The times when competition policy was perceived as an axiomatic, mathematised, highly technical and pretty much non-controversial area of Law & Economics have gone. Over the last decade, competition has become a great theme again. Full of ideological appeals and statements, mindful of their political pedigree, competition law, economics and policy are transitioning from the mechanistic field of microeconomic modelling to the real world of geopolitical chessboards. The new book by two prominent competition law thinkers Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi ‘Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us from Citizen Kings to Market Servants’ (Harper Business, USA, 2020, pp. 402) has triggered a vivid discussion over the ever-fading question on the goals of competition law, economics and policy and – more broadly – on the very nature of the multifaceted phenomenon of competition. The book provokes not only thoughts. From its very title, subtitle, name of chapters, normative position, methodological argumentation and the choice of preprint reviewers, across the selection of case studies and to its very writing style, the book is designed to generate discussion. And for the right reasons. The authors aim to raise (or perhaps to refine) the ethical dimension in the otherwise morally neutral phenomenon of economic competition and its regulation. In what follows I articulate ten points for discussion, written as a reflection on the book. The main focus is on analysing the phenomenon of economic competition, and on the ways how this phenomenon should (and should never) be regulated.
竞争政策被视为一个公理化的、数学化的、高度技术性的、几乎没有争议的法律经济学领域的时代已经一去不复返了。在过去的十年里，竞争再次成为一个伟大的主题。竞争法、经济学和政策充满了意识形态的呼吁和声明，注意到它们的政治血统，它们正在从微观经济模型的机械领域过渡到地缘政治棋盘的现实世界。两位著名的竞争法思想家Maurice E. Stucke和Ariel Ezrachi的新书《过度竞争:自由市场神话如何将我们从公民国王转变为市场仆人》(Harper Business, USA, 2020，第402页)引发了一场关于竞争法、经济学和政策目标的日益消失的问题的生动讨论，更广泛地说，是关于竞争的多面现象的本质。这本书不仅发人深省。从它的标题、副标题、章节名称、规范立场、方法论论证和预印本审稿人的选择，到案例研究的选择和它的写作风格，这本书的目的是引起讨论。而且是出于正确的原因。作者的目的是在经济竞争及其监管这一原本道德中立的现象中提出(或者可能是提炼)伦理维度。在接下来的文章中，我将阐述10点讨论，作为对这本书的反思。主要的焦点是分析经济竞争的现象，以及这种现象应该(也不应该)被监管的方式。
{"title":"'Competition Overdose': Curing Markets from Themselves? Ten Points for Discussion","authors":"Oles Andriychuk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3918775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918775","url":null,"abstract":"The times when competition policy was perceived as an axiomatic, mathematised, highly technical and pretty much non-controversial area of Law & Economics have gone. Over the last decade, competition has become a great theme again. Full of ideological appeals and statements, mindful of their political pedigree, competition law, economics and policy are transitioning from the mechanistic field of microeconomic modelling to the real world of geopolitical chessboards. The new book by two prominent competition law thinkers Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi ‘Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us from Citizen Kings to Market Servants’ (Harper Business, USA, 2020, pp. 402) has triggered a vivid discussion over the ever-fading question on the goals of competition law, economics and policy and – more broadly – on the very nature of the multifaceted phenomenon of competition. The book provokes not only thoughts. From its very title, subtitle, name of chapters, normative position, methodological argumentation and the choice of preprint reviewers, across the selection of case studies and to its very writing style, the book is designed to generate discussion. And for the right reasons. The authors aim to raise (or perhaps to refine) the ethical dimension in the otherwise morally neutral phenomenon of economic competition and its regulation. In what follows I articulate ten points for discussion, written as a reflection on the book. The main focus is on analysing the phenomenon of economic competition, and on the ways how this phenomenon should (and should never) be regulated.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132272254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The chapter discusses the ‘revival’ of exploitative abuses in Europe. In particular, the chapter analyses the legal test and recent enforcement trends concerning excessive and discriminatory pricing, as well as unfair trading conditions under Art. 102 TFEU. The chapter concludes that the revival of exploitative abuses is taking place in specific industries (i.e. energy, pharmaceutical, and digital markets) and only in relation to excessive prices and unfair trading conditions. By contrast, cases sanctioning discriminatory pricing remain extremely rare. In digital markets, the revival of exploitative abuses has mostly concerned unfair trading conditions. The peculiarities of digital markets (i.e. close to zero marginal costs, winner takes all dynamics, and zero-price markets) make it hard for a competition agency to assess an excessive pricing case under the United Brands test and the benchmarking approach. Finally, sector regulation may solve the market failures causing exploitative abuses, but thus making competition law enforcement ‘redundant’.
{"title":"Exploitative Abuses: Recent Trends and Comparative Perspectives","authors":"M. Botta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3909894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3909894","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter discusses the ‘revival’ of exploitative abuses in Europe. In particular, the chapter analyses the legal test and recent enforcement trends concerning excessive and discriminatory pricing, as well as unfair trading conditions under Art. 102 TFEU. The chapter concludes that the revival of exploitative abuses is taking place in specific industries (i.e. energy, pharmaceutical, and digital markets) and only in relation to excessive prices and unfair trading conditions. By contrast, cases sanctioning discriminatory pricing remain extremely rare. In digital markets, the revival of exploitative abuses has mostly concerned unfair trading conditions. The peculiarities of digital markets (i.e. close to zero marginal costs, winner takes all dynamics, and zero-price markets) make it hard for a competition agency to assess an excessive pricing case under the United Brands test and the benchmarking approach. Finally, sector regulation may solve the market failures causing exploitative abuses, but thus making competition law enforcement ‘redundant’.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117259177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Part I of this Note describes the NCAA’s formation and its contemporary model. It also discusses the antitrust and labor law challenges the NCAA has faced inlitigation over its existing approach. Part II explores the twin challenges posed by the Fair Pay to Play Act, which cannot be sufficiently addressed through a unilateral NCAA response. The first challenge is the inconsistency in state laws, which undermines any NCAA response that seeks to impose a uniform set of rules across the country. The second is that the Fair Pay to Play Act fails to address existing legal challenges to the NCAA’s amateur model. Therefore, even if the NCAA accepts a change in the status quo, it misses an opportunity to address the increasingly uncertain broader legal status of its restrictions on college athlete compensation. In response to these challenges, Part III contends that the NCAA should more urgently pursue a comprehensive federal legislative compromise that sacrificesrestrictions on NIL compensation in return for statutory protections from further labor and antitrust litigation. This type of federal legislation would have theadditional benefit of preempting state laws on the subject, thus maintaining a uniform system of rules. By losing the battle to win the war, the NCAA will be well positioned for continued viability in the coming decades
{"title":"Setting the Edge: How the NCAA Can Defend Amateurism by Allowing Third Party Compensation","authors":"B. Feiner","doi":"10.52214/JLA.V44I1.7312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/JLA.V44I1.7312","url":null,"abstract":"Part I of this Note describes the NCAA’s formation and its contemporary model. It also discusses the antitrust and labor law challenges the NCAA has faced inlitigation over its existing approach. Part II explores the twin challenges posed by the Fair Pay to Play Act, which cannot be sufficiently addressed through a unilateral NCAA response. The first challenge is the inconsistency in state laws, which undermines any NCAA response that seeks to impose a uniform set of rules across the country. The second is that the Fair Pay to Play Act fails to address existing legal challenges to the NCAA’s amateur model. Therefore, even if the NCAA accepts a change in the status quo, it misses an opportunity to address the increasingly uncertain broader legal status of its restrictions on college athlete compensation. \u0000In response to these challenges, Part III contends that the NCAA should more urgently pursue a comprehensive federal legislative compromise that sacrificesrestrictions on NIL compensation in return for statutory protections from further labor and antitrust litigation. This type of federal legislation would have theadditional benefit of preempting state laws on the subject, thus maintaining a uniform system of rules. By losing the battle to win the war, the NCAA will be well positioned for continued viability in the coming decades","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127963470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital markets are at the forefront of competition policy. Over the past five years, antitrust regulators around the world have opened many investigations on digital platforms and issued and/or commissioned dozens of studies or expert reports that are focused on understanding the general competitive dynamics of markets such as online search, social media, e-commerce/marketplaces, and mobile operating systems. These studies and reports represent the forefront of our current understanding of how to adapt antitrust policy to the digital era. However, much of their wealth of knowledge is lost because these documents, which add up to thousands of pages of text, figures and tables, have been scattered around the websites of different competition agencies. This literature review consolidates the knowledge of twenty-two reports and studies on topics related to competition in digital markets issued by eighteen different authorities and expert panels around the world over the past five years. It addresses how these reports portray the general competitive dynamics of digital markets, the benefits generated by digitalization, the potential competitive shortcomings of digital markets in general and of well-defined relevant markets in particular, and the solutions that have been proposed to increase competition in the digital world. It also indicates areas where further academic research is needed. In doing so, it should serve as a guide to antitrust scholars, regulators, and practitioners, helping them understand the frontier of knowledge on the competitive dynamics of digital markets and the range of materials that are available for those who want to explore a certain topic more in-depth.
{"title":"Competition in Digital Markets: A Review of Expert Reports","authors":"F. Lancieri, Patricia A. M. Sakowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3681322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3681322","url":null,"abstract":"Digital markets are at the forefront of competition policy. Over the past five years, antitrust regulators around the world have opened many investigations on digital platforms and issued and/or commissioned dozens of studies or expert reports that are focused on understanding the general competitive dynamics of markets such as online search, social media, e-commerce/marketplaces, and mobile operating systems. These studies and reports represent the forefront of our current understanding of how to adapt antitrust policy to the digital era. However, much of their wealth of knowledge is lost because these documents, which add up to thousands of pages of text, figures and tables, have been scattered around the websites of different competition agencies. \u0000 \u0000This literature review consolidates the knowledge of twenty-two reports and studies on topics related to competition in digital markets issued by eighteen different authorities and expert panels around the world over the past five years. It addresses how these reports portray the general competitive dynamics of digital markets, the benefits generated by digitalization, the potential competitive shortcomings of digital markets in general and of well-defined relevant markets in particular, and the solutions that have been proposed to increase competition in the digital world. It also indicates areas where further academic research is needed. \u0000 \u0000In doing so, it should serve as a guide to antitrust scholars, regulators, and practitioners, helping them understand the frontier of knowledge on the competitive dynamics of digital markets and the range of materials that are available for those who want to explore a certain topic more in-depth.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114812021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 31 July 2013 the Knesset adopted a statute on national book price maintenance, entitled the Protection of Literature and Writers in Israel (Provisional Order), 5773-2013. Formerly, there were neither mandatory rules nor consensual agreements concerning book price maintenance. The Statute entered into force on 6 February 2014 for a period of three years, during which its effects and impact on the book market were to be evaluated.
This paper analyzes the background and reasons for adopting the Statute (part II); its object and purpose (part III); its main provisions (part IV); the consequences of its adoption (part V); subsequent developments (part VI); a critical evaluation (part VII); and final conclusions (part VIII).
{"title":"The Israeli Statute on National Book Price Maintenance - A Critical Evaluation","authors":"Talia Einhorn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3772316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3772316","url":null,"abstract":"On 31 July 2013 the Knesset adopted a statute on national book price maintenance, entitled the Protection of Literature and Writers in Israel (Provisional Order), 5773-2013. Formerly, there were neither mandatory rules nor consensual agreements concerning book price maintenance. The Statute entered into force on 6 February 2014 for a period of three years, during which its effects and impact on the book market were to be evaluated. <br><br>This paper analyzes the background and reasons for adopting the Statute (part II); its object and purpose (part III); its main provisions (part IV); the consequences of its adoption (part V); subsequent developments (part VI); a critical evaluation (part VII); and final conclusions (part VIII).","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115605502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Platform-based businesses (“platforms”) have sought to design websites, apps, and interfaces to addict and manipulate users. They intentionally stimulate the release of dopamine in users’ brains, which creates addiction akin to gambling. As examples, reports indicate that Instagram withholds notifying users of “likes” until later so as to increase their dopamine intake—known as a “variable reward schedule.” Or Twitter’s app which opens with a blue screen and pulsating bird: the interface, while intended to appear like its loading, builds a positive feedback loop based on anticipation. Perhaps the most addictive design is Snapchat’s “streak” which has increased attention spent on the platform by 40%. In capturing and maintaining attention, companies increase the amount of time spent and data created (the chief commodity of the digital economy) on their platforms. Once attention is gained, platforms can then exploit their users’ cognitive vulnerabilities in the form of “dark patterns,” which are described as subtle design choices meant to guide users towards adopting behaviors sought by the platform, and other forms of online manipulation. The brilliance of online manipulation is that it makes interactions on the platform—as well as the sharing of one’s photos, messages, geolocation, and contacts—appear like exercises of free will. This threatens an aspect of privacy called “decisional privacy,” referring one’s ability to make choices free of coercion. This Article argues that consumer welfare diminishes when technology is designed to extract wealth from consumers in a manner eroding decisional privacy. Given the lack of regulations on this point, we show that market power and exclusionary strategies enable platforms to adopt dark patterns and other manipulative techniques. The problem is that antitrust has typically viewed efforts to coax consumers as a form of competition or even procompetitive behavior. To us, online manipulation erodes the ability of consumers to act rationally, which empowers platforms to extract wealth and build market power without doing so on the merits. If digital markets were more competitive, market forces would create competition over privacy lines as well as disseminate information about dark patterns, enhancing consumer welfare. We thus insist that courts must not only settle the debate about whether privacy accords with antitrust’s framework—it does—but also recognize the importance of decisional privacy.
{"title":"Are Dark Patterns Anticompetitive?","authors":"G. Day, A. Stemler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3468321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468321","url":null,"abstract":"Platform-based businesses (“platforms”) have sought to design websites, apps, and interfaces to addict and manipulate users. They intentionally stimulate the release of dopamine in users’ brains, which creates addiction akin to gambling. As examples, reports indicate that Instagram withholds notifying users of “likes” until later so as to increase their dopamine intake—known as a “variable reward schedule.” Or Twitter’s app which opens with a blue screen and pulsating bird: the interface, while intended to appear like its loading, builds a positive feedback loop based on anticipation. Perhaps the most addictive design is Snapchat’s “streak” which has increased attention spent on the platform by 40%. In capturing and maintaining attention, companies increase the amount of time spent and data created (the chief commodity of the digital economy) on their platforms. \u0000 \u0000Once attention is gained, platforms can then exploit their users’ cognitive vulnerabilities in the form of “dark patterns,” which are described as subtle design choices meant to guide users towards adopting behaviors sought by the platform, and other forms of online manipulation. The brilliance of online manipulation is that it makes interactions on the platform—as well as the sharing of one’s photos, messages, geolocation, and contacts—appear like exercises of free will. This threatens an aspect of privacy called “decisional privacy,” referring one’s ability to make choices free of coercion. \u0000 \u0000This Article argues that consumer welfare diminishes when technology is designed to extract wealth from consumers in a manner eroding decisional privacy. Given the lack of regulations on this point, we show that market power and exclusionary strategies enable platforms to adopt dark patterns and other manipulative techniques. The problem is that antitrust has typically viewed efforts to coax consumers as a form of competition or even procompetitive behavior. To us, online manipulation erodes the ability of consumers to act rationally, which empowers platforms to extract wealth and build market power without doing so on the merits. If digital markets were more competitive, market forces would create competition over privacy lines as well as disseminate information about dark patterns, enhancing consumer welfare. We thus insist that courts must not only settle the debate about whether privacy accords with antitrust’s framework—it does—but also recognize the importance of decisional privacy.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115480156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In academic and public debate about the increasing imbalance of power between employers and workers, the role of antitrust policy and enforcement has heretofore gotten little attention. This paper shows that where there was once a sharp border — the border of the firm — where labor law ended and antitrust began, there is now a considerable legal gray area. Business models that rely on the control and exploitation of workers, independent contractors, and small businesses are increasingly immune from antitrust liability, without the associated responsibilities on the part of employers traditionally due to workers under labor law. At the same time, antitrust has been increasingly active preventing those workers, independent contractors, and small businesses from coordinating with one another against the interests of powerful corporations. Antitrust’s treatment of gig economy firms like Uber exemplifies its tendency to widen the options available to employers and “lead firms” and constrict them for workers. This paper concludes with a discussion of antitrust policy alternatives to rectify the perversion of antitrust’s original aim: to de-concentrate private power.
{"title":"Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power","authors":"Marshall I. Steinbaum","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3347949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3347949","url":null,"abstract":"In academic and public debate about the increasing imbalance of power between employers and workers, the role of antitrust policy and enforcement has heretofore gotten little attention. This paper shows that where there was once a sharp border — the border of the firm — where labor law ended and antitrust began, there is now a considerable legal gray area. Business models that rely on the control and exploitation of workers, independent contractors, and small businesses are increasingly immune from antitrust liability, without the associated responsibilities on the part of employers traditionally due to workers under labor law. At the same time, antitrust has been increasingly active preventing those workers, independent contractors, and small businesses from coordinating with one another against the interests of powerful corporations. Antitrust’s treatment of gig economy firms like Uber exemplifies its tendency to widen the options available to employers and “lead firms” and constrict them for workers. This paper concludes with a discussion of antitrust policy alternatives to rectify the perversion of antitrust’s original aim: to de-concentrate private power.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123473065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun
This Comment is submitted in relation to the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century. We submit this Comment based upon our extensive experience and expertise in antitrust law and economics. As an organization committed to promoting sound economic analysis as the foundation of antitrust enforcement and competition policy, the Global Antitrust Institute commends the FTC for holding these hearings and for inviting discussion concerning a range of important topics. In this Comment, we will discuss contemporary issues involving innovation, Standard Essential Patents (“SEPs”), and Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”) pricing commitments. As we move forward in an era marked by constant innovation revolving around Intellectual Property (“IP”) rights, it is imperative that the FTC recognize that these IP rights should be treated under the same analytical framework as other property rights and upheld regardless whether the setting is private licensing or FRAND commitments. Our modern law and jurisprudence are well-developed in the area of IP rights, and the reliance on IP rights in the standard-development process should not be accompanied by a move away from this well-developed body of law. In writing this Comment, we want to emphasize the importance of strong IP rights, the lack of evidence supporting the concern over holdup issues, and the need for the FTC to recalibrate priorities in the relationship between IP and antitrust.
{"title":"The Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Innovation and Intellectual Property Policy, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University","authors":"Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3272402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3272402","url":null,"abstract":"This Comment is submitted in relation to the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century. We submit this Comment based upon our extensive experience and expertise in antitrust law and economics. As an organization committed to promoting sound economic analysis as the foundation of antitrust enforcement and competition policy, the Global Antitrust Institute commends the FTC for holding these hearings and for inviting discussion concerning a range of important topics. \u0000In this Comment, we will discuss contemporary issues involving innovation, Standard Essential Patents (“SEPs”), and Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”) pricing commitments. As we move forward in an era marked by constant innovation revolving around Intellectual Property (“IP”) rights, it is imperative that the FTC recognize that these IP rights should be treated under the same analytical framework as other property rights and upheld regardless whether the setting is private licensing or FRAND commitments. Our modern law and jurisprudence are well-developed in the area of IP rights, and the reliance on IP rights in the standard-development process should not be accompanied by a move away from this well-developed body of law. In writing this Comment, we want to emphasize the importance of strong IP rights, the lack of evidence supporting the concern over holdup issues, and the need for the FTC to recalibrate priorities in the relationship between IP and antitrust.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115475512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Worldwide licenses linked to the standard setting process are being challenged on antitrust and jurisdictional grounds. While, so far, most courts have batted away these challenges, some courts have not recognized their validity. If worldwide licenses were to not be enforce globally, then the patent exhaustion doctrine could further eat into the patent holders’ returns. Raising cost of enforcement linked to local licenses and lower returns linked to patent exhaustion would disincentivize standard setting participants. These worldwide licenses are essential to the standard system and must be protected as such: the standard setting organizations, Antitrust authorities, and courts have part to play to ensure the standards survive these attacks.
{"title":"Worldwide FRAND Licensing Standard","authors":"Garry A. Gabison","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3279549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3279549","url":null,"abstract":"Worldwide licenses linked to the standard setting process are being challenged on antitrust and jurisdictional grounds. While, so far, most courts have batted away these challenges, some courts have not recognized their validity. If worldwide licenses were to not be enforce globally, then the patent exhaustion doctrine could further eat into the patent holders’ returns. Raising cost of enforcement linked to local licenses and lower returns linked to patent exhaustion would disincentivize standard setting participants. These worldwide licenses are essential to the standard system and must be protected as such: the standard setting organizations, Antitrust authorities, and courts have part to play to ensure the standards survive these attacks.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122915850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article investigates the roles of the three competition authorities in the Kenyan market. It argues that the underlying laws and regulations as currently designed confers overlapping jurisdiction on the three competition authorities. The article argues that the prevailing position is not efficient and calls for the reconciliation and harmonisation of the roles of the authorities through proper legislation.
{"title":"Concurrent Jurisdictions Debate: What Roles Do the Three Competition Authorities Play in the Kenyan Market?","authors":"Jasper Lubeto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3265632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265632","url":null,"abstract":"The article investigates the roles of the three competition authorities in the Kenyan market. It argues that the underlying laws and regulations as currently designed confers overlapping jurisdiction on the three competition authorities. The article argues that the prevailing position is not efficient and calls for the reconciliation and harmonisation of the roles of the authorities through proper legislation.","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127324933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：