The Relation Between Ethics and Political Science

I T IS easier to state briefly in simple words the relation between ethics and political science than it is to make clear to one's self or others what is involved in the relation. The relation, in large outline, is not difficult to discover. Political science is the study of what ought to be. It is a normative science, if a linking of the terms "normative" and "science" is permissible. Whether or not it is a science, political theory is a study of norms, and it is also to a considerable extent an art of constructing and reconstructing norms. At this point we need not pause to consider whether political theory is a science or an art or a mixture of both. The important fact is that the material with which political theory deals is norms or oughts or ideals. Ethics, on the contrary, is a description of what is or what exists. It is, in other words, a descriptive science. It does not attempt, to be sure, to give a complete description of what exists, but aims rather at describing certain aspects of existence, or at describing existence from a certain point of view. What aspects of existence are described in ethics will be indicated presently. The immediate point to be noticed is that ethics as description of existence contrasts with political theory, which is a study of what ought to be rather than of what is. This much about ethics and political science lies on the surface for anyone to see; but when one attempts to see below the surface one encounters difficulties. "Norms" and "existence" are words, and one might even say that they are metaphysical abstractions. The plain man is exceedingly fond of metaphysical abstractions, and I am not unaware of their value. If we did not use them freely to simplify the complexities of the world,