维斯塔格委员对标准必要专利的错误看法如何说明为什么特朗普总统需要一个统一的反垄断和创新政策

J. Sidak
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Antitrust lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic should not be surprised if President Trump rejects Commissioner Vestager’s vision of competition and innovation and consequently repudiates much of what has been the Obama administration’s vision as well. The Trump administration will surely be more concerned than the Obama administration was about the harm to dynamic efficiency from using antitrust policy to suppress royalties for SEPs. Steven Salop and Carl Shapiro have speculated about two potential approaches that President Trump might take with respect to antitrust enforcement. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

在唐纳德·特朗普当选美国第45任总统13天后,欧盟竞争专员玛格丽特·维斯塔格(Margrethe Vestager)就反垄断在监管主导企业“过高价格”方面的作用发表了讲话,这在美国当然不构成反垄断罪。她的言论暴露了她对标准必要专利(sep)观点的错误事实前提。维斯塔格轻信地重复了一个未经证实的猜测,即智能手机中使用的sep的累计版税为120美元,这至少是可靠的实证分析所发现的数字的六倍。她认为,欧盟的竞争政策是如此具有可塑性,以至于即使没有可靠的实证数据,也允许干预,她愿意公开指出这些数据来支持这一猜测。如果特朗普总统拒绝维斯特格委员的竞争和创新愿景,从而也否定了奥巴马政府的大部分愿景,大西洋两岸的反垄断律师不应该感到惊讶。特朗普政府肯定会比奥巴马政府更担心利用反垄断政策压制专利专利使用费对动态效率的损害。史蒂文·萨洛普和卡尔·夏皮罗推测了特朗普总统在反垄断执法方面可能采取的两种潜在方法。第一种是干预主义,其“首要目标是减少大公司在美国经济中的权力”。第二种是“高度宽松的、极简主义的反垄断方式(不包括价格垄断执法),就像罗伯特·博克和前最高法院大法官安东宁·斯卡利亚那样。”萨洛普和夏皮罗无法想象一个特朗普政府能够比这两种方法更细微的差别,这让人怀疑他们是否认识任何认识投票给特朗普的人的人。同样说明问题的是,他们对特朗普政府反垄断的高层预测,在所有话题中,迅速深入到标准普尔身上。他们声称,对标准专利使用费采取“自由放任”的做法将导致“潜在的巨额资金……来自购买智能手机的普通消费者……对少数实体来说……持有与智能手机相关的标普指数。”萨洛普和夏皮罗显然站在维斯塔格专员一边。我怀疑特朗普总统会这么做。联邦政府在促进创新和竞争以及减轻经济监管负担方面缺乏统一的战略。特朗普总统可能会考虑任命一个人来监督这一统一战略的制定和实施。反垄断部门和联邦贸易委员会最有能力专注于成熟的产品市场。可以理解的是,这些机构试图在经历技术颠覆的市场中卷入竞争纠纷。但这种干预的效果值得商榷。此外,公共选择方面的考虑应该提醒我们注意这样一种可能性,即执法机构被技术部门吸引,正是因为这是经济创造最多财富的领域。监管机构干预的危险之处在于,它将阻碍或消散动态竞争带来的巨大好处——尤其是如果这种干预像维斯塔格委员对标准普尔的看法那样被严重误导的话。
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How Commissioner Vestager's Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation
Thirteen days after America elected Donald Trump its 45th president, Margrethe Vestager, the European Commissioner for Competition, spoke on antitrust’s role in policing a dominant firm’s “excessively high prices,” which of course do not constitute an antitrust offense in the United States. Her remarks revealed the erroneous factual premise of her views on standard-essential patents (SEPs). Commissioner Vestager credulously repeats an unidentified conjecture that the cumulative royalty for SEPs used in smartphones is $120, which is at least six times greater than what reliable empirical analysis finds the amount to be. She suggests that EU competition policy is so malleable as to permit intervention even when there are no reliable empirical data that she is willing to identify publicly in support of that conjecture. Antitrust lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic should not be surprised if President Trump rejects Commissioner Vestager’s vision of competition and innovation and consequently repudiates much of what has been the Obama administration’s vision as well. The Trump administration will surely be more concerned than the Obama administration was about the harm to dynamic efficiency from using antitrust policy to suppress royalties for SEPs. Steven Salop and Carl Shapiro have speculated about two potential approaches that President Trump might take with respect to antitrust enforcement. The first would be interventionist and have “the overarching goal of reducing the power of large corporations in the American economy.” The second would be “a highly permissive, minimalist approach to antitrust (outside of price fixing enforcement) of the type associated with Robert Bork and former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.” That Salop and Shapiro cannot envision a Trump administration capable of any greater nuance than these two approaches make one wonder whether they know anybody who knows anybody who voted for Trump. It is also telling that their high-level predictions about antitrust in the Trump administration promptly drill down specifically on, of all topics, SEPs. They claim that a “laissez-faire” approach to royalties for SEPs would lead to “potentially huge amounts of money... flow[ing] from ordinary consumers purchasing smartphones... to a small number of entities... that hold SEPs relating to smartphones.” Salop and Shapiro evidently stand with Commissioner Vestager. I doubt that President Trump will. The federal government lacks a unified strategy for promoting innovation and competition and for reducing the burden of economic regulation. President Trump might consider appointing one person to oversee the formulation and implementation of that unified strategy. The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission are best equipped to focus on established product markets. The agencies understandably try to insinuate themselves in competitive disputes in markets experiencing technological disruption. But the efficacy of such intervention is debatable. Moreover, public choice considerations should alert us to the possibility that the enforcement agencies are attracted to the technology sector precisely because that is where the economy is creating the largest amount of wealth. The danger of the agencies’ intervention — particularly if that intervention is so misinformed as Commissioner Vestager views on SEPs are — is that it will retard or dissipate the huge benefits of dynamic competition.
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