Falko Fecht, J. Peydró, Gunseli Tumer-Alkan, Yuejuan Yu
We analyze how banks’ equity stakes in firms influence their credit supply in crisis times. For identification, we exploit the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and merge unique supervisory data from the German credit register on individual bank-firm credit exposures with the security register data that include banks’ equity holdings. We find that a large and ex-ante persistent equity position held by a bank in a firm is associated with a larger credit provision from the respective bank to that firm. In crisis times, however, equity stakes only foster credit supply to ex-ante riskier firms especially from relatively weak banks. This ex-ante risk-taking may be due to better (insider) information by the bank, including a traditional lending relationship over the crisis. However, this ex-ante riskier lending translates also into higher ex-post loan defaults, worse firm-level stock market returns and even more firm bankruptcy or restructuring cases. Our results therefore suggest that banks’ equity stakes in their borrowers do not mitigate debt overhang problems of distressed firms in crisis times, but rather foster evergreening of banks’ outstanding credit to those (zombie) firms.
{"title":"Banks’ Equity Stakes in Firms: A Blessing or Curse in Credit Markets?","authors":"Falko Fecht, J. Peydró, Gunseli Tumer-Alkan, Yuejuan Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3932233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3932233","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how banks’ equity stakes in firms influence their credit supply in crisis times. For identification, we exploit the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and merge unique supervisory data from the German credit register on individual bank-firm credit exposures with the security register data that include banks’ equity holdings. We find that a large and ex-ante persistent equity position held by a bank in a firm is associated with a larger credit provision from the respective bank to that firm. In crisis times, however, equity stakes only foster credit supply to ex-ante riskier firms especially from relatively weak banks. This ex-ante risk-taking may be due to better (insider) information by the bank, including a traditional lending relationship over the crisis. However, this ex-ante riskier lending translates also into higher ex-post loan defaults, worse firm-level stock market returns and even more firm bankruptcy or restructuring cases. Our results therefore suggest that banks’ equity stakes in their borrowers do not mitigate debt overhang problems of distressed firms in crisis times, but rather foster evergreening of banks’ outstanding credit to those (zombie) firms.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123031703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
COVID-19 evolved to become the first major global crisis since the sub-prime and the euro sovereign debt crisis. Banks' funding planning was exposed to constraints and risks, especially in their major foreign currencies. Using two-way quotes for foreign exchange swaps, we find that when the crisis evolves, banks actively increase swap maturities while being confronted with increased swap spreads. Not surprisingly, this development reflects increasing uncertainty in the market. Contrary to common intuition, however, we find that after the coordinated central bank intervention in March 2020 banks only marginally reduce swap durations, while spreads continue to climb further. Our results suggest that the interventions did not yield the desired effect and uncertainty in the market remained.
{"title":"Interbank Markets and Central Bank Intervention during the COVID-19 Crisis","authors":"Janika Bockmeyer, Arne Reichel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3929369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3929369","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 evolved to become the first major global crisis since the sub-prime and the euro sovereign debt crisis. Banks' funding planning was exposed to constraints and risks, especially in their major foreign currencies. Using two-way quotes for foreign exchange swaps, we find that when the crisis evolves, banks actively increase swap maturities while being confronted with increased swap spreads. Not surprisingly, this development reflects increasing uncertainty in the market. Contrary to common intuition, however, we find that after the coordinated central bank intervention in March 2020 banks only marginally reduce swap durations, while spreads continue to climb further. Our results suggest that the interventions did not yield the desired effect and uncertainty in the market remained.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"57 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131399609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the impact of lenders’ sensitivity to a change in company risk and public insolvency guarantees, on market discipline in life insurance during the 1985-2010 period. We find strong market discipline for young insurers but not for older insurer, supporting the strong influence of risk insensitive lenders due their trust attached to individual insurers. Furthermore, by exploiting the variation in the creation of guaranty funds by 16 states during the sample period, we find robust evidence that the market discipline in young insurers has been dampened by guaranty funds, while such moral hazard is not observed in old insurers. We also find some evidence to suggest that company risk increases with lender trust but little evidence of the influence of guaranty fund coverage on risk-taking in the US life insurance industry.
{"title":"Too Old to Fail: Risk Perception and Market Discipline","authors":"Shinichi Kamiya, Martin Grace, George Zanjani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3918081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918081","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of lenders’ sensitivity to a change in company risk and public insolvency guarantees, on market discipline in life insurance during the 1985-2010 period. We find strong market discipline for young insurers but not for older insurer, supporting the strong influence of risk insensitive lenders due their trust attached to individual insurers. Furthermore, by exploiting the variation in the creation of guaranty funds by 16 states during the sample period, we find robust evidence that the market discipline in young insurers has been dampened by guaranty funds, while such moral hazard is not observed in old insurers. We also find some evidence to suggest that company risk increases with lender trust but little evidence of the influence of guaranty fund coverage on risk-taking in the US life insurance industry.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132488420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Crises are difficult to predict with the most recent and notable examples being the failure of the profession to see the 2007-2008 Credit Crunch. The failure of quantitative approaches to crises is due to the relative non-comparability of crises when using large-N methods that leave out context – social, political, and institutional. This led to a search for an alternative approach. The theory development research strategies of abduction/retroduction were used to develop a process-oriented theory of financial crises. The process of how a crisis unfolds happens through a 4-step macro-level process: Social, Trigger, Disruption and Psychological. Embedded within the Socio-Political Theory of Crises (SPTC) are three mechanisms: macro-level, disruption, and micro-level. This theory, which now has at its core the social, political, and institutional context, can be used to understand and to explain a variety of financial crises and to compare crises based on the process of how they unfold.
{"title":"The Socio-Political Theory of Crises (SPTC)","authors":"John Diamondopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3902103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902103","url":null,"abstract":"Crises are difficult to predict with the most recent and notable examples being the failure of the profession to see the 2007-2008 Credit Crunch. The failure of quantitative approaches to crises is due to the relative non-comparability of crises when using large-N methods that leave out context – social, political, and institutional. This led to a search for an alternative approach. The theory development research strategies of abduction/retroduction were used to develop a process-oriented theory of financial crises. The process of how a crisis unfolds happens through a 4-step macro-level process: Social, Trigger, Disruption and Psychological. Embedded within the Socio-Political Theory of Crises (SPTC) are three mechanisms: macro-level, disruption, and micro-level. This theory, which now has at its core the social, political, and institutional context, can be used to understand and to explain a variety of financial crises and to compare crises based on the process of how they unfold.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117263410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the financial markets, contradictory opinions generate a set of constraints which mediate information through a system of expected target prices. As a result, prices are a measure of value as much as they are an indication of how these expectations concerning value remain valid. Thus, path dependent negative and positive feedback loops modify price action, driving it away from random behavior. This study shows that complexity at work tends to be structured by Fibonacci numbers and ratios thus creating conditions for the emergence of constrained patterns which can lead to a renewed approach of forecasting and risk monitoring.
{"title":"Opinions, Prices and Fibonacci Structures","authors":"Nicolas Maloumian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3899879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899879","url":null,"abstract":"In the financial markets, contradictory opinions generate a set of constraints which mediate information through a system of expected target prices. As a result, prices are a measure of value as much as they are an indication of how these expectations concerning value remain valid. Thus, path dependent negative and positive feedback loops modify price action, driving it away from random behavior. This study shows that complexity at work tends to be structured by Fibonacci numbers and ratios thus creating conditions for the emergence of constrained patterns which can lead to a renewed approach of forecasting and risk monitoring.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114449254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper establishes empirical evidence that network among mutual funds that share a similar benchmark plays an important role in changes in fund net asset value (NAV) and total net assets (TNA). Using a matrix that indicates the level of overlapped security holdings of funds, we obtain eigenvector centrality, which measures the `influence' of each fund. A fund that has high eigenvector centrality is one that has high fund holdings overlap with other peers, who themselves have high overlap with others. A panel VAR analysis shows significant positive relation of changes in lagged eigenvector centrality with changes in fund NAV and TNA. Changes in eigenvector centrality `Granger causes' changes in fund's NAV and TNA and vice versa. A shock in centrality leads to an increase in fund NAV and TNA. These results make eigenvector centrality a feasible indicator to measure the benchmark-induced herding of individual funds. High centrality funds that have the highest herding tendencies among their peers have the largest average total assets under management. In general, high centrality funds have the lowest tracking error, fund beta, expense and turnover ratios and management fees compared to their peers. To achieve these criteria, high centrality funds have larger exposure to the `low-beta' stock market segment compared to their peers, as well as small but nimble positions in the `high-beta' stock market segment.
{"title":"Networks and Performance of Index-Benchmarked Mutual Funds","authors":"Dan Xia Wong, Chia-Yi Yen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3895583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895583","url":null,"abstract":"This paper establishes empirical evidence that network among mutual funds that share a similar benchmark plays an important role in changes in fund net asset value (NAV) and total net assets (TNA). Using a matrix that indicates the level of overlapped security holdings of funds, we obtain eigenvector centrality, which measures the `influence' of each fund. A fund that has high eigenvector centrality is one that has high fund holdings overlap with other peers, who themselves have high overlap with others. A panel VAR analysis shows significant positive relation of changes in lagged eigenvector centrality with changes in fund NAV and TNA. Changes in eigenvector centrality `Granger causes' changes in fund's NAV and TNA and vice versa. A shock in centrality leads to an increase in fund NAV and TNA. These results make eigenvector centrality a feasible indicator to measure the benchmark-induced herding of individual funds. High centrality funds that have the highest herding tendencies among their peers have the largest average total assets under management. In general, high centrality funds have the lowest tracking error, fund beta, expense and turnover ratios and management fees compared to their peers. To achieve these criteria, high centrality funds have larger exposure to the `low-beta' stock market segment compared to their peers, as well as small but nimble positions in the `high-beta' stock market segment.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133140933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fernando Bolívar, Miguel A. Duran, Ana Lozano-Vivas
This paper analyzes the relation between bank profit performance and business models. To assess the profitability of bank business models, we propose a new approach based on machine learning. In particular, we identify bank business models using balance sheet components’ contributions to profitability as a grouping criterion. Thus, in contrast to previous works, the strategy for identifying bank business models is not based on similarities among banks’ asset and liability mixes, but on these mixes’ contributions to profitability. We apply this methodological proposal to the European Union banking system in 1997–2016.
{"title":"Business Model Contributions to Bank Profit Performance: A Machine Learning Approach","authors":"Fernando Bolívar, Miguel A. Duran, Ana Lozano-Vivas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3875650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875650","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the relation between bank profit performance and business models. To assess the profitability of bank business models, we propose a new approach based on machine learning. In particular, we identify bank business models using balance sheet components’ contributions to profitability as a grouping criterion. Thus, in contrast to previous works, the strategy for identifying bank business models is not based on similarities among banks’ asset and liability mixes, but on these mixes’ contributions to profitability. We apply this methodological proposal to the European Union banking system in 1997–2016.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"77 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132911709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Institutional portfolios are increasing allocations to illiquid private assets seeking better returns and diversification. However, as allocations increase, a portfolio’s liquidity structure changes, sometimes abruptly. How can a CIO increase their confidence with private asset allocations and unlock their potential? Using a corporate defined benefit pension plan as our example, we present and illustrate a practical framework (OASIS TM) that can help CIOs analyze how their top-down asset allocation and their bottom-up private investing activity interact to affect their portfolio’s ability to respond to liquidity demands in a multi-asset, multi-period setting. This is exactly what a CIO needs to know. Besides scheduled benefit payments, corporate pension plans have many unexpected liquidity demands which should be accounted for when evaluating liquidity risk. For example, a plan should be able to rebalance when market movements cause allocations to exceed risk limits. A plan also needs liquidity to meet unexpected capital calls and be prepared for exogenous cash flow events driven by corporate actions (e.g., pension risk transfers, corporate contributions, and merger and acquisition activities). Many plans also have asset allocation glide paths, conditional on the plan’s funding ratio, that present additional liquidity strains as it may be difficult to sell illiquid assets to satisfy new allocation targets. The CIO’s challenge is to maximize expected portfolio performance while keeping liquidity risk under control. By measuring the potential tradeoff between asset allocation, portfolio performance and multiple dimensions of liquidity risk, the OASIS framework can help CIOs make more informed portfolio management decisions.
{"title":"Harnessing the Potential of Private Assets: A Framework for Institutional Portfolio Construction","authors":"Junying Shen, Michelle Teng, Ding Li, G. Qiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3877588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3877588","url":null,"abstract":"Institutional portfolios are increasing allocations to illiquid private assets seeking better returns and diversification. However, as allocations increase, a portfolio’s liquidity structure changes, sometimes abruptly. How can a CIO increase their confidence with private asset allocations and unlock their potential? Using a corporate defined benefit pension plan as our example, we present and illustrate a practical framework (OASIS TM) that can help CIOs analyze how their top-down asset allocation and their bottom-up private investing activity interact to affect their portfolio’s ability to respond to liquidity demands in a multi-asset, multi-period setting. This is exactly what a CIO needs to know. Besides scheduled benefit payments, corporate pension plans have many unexpected liquidity demands which should be accounted for when evaluating liquidity risk. For example, a plan should be able to rebalance when market movements cause allocations to exceed risk limits. A plan also needs liquidity to meet unexpected capital calls and be prepared for exogenous cash flow events driven by corporate actions (e.g., pension risk transfers, corporate contributions, and merger and acquisition activities). Many plans also have asset allocation glide paths, conditional on the plan’s funding ratio, that present additional liquidity strains as it may be difficult to sell illiquid assets to satisfy new allocation targets. The CIO’s challenge is to maximize expected portfolio performance while keeping liquidity risk under control. By measuring the potential tradeoff between asset allocation, portfolio performance and multiple dimensions of liquidity risk, the OASIS framework can help CIOs make more informed portfolio management decisions.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123378176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martina Jašová, L. Laeven, Caterina Mendicino, J. Peydró, Dominik Supera
We show that lender of the last resort (LOLR) policy contributes to higher bank interconnectedness and systemic risk. Using novel micro-level data, we analyze the haircut gap channel of LOLR – the difference between the private market and central bank haircuts. LOLR increases interconnectedness by incentivizing banks to pledge higher haircut gap bonds, especially issued by similar banks and by systemically important banks. LOLR also exacerbates cross-pledging of bank bonds. Higher haircut gaps only incentivize banks, not other intermediaries without LOLR access, to increase bank bond holdings. Finally, LOLR revives bank bond issuance associated with higher haircut gaps.
{"title":"Systemic Risk and Monetary Policy: The Haircut Gap Channel of the Lender of Last Resort","authors":"Martina Jašová, L. Laeven, Caterina Mendicino, J. Peydró, Dominik Supera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3857237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3857237","url":null,"abstract":"We show that lender of the last resort (LOLR) policy contributes to higher bank interconnectedness and systemic risk. Using novel micro-level data, we analyze the haircut gap channel of LOLR – the difference between the private market and central bank haircuts. LOLR increases interconnectedness by incentivizing banks to pledge higher haircut gap bonds, especially issued by similar banks and by systemically important banks. LOLR also exacerbates cross-pledging of bank bonds. Higher haircut gaps only incentivize banks, not other intermediaries without LOLR access, to increase bank bond holdings. Finally, LOLR revives bank bond issuance associated with higher haircut gaps.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128467028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rapid increase in U.S. house prices during the 2001--2006 period was accompanied by a historically rapid expansion of bank assets. We exploit cross-regional variation in local housing booms to study how housing demand shocks affected the growth of the banking sector. We estimate the effect of housing demand shocks that are orthogonal to local non-housing demand shocks and a range of observed local credit supply shocks. We employ several instrumental variables that plausibly identify variation in local housing demand that is exogenous to local banks. We find that the housing boom had a large effect on bank asset growth---the cross-regional elasticity of bank growth with respect to housing demand shocks is around 0.6. The regional elasticity estimate suggests that in aggregate, non-credit-supply-induced housing demand shocks can potentially account for more than a third of the growth of the banking sector during this period.
{"title":"Housing Booms and Bank Growth","authors":"M. Flannery, Leming Lin, Luxi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3749564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749564","url":null,"abstract":"The rapid increase in U.S. house prices during the 2001--2006 period was accompanied by a historically rapid expansion of bank assets. We exploit cross-regional variation in local housing booms to study how housing demand shocks affected the growth of the banking sector. We estimate the effect of housing demand shocks that are orthogonal to local non-housing demand shocks and a range of observed local credit supply shocks. We employ several instrumental variables that plausibly identify variation in local housing demand that is exogenous to local banks. We find that the housing boom had a large effect on bank asset growth---the cross-regional elasticity of bank growth with respect to housing demand shocks is around 0.6. The regional elasticity estimate suggests that in aggregate, non-credit-supply-induced housing demand shocks can potentially account for more than a third of the growth of the banking sector during this period.","PeriodicalId":123550,"journal":{"name":"Financial Crises eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127798221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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