太老而不能失败:风险感知和市场纪律

Shinichi Kamiya, Martin Grace, George Zanjani
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摘要

本文研究了1985-2010年期间出借人对公司风险和公共破产担保变化的敏感性对寿险市场纪律的影响。我们发现年轻的保险公司有很强的市场纪律,而年长的保险公司没有,这支持了风险不敏感的贷款人的强大影响力,因为他们信任个别保险公司。此外,通过利用16个州在样本期间担保基金创建的变化,我们发现强有力的证据表明,年轻保险公司的市场纪律已经被担保基金所抑制,而在老保险公司中没有观察到这种道德风险。我们还发现一些证据表明,公司风险随着贷款人信任的增加而增加,但几乎没有证据表明担保基金覆盖率对美国寿险行业风险承担的影响。
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Too Old to Fail: Risk Perception and Market Discipline
This paper studies the impact of lenders’ sensitivity to a change in company risk and public insolvency guarantees, on market discipline in life insurance during the 1985-2010 period. We find strong market discipline for young insurers but not for older insurer, supporting the strong influence of risk insensitive lenders due their trust attached to individual insurers. Furthermore, by exploiting the variation in the creation of guaranty funds by 16 states during the sample period, we find robust evidence that the market discipline in young insurers has been dampened by guaranty funds, while such moral hazard is not observed in old insurers. We also find some evidence to suggest that company risk increases with lender trust but little evidence of the influence of guaranty fund coverage on risk-taking in the US life insurance industry.
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