竞争环境下的税收损失结转

ERN: Monopoly Pub Date : 2017-07-21 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2506636
Anja M. B. De Waegenaere, R. Sansing, J. Wielhouwer
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了双寡头行业中的经营和投资决策,在这种情况下,对研究的初始投资为一家公司带来了直接的税收优惠,但为另一家公司带来了净经营损失。我们表明,传统观点认为,第一家公司在研究投资方面处于更好的地位,这在竞争环境中并不成立。这是因为如果两家公司都投资于研究,那么在研究成功后,有净经营亏损结转的公司会做出更积极的投资决策。
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Tax Loss Carryovers in a Competitive Environment
We examine operating and investment decisions in a duopolistic industry in which an initial investment in research yields an immediate tax benefit for one firm, but creates a net operating loss carryover for the other firm. We show that the conventional wisdom that suggests that the first firm is in a better position to make the research investment need not hold in a competitive environment. This occurs because if both firms invest in research, the firm with the net operating loss carryover makes more aggressive investment decisions following successful research.
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