基于精算公平、成本中性和逆向选择的养老金延期英国的观点

J. Dagpunar
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摘要

有资格领取固定福利社会保障养恤金的人可以推迟领取养恤金,并在推迟领取时通过应计额领取额外养恤金或可能的一次性领取。在某些情况下,延期者的伴侣可以继承这种利益。对于这种方案,定义了对一类养恤金领取者的精算公平性的概念。除非双方的贴现率相同,否则一个精算公平的计划对养老金提供者来说不会是成本中立的。除了这种不对称之外,逆向选择还会影响精算公平和提供者的成本。对于提供商试图在承认或不承认逆向选择的情况下实现精算公平而遭受的成本惩罚,推导出了表达式。类似地,当目标是实现提供者的成本中立时,获得延迟者的成本表达式。以英国国家养老金计划为例,给出了一些数值例子。根据现行规定,精算公平性存在重大偏差,特别是对于那些在2016年4月6日之前达到领取国家养老金年龄的人以及那些有资格继承福利的伴侣的人。即使当养老金提供者试图实现精算公平或成本中立时,如果忽略逆向选择,那么与两者的显著偏离是很可能的。
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Pension Deferral With Reference to Actuarial Fairness, Cost Neutrality, and Adverse Selection; a UK Perspective
Persons who are eligible for a defined benefit social security pension may defer their pension and receive, through accruals, an extra pension or possibly a lump sum, on termination of deferral. In certain cases, partners of the deferrer may inherit such benefits. For such a scheme, the concept of actuarial fairness to a category of pensioners is defined. A scheme that is actuarially fair will not be cost neutral to the pension provider unless the discount rate is the same for both parties. In addition to this asymmetry, adverse selection will impact upon both actuarial fairness and cost to the provider. Expressions are derived for the cost penalty to the provider for attempting to achieve actuarial fairness both with and without an acknowledgement of adverse selection. Similarly, when the objective is to achieve cost neutrality for the provider, expressions for the cost to the deferrer are obtained. Some numerical examples are given in the case of the UK state pension scheme. Under present rules it is shown that there are significant departures from actuarial fairness, particularly for those who achieved state pension age before 6 April 2016 and those with partners eligible to inherit benefits. Even when a pension provider attempts to achieve either actuarial fairness or cost neutrality, if adverse selection is ignored, then significant departures from both are quite possible.
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