Ever since Sutherland (1939) coined the term “white-collar crime”, there has been extensive research and debate on what to include and what to exclude from this offense category (e.g., Piquero and Benson 2004; Pontell et al. 2014; Stadler et al. 2013). In accordance with Sutherland’s original work, convenience theory emphasizes the position and trust enjoyed by the offender in an occupational setting (Shapiro 1987). Therefore, the organizational dimension is the core of convenience theory where the offender has access to resources to commit and conceal financial crime.
自从Sutherland(1939)创造了“白领犯罪”一词以来，关于这一犯罪类别应该包括什么和应该排除什么，一直有广泛的研究和辩论(例如，Piquero和Benson 2004;Pontell et al. 2014;Stadler et al. 2013)。根据萨瑟兰(Sutherland)的原始著作，便利理论强调冒犯者在职业环境中所享有的地位和信任(Shapiro 1987)。因此，组织维度是便利理论的核心，组织维度是犯罪人获取资源实施和隐匿金融犯罪的场所。
{"title":"White Collar Crime - An Overview","authors":"Shahbaz Akhtar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3888894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888894","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since Sutherland (1939) coined the term “white-collar crime”, there has been extensive research and debate on what to include and what to exclude from this offense category (e.g., Piquero and Benson 2004; Pontell et al. 2014; Stadler et al. 2013). In accordance with Sutherland’s original work, convenience theory emphasizes the position and trust enjoyed by the offender in an occupational setting (Shapiro 1987). Therefore, the organizational dimension is the core of convenience theory where the offender has access to resources to commit and conceal financial crime.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122282687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article examines the main stages of the formation of the institution of criminal responsibility for the legalization of money or other property acquired by criminal means, draws attention to the fact that the foundations of responsibility for this crime can be found back in the 15th century. Based on the analysis of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and Russian regulations, a conclusion is drawn about the modern regulation of the institution in question.
{"title":"A Historical Flashback of the Formation and Development of Criminal Liability for the Legalization of Money or Other Property Acquired by Criminal","authors":"D. Ivanov, Dmitry Vanin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850814","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the main stages of the formation of the institution of criminal responsibility for the legalization of money or other property acquired by criminal means, draws attention to the fact that the foundations of responsibility for this crime can be found back in the 15th century. Based on the analysis of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and Russian regulations, a conclusion is drawn about the modern regulation of the institution in question.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114350365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With market economies quickly evolving, questions on whether insider trading must be legal are fast gaining ground. In this paper, we evaluate whether countries possess well-equipped legislations to justify the illegality of insider trading. For the purpose of research, focus is given to the legislations of the United States and India; while reasoning from an Indian perspective.
{"title":"Can Countries Justify the Existence of Insider Trading Laws? An Indian Perspective","authors":"Chandra Lekha B","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3849367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3849367","url":null,"abstract":"With market economies quickly evolving, questions on whether insider trading must be legal are fast gaining ground. In this paper, we evaluate whether countries possess well-equipped legislations to justify the illegality of insider trading. For the purpose of research, focus is given to the legislations of the United States and India; while reasoning from an Indian perspective.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121354651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I show that public companies disproportionately disclose positive news on days when corporate executives sell shares under predetermined Rule 10b5-1 plans. I find that the likelihood, share volume and dollar volume of insider sales under 10b5-1 plans are higher when good news is disclosed, and each of these are higher when the disclosed news is better. Disclosure of good news on Rule 10b5-1 selling days is greatest in the health care sector and among mid-cap firms. I show that stock prices reverse after high levels of Rule 10b5-1 selling on positive news days, and that the price reversal increases with the share volume of Rule 10b5-1 selling. I show that, whatever might be said about health care executives’ advantageous stock sales as they developed vaccines during the pandemic of 2020, those sales were not uncommon.
{"title":"Insider Trading and Strategic Disclosure","authors":"Joshua Mitts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3741464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741464","url":null,"abstract":"I show that public companies disproportionately disclose positive news on days when corporate executives sell shares under predetermined Rule 10b5-1 plans. I find that the likelihood, share volume and dollar volume of insider sales under 10b5-1 plans are higher when good news is disclosed, and each of these are higher when the disclosed news is better. Disclosure of good news on Rule 10b5-1 selling days is greatest in the health care sector and among mid-cap firms. I show that stock prices reverse after high levels of Rule 10b5-1 selling on positive news days, and that the price reversal increases with the share volume of Rule 10b5-1 selling. I show that, whatever might be said about health care executives’ advantageous stock sales as they developed vaccines during the pandemic of 2020, those sales were not uncommon.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134182609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Baker, Benjamin Edwards, Andrew Jennings, Samantha J. Prince
In May 2020, the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an organization representing state and provincial securities regulators in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, released a draft Model Whistleblower Award and Protection Act (the Proposed Act) for public comment. The Proposed Act drew from securities-whistleblower statutes in Utah and Indiana, as well as the federal Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts. In brief, the Proposed Act provided for a state-level securities whistleblower-award program and an anti-retaliation private right of action. NASAA received seven comment letters, including one from securities scholars. Our securities scholars’ letter highlighted two areas of concern. First, we noted that in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the Dodd-Frank Act did not protect from employer retaliation those who blow the whistle only internally. Given that the Proposed Act’s text closely tracked Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, we observed that it had the same problem seen in Digital Realty. We urged a revision to close this gap, a change that would give internal securities whistleblowers at least a state retaliation right of action. Second, we urged that the whistleblower-award provision allow for attorney-mediated anonymous reporting. In late August 2020, NASAA released the final version of the act (the Final Act). The Final Act’s Section 10 resolved our Digital Realty concern by extending anti-retaliation protections to those who report only internally. The Final Act’s Section 4 addressed our concern that whistleblowers who submit anonymous reports pre-award should remain eligible for whistleblower awards. A copy of our comment letter follows this introductory note. The Proposed Act is attached as Exhibit A and the Final Act as Exhibit B.
2020年5月，北美证券管理员协会(NASAA)，一个代表加拿大、美国和墨西哥州和省级证券监管机构的组织，发布了一份示范举报人奖励和保护法草案(拟议法案)，征求公众意见。拟议中的法案借鉴了犹他州和印第安纳州的证券举报人法规，以及联邦的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》和《多德-弗兰克法案》。简而言之，拟议法案规定了州一级的证券举报人奖励计划和反报复的私人诉讼权利。nasa收到了七封评论信，其中一封来自证券学者。我们的证券学者的信强调了两个值得关注的领域。首先，我们注意到，在Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778(2018)中，最高法院认为，《多德-弗兰克法案》并未保护那些仅在内部举报的人免受雇主报复。鉴于拟议法案的文本与多德-弗兰克的反报复条款密切相关，我们观察到它存在与数字房地产相同的问题。我们敦促修订法案以缩小这一差距，这一变化将至少赋予证券内部举报人国家报复行动的权利。其次，我们敦促举报人奖励条款允许律师调解的匿名举报。2020年8月下旬，nasa发布了该法案的最终版本(最终法案)。《最终法案》第10条通过将反报复保护扩大到那些只在内部举报的人，解决了我们对数字房地产的担忧。《最终法案》第4条解决了我们的担忧，即在奖励前提交匿名报告的举报人仍有资格获得举报人奖励。我们的评论信的副本在这篇介绍性说明之后。拟议法案作为附件A，最终法案作为附件B。
{"title":"Securities Scholars’ Comment Letter on Draft Model Whistleblower Award and Protection Act","authors":"A. Baker, Benjamin Edwards, Andrew Jennings, Samantha J. Prince","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3735186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3735186","url":null,"abstract":"In May 2020, the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an organization representing state and provincial securities regulators in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, released a draft Model Whistleblower Award and Protection Act (the Proposed Act) for public comment. The Proposed Act drew from securities-whistleblower statutes in Utah and Indiana, as well as the federal Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts. In brief, the Proposed Act provided for a state-level securities whistleblower-award program and an anti-retaliation private right of action. \u0000 \u0000NASAA received seven comment letters, including one from securities scholars. Our securities scholars’ letter highlighted two areas of concern. First, we noted that in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the Dodd-Frank Act did not protect from employer retaliation those who blow the whistle only internally. Given that the Proposed Act’s text closely tracked Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, we observed that it had the same problem seen in Digital Realty. We urged a revision to close this gap, a change that would give internal securities whistleblowers at least a state retaliation right of action. Second, we urged that the whistleblower-award provision allow for attorney-mediated anonymous reporting. \u0000 \u0000In late August 2020, NASAA released the final version of the act (the Final Act). The Final Act’s Section 10 resolved our Digital Realty concern by extending anti-retaliation protections to those who report only internally. The Final Act’s Section 4 addressed our concern that whistleblowers who submit anonymous reports pre-award should remain eligible for whistleblower awards. A copy of our comment letter follows this introductory note. The Proposed Act is attached as Exhibit A and the Final Act as Exhibit B.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116124243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-16DOI: 10.1163/15718174-02802002
B. Custers, J. Oerlemans, Ronald Pool
Ransomware is malicious software (malware) that blocks access to someone’s computer system or files on the system and subsequently demands a ransom to be paid for unlocking the computer or files. Ransomware is considered one of the main threats in cybercrime today. Cryptoware is a specific type of ransomware, which encrypts files on computer systems. The ransom is often demanded in bitcoins. Based on desk research, a series of interviews, and the investigation of several police files, this paper investigates the modi operandi in which cybercriminals use ransomware and cryptoware to make profits and how they launder these profits. Two models, based on the payment of the ransom via vouchers and via bitcoins respectively, are identified and described. These methods allow criminals to launder profits in relative anonymity and prevent the seizure of the illegally obtained money.
{"title":"Laundering the Profits of Ransomware: Money Laundering Methods for Vouchers and Cryptocurrencies","authors":"B. Custers, J. Oerlemans, Ronald Pool","doi":"10.1163/15718174-02802002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718174-02802002","url":null,"abstract":"Ransomware is malicious software (malware) that blocks access to someone’s computer system or files on the system and subsequently demands a ransom to be paid for unlocking the computer or files. Ransomware is considered one of the main threats in cybercrime today. Cryptoware is a specific type of ransomware, which encrypts files on computer systems. The ransom is often demanded in bitcoins. Based on desk research, a series of interviews, and the investigation of several police files, this paper investigates the modi operandi in which cybercriminals use ransomware and cryptoware to make profits and how they launder these profits. Two models, based on the payment of the ransom via vouchers and via bitcoins respectively, are identified and described. These methods allow criminals to launder profits in relative anonymity and prevent the seizure of the illegally obtained money.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121792104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the article, the author examines a number of criminal procedural errors made by the preliminary investigation or operational-search authorities during the pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases of fraud, as a result of which the author draws the appropriate conclusions of a theoretical and practical nature.
{"title":"Pre-Trial Proceedings in Cases of Fraud in the Field of Entrepreneurial Activity: Criminal Procedural Violations","authors":"K. Klevtsov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3728679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728679","url":null,"abstract":"In the article, the author examines a number of criminal procedural errors made by the preliminary investigation or operational-search authorities during the pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases of fraud, as a result of which the author draws the appropriate conclusions of a theoretical and practical nature.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122688052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-28DOI: 10.1017/9781108759458.001
Benjamin van Rooij, D. Sokol
Compliance has become important in our contemporary markets, societies, and modes of governance across very different public and private domains, stimulating a rich body of empirical work and practical expertise. Yet, so far, we do not have a comprehensive understanding of what compliance is and what mechanisms and interventions play a role in shaping it nor how compliance shapes various fields. Thus far, the academic knowledge of compliance has remained siloed in different disciplinary domains, and along different regulatory and legal spheres and different mechanisms and interventions. This chapter, which is the introduction to the Cambridge Handbook of Compliance, offers a comprehensive view of what compliance is. It takes a broad approach in seeing compliance as the interaction between rules and behavior. It discusses what different mechanisms and interventions are at play in shaping such compliance. And it reflects on the the different methods to study compliance and their inherent limitations.
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The personal benefit element of the tipping violation established in Dirks v. SEC has been misunderstood. Courts, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and criminal prosecutors have broadly construed it to create liability for insiders who received remote, speculative, immaterial, or intangible returns after disclosing confidential company information. Several situations, such as an insider’s gift of confidential information to a relative or friend or an intention to benefit the recipient of the information, do not require the insider to receive anything at all. The drafting history of the majority opinion in Dirks in the papers of its author, Justice Lewis Powell, reveals that the current wide interpretations of personal benefit in tipping cases are not consistent with the test the Court intended. The principal test of personal benefit was to be the insider’s receipt of cash or something of value within a short time. The special fact situations mentioned in Dirks, including a disclosure as a gift or with an intention to benefit, were not independent and sufficient grounds for finding that an insider received a personal benefit. They were situations that often could create an inference of personal benefit. The drafting history and Powell’s previous opinions show that Powell carefully used the word “inference” in the final opinion. He wanted proof of a fact situation to allow but not require a fact finder to conclude a tipper received a personal benefit. He did not intend proof of a fact situation to create a presumption or ultimate liability. Lessons from the drafting history show that the Supreme Court misapplied the gift situation in Salman. They also show that the Second Circuit’s recent Martoma decision misinterpreted the intention-to-benefit language in the fact situations.
在德克斯诉美国证券交易委员会案中确立的小费违规的个人利益因素被误解了。法院、美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)和刑事检察官将其宽泛地解释为，在披露公司机密信息后获得远程、投机性、非物质或无形回报的内部人士应承担责任。在某些情况下，例如内部人员向亲戚或朋友赠送机密信息或意图使信息接受者受益，内部人员根本不需要接受任何东西。德克斯案多数派意见的起草历史，在其作者刘易斯·鲍威尔法官的论文中，揭示了目前对小费案件中个人利益的广泛解释与法院意图的检验是不一致的。个人利益的主要检验标准是内部人在短时间内收到现金或其他有价值的东西。德克斯提到的特殊事实情况，包括作为礼物或有意受益的披露，不是认定内幕人获得个人利益的独立和充分理由。这些情况通常会产生个人利益的推论。起草历史和鲍威尔之前的意见表明，鲍威尔在最终意见中谨慎地使用了“推论”一词。他想要一个事实情况的证据，允许但不要求事实发现者得出小费者获得个人利益的结论。他不打算证明事实情况以产生推定或最终责任。起草历史的教训表明，最高法院误用了萨勒曼的礼物情况。它们还表明，第二巡回上诉法院最近对马拓玛案的判决在事实情况下误解了意图利益的语言。
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Pub Date : 2020-03-17DOI: 10.1017/9781108759458.025
Miriam H. Baer
Corporate leniency programs promise putative offenders reduced punishment and fewer regulatory interventions in exchange for the corporation’s credible and authentic commitment to remedy wrongdoing and promptly self-report future violations of law to the requisite authorities. Because these programs have been devised with multiple goals in mind—i.e., deterring wrongdoing and punishing corporate executives, improving corporate cultural norms, and extending the government’s regulatory reach—it is all but impossible to gauge their “success” objectively. We know that corporations invest significant resources in compliance-related activity and that they do so in order to take advantage of the various benefits promised by leniency regimes. We cannot definitively say, however, how valuable this activity has been in reducing either the incidence or severity of harms associated with corporate misconduct. Notwithstanding these blind spots, recent developments in the Department of Justice’s stance towards corporate offenders provides valuable insight on the structural design of a leniency program. Message framing, precision of benefit, and the scope and centralization of the entity that administers a leniency program play important roles in how well the program is received by its intended targets and how long it survives. If the program’s popularity and longevity says something about its success, then these design factors merit closer attention. Using the Department of Justice’s Yates Memo and FCPA Pilot Program as demonstrative examples, this book chapter excavates the framing and design factors that influence a leniency program’s performance. Carrots seemingly work better than sticks; and centralization of authority appears to better facilitate relationships between government enforcers and corporate representatives. But that is not the end of the story. To the outside world, flexible leniency programs can appear clubby, weak and under-effective. The very design elements that generate trust between corporate targets and government enforcers may simultaneously sow credibility problems with the greater public. This conundrum will remain a core issue for policymakers as they continue to implement, shape and tinker with corporate leniency programs.
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