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引用次数: 0
摘要
这场历史性的金融危机及其对企业行为的关注的影响之一,可能是分配责任的压力加大。考虑到公司不受起诉和起诉的愿望,这种压力必然会指向公司内部有罪的员工。因此,公司董事将不得不考虑查明这些有罪员工所需的程序——公司调查——对公司的潜在影响。此外,如果公司成功避免被起诉,它可能会通过延期或不起诉协议(分别为“DPA”和“NPA”)受到持续的监督。本文将追溯美国司法部(“DOJ”)在制定《联邦起诉公司原则》(Principles of Federal prosecution of Corporations)的各种版本时所经历的痛苦历程。尽管美国司法部为解决这些问题制定了近十年的备忘录,但该公司仍容易受到重要法律保护和道德原则的破坏。此外,如果一家公司成功地避免了起诉,并签订了延期或不起诉协议,其董事需要意识到他们可能在经营的未知水域。本文还将讨论围绕此类协议的具体治理问题。
Corporate Investigations - Challenges in Corporate Governance
One of the effects of this historic financial crisis and its spotlight on corporate conduct is likely to be an increased pressure to allocate blame. That pressure is bound to be directed toward identifying culpable employees within a firm, given the desire to spare corporations from indictment and prosecution. Thus corporate directors will have to consider the potential implications to the firm of the process required to identify such culpable employees- corporate investigations. Additionally, should the firm succeed in being spared an indictment it will likely be subject to ongoing oversight through a Deferred or Non-prosecution agreement (“DPA” and “NPA,” respectively). This paper will trace the tortured trail of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in creating various iterations of Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Corporations. Notwithstanding nearly a decade of memoranda addressing these issues the DOJ has left the corporation vulnerable to undermining important legal protections and ethical principles. Furthermore, should a corporation succeed in avoiding indictment and entering into a deferred or non-prosecution agreement its directors need to be aware of the unchartered waters in which they may be operating. This paper will also address the specific governance issues surrounding such agreements.