{"title":"连续相同收益和斯坦福集团丑闻","authors":"D. Chance, Ashley R. Schexnaildre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1532377","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"As one piece of evidence in the prosecution of fraud and Ponzi scheme charges against R. Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, and Laura Pendergest-Holt of the Stanford International Bank, Ltd., the Stanford Group Company, and Stanford Capital Management, LLC, the Securities and Exchange Commission noted that the firm had reported consecutive identical four-digit returns of 15.71% in 1995 and 1996. An unidentified expert and Ms. Pendergest-Holt asserted that this result was unlikely, and the SEC has viewed it as evidence of long-term fraudulent activity. This paper examines the likelihood of consecutive identical four digit returns using simulation over a variety of market parameters with both equity and interest rate volatility and several general types of investment strategies. Given our results on the frequency of this event and the fact that there are about 300,000 investment managers in the United States, it is quite possible that many investment managers experience consecutive identical four-digit returns over a two-year period. In low risk environments and following low risk strategies, there could easily be more than 100. The combination of consecutive identical four-digit returns with evidence of fraud may be inculpatory evidence but the former, by itself, should not be considered unusual for the totality of investment managers in the market.","PeriodicalId":376821,"journal":{"name":"White Collar Crime eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Consecutive Identical Returns and the Stanford Group Scandal\",\"authors\":\"D. Chance, Ashley R. Schexnaildre\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1532377\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"As one piece of evidence in the prosecution of fraud and Ponzi scheme charges against R. Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, and Laura Pendergest-Holt of the Stanford International Bank, Ltd., the Stanford Group Company, and Stanford Capital Management, LLC, the Securities and Exchange Commission noted that the firm had reported consecutive identical four-digit returns of 15.71% in 1995 and 1996. An unidentified expert and Ms. Pendergest-Holt asserted that this result was unlikely, and the SEC has viewed it as evidence of long-term fraudulent activity. This paper examines the likelihood of consecutive identical four digit returns using simulation over a variety of market parameters with both equity and interest rate volatility and several general types of investment strategies. Given our results on the frequency of this event and the fact that there are about 300,000 investment managers in the United States, it is quite possible that many investment managers experience consecutive identical four-digit returns over a two-year period. In low risk environments and following low risk strategies, there could easily be more than 100. The combination of consecutive identical four-digit returns with evidence of fraud may be inculpatory evidence but the former, by itself, should not be considered unusual for the totality of investment managers in the market.\",\"PeriodicalId\":376821,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"White Collar Crime eJournal\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-01-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"White Collar Crime eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1532377\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"White Collar Crime eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1532377","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
作为对斯坦福国际银行有限公司、斯坦福集团公司和斯坦福资本管理有限责任公司的R. Allen Stanford、James M. Davis和Laura pender- holt的欺诈和庞氏骗局起诉的证据之一,证券交易委员会指出,该公司在1995年和1996年连续报告了15.71%的四位数回报率。一位身份不明的专家和彭德杰斯特-霍尔特断言,这一结果不太可能出现,证交会将其视为长期欺诈活动的证据。本文考察了连续相同的四位数回报的可能性,使用模拟在各种市场参数与股票和利率波动和几种一般类型的投资策略。考虑到我们对这一事件发生频率的研究结果,以及美国大约有30万名投资经理的事实,很有可能许多投资经理在两年的时间里连续获得相同的四位数回报。在低风险环境和遵循低风险策略的情况下,很容易超过100个。连续相同的四位数回报与欺诈证据相结合,可能是有罪的证据,但对于市场上的所有投资经理来说,前者本身不应被视为不寻常。
Consecutive Identical Returns and the Stanford Group Scandal
As one piece of evidence in the prosecution of fraud and Ponzi scheme charges against R. Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, and Laura Pendergest-Holt of the Stanford International Bank, Ltd., the Stanford Group Company, and Stanford Capital Management, LLC, the Securities and Exchange Commission noted that the firm had reported consecutive identical four-digit returns of 15.71% in 1995 and 1996. An unidentified expert and Ms. Pendergest-Holt asserted that this result was unlikely, and the SEC has viewed it as evidence of long-term fraudulent activity. This paper examines the likelihood of consecutive identical four digit returns using simulation over a variety of market parameters with both equity and interest rate volatility and several general types of investment strategies. Given our results on the frequency of this event and the fact that there are about 300,000 investment managers in the United States, it is quite possible that many investment managers experience consecutive identical four-digit returns over a two-year period. In low risk environments and following low risk strategies, there could easily be more than 100. The combination of consecutive identical four-digit returns with evidence of fraud may be inculpatory evidence but the former, by itself, should not be considered unusual for the totality of investment managers in the market.