{"title":"强势ceo与股价崩盘风险","authors":"MD Al Mamun, B. Balachandran, H. N. Duong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2797107","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.","PeriodicalId":373523,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"105","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Powerful CEOs and Stock Price Crash Risk\",\"authors\":\"MD Al Mamun, B. Balachandran, H. N. Duong\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2797107\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.\",\"PeriodicalId\":373523,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"105\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2797107\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2797107","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.
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