter argues that the normative implications of breaching the war contract are themselves part of the contract. In the absence of an international body that can enforce the contract on those violating it, the parties have the right to respond to violations of the in bello rules. These remedies—these counter-violations—should be cautious and restrained, with a constant eye on the goal of reinstituting the parties’ commitment to the broken rules. The in bello violations that call for retaliation are of three general kinds: (a) violating prohibitions whose source is merely conventional, such as those outlawing certain weapons; (b) violating the prohibition against targeting civilians in cases in which the civilians attacked bear responsibility for the enemy war effort, such as politicians or party members; and (c) carrying out indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The chapter argues that retaliation in kind is licensed by the war contract in all three categories. Ex ante, decent and partial parties would see the need to deter disobedient parties and to make them realize that they would pay too high a price for violations of the war agreement. Thus, a war ethic of the kind the chapter proposes will make the world a safer place in which to live.
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Contractarianism and the Moral Equality of Civilians Foundations of a Non-Individualist Morality The Aims of Just Wars and Jus Ex Bello Concluding Remarks Contractarianism and the Moral Equality of Combatants
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