A Political Economy Perspective of The Egyptian Competition Authority

In 1990, Egypt started in collaboration with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural economic reforms aiming at following the track of a market-oriented economy rather than its four-decade state-directed one. As a result, there was a need to reconsider the role of government in such an economic system; many questions were raised on the scope of government intervention and the mechanisms of such interventions. One of the most vital questions was how the government would be able to develop a competitive market where government-business policies are fair and just, access by new market players is not risky, exit from the market is not a source of distortion, and consumers rights of wide-located and diversified-based market products are maintained.

It seems that the final outcome of such a debate was the adoption of the Law No. 3 of 2005 on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Antitrust Practices which first established The Competition Protection Authority known as The Egyptian Competition Authority “ECA” as an independent authority with financial autonomy.

Having said that, the political economy perspective of the competition law, governance, and policy is too extensive to be covered by one paper. Thus, this paper, after offering an overview of the Political Economy Constitutional Preferences and the Constitutional Framework of the Regulatory Agencies in Egypt, is mainly focusing on answering the following two questions:

1- What are the political economy circumstances in which the ECA evolved?

2- Where does the ECA stand from the financial autonomy?