IntelliCAN:针对安全汽车的防攻击控制器区域网络(CAN)

Mohammad Raashid Ansari, Shucheng Yu, Qiaoyan Yu
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引用次数: 9

摘要

控制器局域网(CAN)是连接汽车电子控制单元的主要总线网络。虽然CAN协议已被修订以提高车辆的安全性,但CAN的安全弱点尚未得到充分解决。汽车的安全威胁可能来自外部无线通信,也可能来自安装在CAN总线上的内部恶意CAN节点。尽管威胁来源多种多样,但CAN的安全弱点是安全问题的根源。由于每个CAN节点的计算能力和存储容量有限,在保证CAN协议兼容性的前提下,缺乏硬件高效的CAN系统保护方法。为了节省成本和保持兼容性,我们提出利用内置的CAN故障约束机制来检测来自CAN总线上恶意CAN设备的伪装攻击。仿真结果表明,与全帧加密方法相比,该方法实现了10-5量级的攻击误检率,并将加密延迟降低了68%。
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IntelliCAN: Attack-resilient Controller Area Network (CAN) for secure automobiles
Controller Area Network (CAN) is the main bus network that connects electronic control units in automobiles. Although CAN protocols have been revised to improve the vehicle safety, the security weaknesses of CAN have not been fully addressed. Security threats on automobiles might be from external wireless communication or from internal malicious CAN nodes mounted on the CAN bus. Despite of various threat sources, the security weakness of CAN is the root of security problems. Due to the limited computation power and storage capacity on each CAN node, there is a lack of hardware-efficient protection methods for the CAN system without losing the compatibility to CAN protocols. To save the cost and maintain the compatibility, we propose to exploit the built-in CAN fault confinement mechanism to detect the masquerade attacks originated from the malicious CAN devices on the CAN bus. Simulation results show that our method achieves the attack misdetection rate at the order of 10-5 and reduces the encryption latency by up to 68% over the complete frame encryption method.
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