在动态比赛中领先?

PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3495187

Philipp Denter, D. Sisak

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在促销竞赛或其他类似锦标赛的情况下，委托人可能会对代理人所付出的最大努力赋予一定的价值。我们表明，无论何时智能体在多个时间段内相互作用，即使是完全对称的智能体，也要让其中一个领先是最优的。奖励一个小的领先优势可以在不减少总体努力的情况下增加个人的最大努力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments?

In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort.

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PSN: Game Theory (Topic)

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