Watsonian Compatibilism

This chapter provides a compatibilist theory of freedom and responsibility built from key elements of Gary Watson’s important essays on these topics. Its aim is the construction of something like a Watsonian theory of freedom and responsibility, using important elements of Watson’s views— preserving his centrally important proposed mesh theory—but also departing from them at critical points. Three features of Watson’s work are addressed. First, that acting freely is explained in terms of acting in accord with one’s evaluative commitments. Second, that Watson’s view is a version of a reasons-responsive theory. The chapter examines his notion of responsiveness or sensitivity to reasons and looks at how it differs from those of others who have developed a reasons-responsive view? Third, Watson’s deepening of our understanding of moral responsibility, by way of both his critical assessment of Strawson’s views and his own work on the topic. How should we understand morally responsible agency in light of his contributions?