网络攻击与最大权值根子树问题

G. Agnarsson, R. Greenlaw, Sanpawat Kantabutra
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引用次数: 7

摘要

本文对网络安全研究做出了三点贡献。首先,我们定义了一个网络安全系统模型,并在模型框架内定义了网络安全攻击的概念。该模型强调了游戏结束组件的重要性——关键的系统组件,如果获得这些组件,对手将有能力彻底击败一个系统。与许多系统一样,该模型基于使用深度防御/分层安全方法的系统。在该模型中,我们定义了渗透成本的概念,即为了突破下一层安全而必须支付的成本。其次,我们用双权树定义了基于网络安全攻击的自然决策和优化问题,并分析了它们的复杂性。更准确地说,给定一个街道根植在一个顶点r,穿透成本优势functionc T,一个目标获取顶点函数p T,攻击者的预算和游戏结束thresholdB, G∈ℚ+分别,我们考虑的问题determiningthe存在的子树T ' T在攻击者探讨罢了,边缘的成本之和T '小于或等于B收购总价值超过thegame-over阈值,我们证明了该问题的一般形式是难以处理的,但确实允许采用多项式时间逼近格式。我们还分析了三个限制版本的问题的复杂性,其中渗透成本是给定固定数量的不同值之间的常数函数,整数值和有理值。利用递归和动态规划技术,我们证明了对于常数渗透成本,可以在多项式时间内找到最优网络攻击策略;对于整数值和有理数值渗透成本,可以在伪多项式时间内找到最优网络攻击策略。第三,我们提供了与网络安全系统架构设计和模型相关的开放问题列表。
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On Cyber Attacks and the Maximum-Weight Rooted-Subtree Problem
This paper makes three contributions to cyber-security research. First,we define a model for cyber-security systems and the concept of acyber-security attack within the model's framework. The modelhighlights the importance of game-over components - criticalsystem components which if acquired will give an adversary the abilityto defeat a system completely. The model is based on systems thatuse defense-in-depth/layered-security approaches, as many systemsdo. In the model we define the concept of penetration cost,which is the cost that must be paid in order to break into the nextlayer of security. Second, we define natural decision and optimizationproblems based on cyber-security attacks in terms of doubly weightedtrees, and analyze their complexity. More precisely, given a treeT rooted at a vertex r, a penetrating cost edge functionc on T, a target-acquisition vertex function p on T,the attacker's budget and the game-over thresholdB,G ∈ ℚ+respectively, we consider the problem of determiningthe existence of a rooted subtree T' of T within the attacker'sbudget that is, the sum of the costs of the edges in T' is lessthan or equal to B with total acquisition value more than thegame-over threshold that is, the sum of the target values of thenodes in T' is greater than or equal to G. We prove that thegeneral version of this problem is intractable, but does admit apolynomial time approximation scheme. We also analyze the complexityof three restricted versions of the problems, where the penetrationcost is the constant function, integer-valued, and rational-valuedamong a given fixed number of distinct values. Using recursion anddynamic-programming techniques, we show that for constant penetrationcosts an optimal cyber-attack strategy can be found in polynomialtime, and for integer-valued and rational-valued penetration costsoptimal cyber-attack strategies can be found in pseudo-polynomialtime. Third, we provide a list of open problems relating to the architecturaldesign of cyber-security systems and to the model.
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