{"title":"“民主和平”的政治激励解释:来自实验研究的证据","authors":"N. Geva, Karl Derouen, A. Mintz","doi":"10.1080/03050629308434805","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we summarize a series of experimental studies that show that democracies don't fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so. The use of force against other democracies is perceived by the public and by leaders of democratic states as a failure of foreign policy. The reliance of democratic leaders on public support decreases therefore the likelihood of the use of force against other democracies.","PeriodicalId":306154,"journal":{"name":"AARN: State & Non-State Political Organization (Sub-Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"46","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Political Incentive Explanation of ‘Democratic Peace’: Evidence From Experimental Research\",\"authors\":\"N. Geva, Karl Derouen, A. Mintz\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/03050629308434805\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we summarize a series of experimental studies that show that democracies don't fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so. The use of force against other democracies is perceived by the public and by leaders of democratic states as a failure of foreign policy. The reliance of democratic leaders on public support decreases therefore the likelihood of the use of force against other democracies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":306154,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AARN: State & Non-State Political Organization (Sub-Topic)\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1993-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"46\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AARN: State & Non-State Political Organization (Sub-Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629308434805\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AARN: State & Non-State Political Organization (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629308434805","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Political Incentive Explanation of ‘Democratic Peace’: Evidence From Experimental Research
In this paper, we summarize a series of experimental studies that show that democracies don't fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so. The use of force against other democracies is perceived by the public and by leaders of democratic states as a failure of foreign policy. The reliance of democratic leaders on public support decreases therefore the likelihood of the use of force against other democracies.