{"title":"次贷的黄金时期:对财政部防止另一场信贷危机提议的评估","authors":"David Schneider","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1313694","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The first part explains how the symbiotic relationship between subprime mortgages and the derivatives market, together with regulatory acquiescence caused the current credit crisis. The second part explains the Treasury's proposal to prevent another credit crisis by adopting an objectives-based regulatory structure. Finally, the third part offers a critique of the Treasury's proposed objectives-based regulatory structure and instead advocates in favor of a single consolidated regulator structure.","PeriodicalId":106641,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Primetime for Subprime: Evaluation of the Treasury's Proposal to Prevent Another Credit Crisis\",\"authors\":\"David Schneider\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1313694\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The first part explains how the symbiotic relationship between subprime mortgages and the derivatives market, together with regulatory acquiescence caused the current credit crisis. The second part explains the Treasury's proposal to prevent another credit crisis by adopting an objectives-based regulatory structure. Finally, the third part offers a critique of the Treasury's proposed objectives-based regulatory structure and instead advocates in favor of a single consolidated regulator structure.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106641,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law\",\"volume\":\"151 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-12-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313694\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313694","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Primetime for Subprime: Evaluation of the Treasury's Proposal to Prevent Another Credit Crisis
The first part explains how the symbiotic relationship between subprime mortgages and the derivatives market, together with regulatory acquiescence caused the current credit crisis. The second part explains the Treasury's proposal to prevent another credit crisis by adopting an objectives-based regulatory structure. Finally, the third part offers a critique of the Treasury's proposed objectives-based regulatory structure and instead advocates in favor of a single consolidated regulator structure.