回复Black等人(2019)的“Reg SHO再分析项目:重新考虑Fang、Huang和Karpoff(2016)关于Reg SHO和盈余管理的问题”。

Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang, Jonathan M. Karpoff
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在2016年的一篇论文中(Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016),我们报告说,在Reg SHO试点计划期间,面临卖空前景增加的公司在试点期间的可自由支配应计利润较低。Black、Desai、Litvak、Yoo和Yu(2019,以下简称BDLYY)认为这一结果是不可复制的。我们证明BDLYY的索赔是不正确的。之前,masa, Zhang, and Zhang(2015)和Heath, Ringgenberg, Samadi, and Werner(2019)的论文中重复了应提项目的结果,并且使用我们自2014年以来广泛共享的数据和代码(包括2015年与BDLYY团队共享的数据和代码)和我们最近公开发布的数据和代码很容易复制。应计项目结果也适用于广泛的规范变化,包括BDLYY论文所暗示的变化,其中包括:与业绩匹配的可自由支配应计项目和应计项目总额的各种衡量标准;使用原始的2012年Compustat数据或当前可用的2019年Compustat数据;包括公司和年度固定效应;在差异中差异(DiD)检验中包括或排除其他协变量;使用不平衡面板而不是平衡面板。我们推测,BDLYY的结果与先前的结果不一致,因为它们部分依赖于非标准应计指标和/或使用的样本与Fang等人(2016)、Massa等人(2015)和Heath等人(2019)使用的样本不同。最后,我们讨论两个理论问题。首先,我们重申,在Reg SHO期间观察到的卖空增加既不是必要的,也不足以证明卖空的前景对盈余管理具有纪律效应,因为管理者的内生调整影响卖空者的机会和观察到的卖空。其次,正如最近的实证研究结果所表明的那样,我们讨论了一个担忧,即Reg SHO的变化似乎太小,无法解释广泛的企业结果。
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Reply to 'The Reg SHO Reanalysis Project: Reconsidering Fang, Huang and Karpoff (2016) on Reg SHO and Earnings Management' by Black et al. (2019)
In a 2016 paper (Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016), we report that firms exposed to an increase in the prospect of short selling during the Reg SHO pilot program have lower discretionary accruals during the pilot period. Black, Desai, Litvak, Yoo, and Yu (2019, hereafter, BDLYY) argue that this result is not replicable. We show that BDLYY’s claim is incorrect. The accruals result previously was replicated in papers by Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2015) and Heath, Ringgenberg, Samadi, and Werner (2019), and is easily replicable using data and code that we have shared widely since 2014 – including with the BDLYY team in 2015 – and that we recently posted publicly. The accruals result also is robust to a wide range of specification changes, including those implied by the BDLYY paper, which include: various measures of performance-matched discretionary accruals and total accruals; using our original 2012 Compustat data or currently available 2019 Compustat data; including both firm and year fixed effects; including or excluding other covariates in the difference-in-differences (DiD) tests; and using unbalanced rather than balanced panels. We conjecture that BDLYY’s results are inconsistent with prior results because they rely partly on non-standard accruals measures and/or use samples that differ from those used by Fang et al. (2016), Massa et al. (2015), and Heath et al. (2019). We conclude by discussing two theoretical concerns. First, we reiterate that an observed increase in short selling during the Reg SHO period is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the prospect of short selling has a disciplinary effect on earnings management, as managers’ endogenous adjustments affect short sellers’ opportunities and observed short selling. Second, we discuss a concern that the Reg SHO change appears to be too small to explain a wide range of firm outcomes, as recent empirical findings suggest.
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