意图与解释:走向法律解释学的元理论

D. Green
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摘要

本文讨论了法律(即宪法和成文法)解释的讨论所依据的术语,主张从“原旨主义”转向“意旨主义”。我认为,原旨主义与其敌人的共同之处远比人们普遍认识到的要多,而意旨主义更好地暗示了这种解释方法的最基本方面,即关于意图的存在、性质和重要性。我断言,原旨主义者,就像许多传统上被认为反对他们的人一样,都是意图主义者,因为他们依赖于意图的心理状态理论。通过追踪行动哲学和文学理论中的辩论,我还建议,讨论意图主义是有帮助的,因为它更明确地将法律问题与这些其他领域共同的解释问题联系起来。我的方法也涉及其他人的工作,他们以不同的方式,在早期的法律文献中讨论了意图主义的更广泛的背景和含义,特别是海蒂·赫德(Heidi Hurd)关于意图主义在法律解释中的普遍性的研究。虽然我在这里没有描述或赞同一种特定的解释方法,但我的结论确实延伸到断言原旨主义和文本主义,而不是互补,是彼此直接矛盾的——原旨主义是意旨主义的一种形式,而文本主义明确地拒绝意旨主义。
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Intention and Interpretation: Towards A Meta-Theory of Legal Hermenuetics
This article addresses the terms under which discussions of legal (i.e. constitutional and statutory) interpretation take place, advocating a shift away from “originalism” as our axis of debate to “intentionalism.” I argue that originalism has far more in common with its foes than has been generally recognized, and that intentionalism better implicates the most fundamental aspect of such methods of interpretation, regarding the existence, nature, and importance of intentions. I assert that originalists, just as much as many traditionally considered opposed to them, are intentionalists because they rely on mental state theories of intention. Tracking debates in the philosophy of action and literary theory, I also suggest that it is helpful to talk of intentionalism because it more explicitly relates legal concerns to the interpretive concerns common to these other fields. My approach also engages the work of others who, in various ways, have earlier discussed in the legal literature the broader context and implications of intentionalism, and especially that of Heidi Hurd on the ubiquity of intentionalism in legal interpretation. Although I do not here limn or endorse a specific interpretive methodology, my conclusions do extend to asserting that originalism and textualism, instead of being complementary, are at direct odds with one another – with originalism being a form of intentionalism and textualism explicitly rejecting intentionalism.
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