大型匹配市场容量操纵的稳定性与免疫

EduRN: Economics Education (ERN) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-28 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3738973

Morteza Honarvar, Behrang Kamali-Shahdadi

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在匹配市场中，稳定的机制不是无策略的;然而，它们在实践中很有效。我们研究了大学录取问题，其中大学有完全异质的偏好，并且有一个连续的学生。我们找到了高校能力向量的上界，使得高校在任何稳定的机制下都有动机如实报告自己的能力。

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Stability and Immunity to Capacity Manipulation in Large Matching Markets

Abstract Stable mechanisms are not strategy-proof in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences, and there is a continuum of students. We find an upper bound for the colleges’ capacities vector such that colleges have the incentive to report their capacities truthfully in any stable mechanism.

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EduRN: Economics Education (ERN) (Topic)

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