Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0006
Michael Smith
This chapter is concerned with Gary Watson’s overall conception of moral responsibility, and in particular the influence on it of P. F. Strawson’s paper, “Freedom and Resentment.”The chapter provides an anti-Strawsonian theory of responsibility, that is, one in which an agent’s being responsible is independently understood and their being held responsible is understood in terms of this independent notion. It also argues that being held responsible is best understood not in terms of retributive emotions like resentment or indignation, as Strawson suggests, but rather in terms of trust.Two points are made about Watson’s account of being responsible: one, that the demand that we give a folk-psychological explanation of an agent’s failure to exercise a capacity he possesses is unreasonable; two, that it is not the case that, as Watson maintains, the distinction between those who fail to exercise a capacity that they have, and those who lack a capacity altogether, is a distinction without a difference. The proffered anti-Strawsonian theory of responsibility is based on this crucial distinction.
{"title":"Gary Watson","authors":"Michael Smith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is concerned with Gary Watson’s overall conception of moral responsibility, and in particular the influence on it of P. F. Strawson’s paper, “Freedom and Resentment.”The chapter provides an anti-Strawsonian theory of responsibility, that is, one in which an agent’s being responsible is independently understood and their being held responsible is understood in terms of this independent notion. It also argues that being held responsible is best understood not in terms of retributive emotions like resentment or indignation, as Strawson suggests, but rather in terms of trust.Two points are made about Watson’s account of being responsible: one, that the demand that we give a folk-psychological explanation of an agent’s failure to exercise a capacity he possesses is unreasonable; two, that it is not the case that, as Watson maintains, the distinction between those who fail to exercise a capacity that they have, and those who lack a capacity altogether, is a distinction without a difference. The proffered anti-Strawsonian theory of responsibility is based on this crucial distinction.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122037797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0010
G. Yaffe
The chapter seeks to better understand the prospects of Watson’s account of addiction. In particular, it is concerned with the question of how addiction can weaken the demand that the addict comply with otherwise legitimate demands. Watson answers this question by pointing to the way in which addictive desires distract attention in a way that makes it unreasonable to expect addicts to comply with legitimate demands with the same alacrity with which we expect non-addicts to comply with such demands. Demurring, the chapter argues instead that the expectation that addicts comply with otherwise legitimate demands is weakened because, for the addict, wholehearted effort to comply is simply not possible.
{"title":"Compromised Addicts","authors":"G. Yaffe","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter seeks to better understand the prospects of Watson’s account of addiction. In particular, it is concerned with the question of how addiction can weaken the demand that the addict comply with otherwise legitimate demands. Watson answers this question by pointing to the way in which addictive desires distract attention in a way that makes it unreasonable to expect addicts to comply with legitimate demands with the same alacrity with which we expect non-addicts to comply with such demands. Demurring, the chapter argues instead that the expectation that addicts comply with otherwise legitimate demands is weakened because, for the addict, wholehearted effort to comply is simply not possible.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115364610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0003
S. Wolf
This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibility.” It aims to disambiguate and revise the notions of attributability and accountability that Watson’s essay introduced and to clarify the relation between them. It distinguishes mere negative descriptions of an individual from negative attitudes toward that individual, and further distinguishes negative attitudes that constitute criticism from other attitudes that constitute blame. Accepting Watson’s idea that an act or trait is attributable to someone just in case it discloses a feature of an agent’s self, the essay argues that attributability (of a fault) is sufficient to justify criticism of an individual; blame and public sanctions, by contrast, require accountability.
{"title":"Attributability and the Self","authors":"S. Wolf","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibility.” It aims to disambiguate and revise the notions of attributability and accountability that Watson’s essay introduced and to clarify the relation between them. It distinguishes mere negative descriptions of an individual from negative attitudes toward that individual, and further distinguishes negative attitudes that constitute criticism from other attitudes that constitute blame. Accepting Watson’s idea that an act or trait is attributable to someone just in case it discloses a feature of an agent’s self, the essay argues that attributability (of a fault) is sufficient to justify criticism of an individual; blame and public sanctions, by contrast, require accountability.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114565527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0004
Pamela Hieronymi
In his landmark “Two Faces of Responsibility,” Gary Watson suggested that one face of responsibility evaluates agents and actions against standards of virtue while another concerns holding one another accountable through, e.g., demands and sanctions. This chapter elaborates the idea of a sanction before noting that many responses to moral failing fall between evaluation (a kind of belief) and sanction (a voluntary action). Being responsible also involves being subject to a variety of reactions that are “non-voluntary” in a sense here explained. The non-voluntariness of these reactions has two important upshots: First, questions about their justification are complex, in ways here examined. Second, unlike sanctions, they are not well thought of as burdens voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the responder. By overlooking the non-voluntariness of many reactions to moral failure, we risk misunderstanding the significance of those reactions. In an important sense, they are not about the wrongdoer, but rather about the one wronged.
在具有里程碑意义的《责任的两面》(Two Faces of Responsibility)一书中，加里·沃森(Gary Watson)提出，一种责任面是根据美德标准来评估行为主体和行为，而另一种责任面则是通过要求和制裁等方式来追究彼此的责任。本章详细阐述了制裁的概念，然后注意到许多对道德失败的反应介于评价(一种信念)和制裁(一种自愿行动)之间。负起责任还包括受到各种各样的“非自愿”反应的影响。这些非自愿性的反应有两个重要的结果:首先，关于其正当性的问题是复杂的，在这里考察的方式。其次，与制裁不同的是，它们并没有被很好地认为是回应者自愿强加给违法者的负担。如果我们忽视了许多对道德失败的非自愿性反应，我们就有可能误解这些反应的重要性。从一个重要的意义上说，它们不是关于做错事的人，而是关于被冤枉的人。
{"title":"I’ll Bet You Think This Blame is About You","authors":"Pamela Hieronymi","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"In his landmark “Two Faces of Responsibility,” Gary Watson suggested that one face of responsibility evaluates agents and actions against standards of virtue while another concerns holding one another accountable through, e.g., demands and sanctions. This chapter elaborates the idea of a sanction before noting that many responses to moral failing fall between evaluation (a kind of belief) and sanction (a voluntary action). Being responsible also involves being subject to a variety of reactions that are “non-voluntary” in a sense here explained. The non-voluntariness of these reactions has two important upshots: First, questions about their justification are complex, in ways here examined. Second, unlike sanctions, they are not well thought of as burdens voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the responder. By overlooking the non-voluntariness of many reactions to moral failure, we risk misunderstanding the significance of those reactions. In an important sense, they are not about the wrongdoer, but rather about the one wronged.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134347164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0007
T. Scanlon
The chapter examines arguments offered by Gary Watson, drawing on the case of psychopaths, for broadening the conditions of moral responsibility that are required for reactive attitudes such as resentment. These broader conditions include what Watson calls accountability as well as attributability. Focusing mainly on ‘negative’ reactive attitudes, of which a few examples are given, there is an examination of associated conditions of responsibility, and in some depth, of Watson’s argument for accountability as a condition for responsibility; the case of psychopaths is the vehicle for this examination.
{"title":"Learning from Psychopaths","authors":"T. Scanlon","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter examines arguments offered by Gary Watson, drawing on the case of psychopaths, for broadening the conditions of moral responsibility that are required for reactive attitudes such as resentment. These broader conditions include what Watson calls accountability as well as attributability. Focusing mainly on ‘negative’ reactive attitudes, of which a few examples are given, there is an examination of associated conditions of responsibility, and in some depth, of Watson’s argument for accountability as a condition for responsibility; the case of psychopaths is the vehicle for this examination.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132569413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0008
J. Kennett
This chapter takes up the question of whether psychopaths can legitimately be held morally accountable, and the resolution of these issues developed is subtle. First it argues that psychopaths are not accountable for their actions in the sense required for moral blameworthiness. Second, it argues that psychopaths’ actions are not attributable to them in the way that would make them fitting targets of the criminal law. The assertion that attributability is not a face of responsibility is explored and justified. The chapter, while respecting Watson and authors who have followed him in the enquiry into the crucially important attributability ‘face’ of responsibility, also offers a somewhat revisionary account of the ethical significance of attributability and the role of the reactive attitudes in social and moral life.
{"title":"Competence, Attributability, and Blame","authors":"J. Kennett","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter takes up the question of whether psychopaths can legitimately be held morally accountable, and the resolution of these issues developed is subtle. First it argues that psychopaths are not accountable for their actions in the sense required for moral blameworthiness. Second, it argues that psychopaths’ actions are not attributable to them in the way that would make them fitting targets of the criminal law. The assertion that attributability is not a face of responsibility is explored and justified. The chapter, while respecting Watson and authors who have followed him in the enquiry into the crucially important attributability ‘face’ of responsibility, also offers a somewhat revisionary account of the ethical significance of attributability and the role of the reactive attitudes in social and moral life.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127423290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0009
R. Duff
Drawing on Gary Watson’s seminal work on responsibility, this chapter focuses on what he calls accountability. It distinguishes (in section 8.1), answerability from liability, and then concentrates on answerability, which operates, it argues (contra David Shoemaker), analogously in both moral and legal contexts. It discusses (in section 8.2) the way in which answerability requires us to attend to the capacities of the person whom we hold responsible, not just at the time of the conduct for which he is now being held responsible, but at the time of the holding. In section 8.3, it then attends to some implications of the requirement that when we hold someone answerable, we must be ready to listen to their answer. Finally, in section 8.4, it tackles the issue of standing: what gives us the right to call another person to account; and what can undermine that standing—with what implications?
{"title":"Moral and Criminal Responsibility","authors":"R. Duff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on Gary Watson’s seminal work on responsibility, this chapter focuses on what he calls accountability. It distinguishes (in section 8.1), answerability from liability, and then concentrates on answerability, which operates, it argues (contra David Shoemaker), analogously in both moral and legal contexts. It discusses (in section 8.2) the way in which answerability requires us to attend to the capacities of the person whom we hold responsible, not just at the time of the conduct for which he is now being held responsible, but at the time of the holding. In section 8.3, it then attends to some implications of the requirement that when we hold someone answerable, we must be ready to listen to their answer. Finally, in section 8.4, it tackles the issue of standing: what gives us the right to call another person to account; and what can undermine that standing—with what implications?","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121805818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0005
R. Wallace
A significant theme in the work of Gary Watson is the idea that responsibility relations involve the addressing of moral demands to other agents. But both the nature of moral address, and its bearing on other moral debates, remain somewhat obscure. This chapter offers an interpretation of moral address in terms of the Strawson-style reactive attitudes. On the basis of this interpretation, it goes on to explore the significance of moral address for questions about the conditions of moral responsibility and about the ultimate nature of moral requirements. In the process, some particular Watsonian themes are discussed: the nature of the moral demands commonly associated with moral address; the fact that moral address frequently turns on interpersonal accountability; and the limits of moral address, seen in the requirement that it be directed to individuals who have the capacity to understand and respond to such demands.
{"title":"Moral Address","authors":"R. Wallace","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198830238.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"A significant theme in the work of Gary Watson is the idea that responsibility relations involve the addressing of moral demands to other agents. But both the nature of moral address, and its bearing on other moral debates, remain somewhat obscure. This chapter offers an interpretation of moral address in terms of the Strawson-style reactive attitudes. On the basis of this interpretation, it goes on to explore the significance of moral address for questions about the conditions of moral responsibility and about the ultimate nature of moral requirements. In the process, some particular Watsonian themes are discussed: the nature of the moral demands commonly associated with moral address; the fact that moral address frequently turns on interpersonal accountability; and the limits of moral address, seen in the requirement that it be directed to individuals who have the capacity to understand and respond to such demands.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133798784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0012
Sarah Buss
This is a transcript of an interview with Gary Watson conducted by Sarah Buss on November 3, 2016. It commences with some autobiographical context: Watson became interested in philosophy after high school upon meeting a philosophy major at an artist’s colony. The study of political philosophy drew him into considering freedom and responsibility, and autonomy. The case of Harris is covered as an investigation of normative competency. Problems with the notion of weak will and self-control are discussed. Asked for any important changes in his thinking, Watson responds that he conflated issues of autonomy and of responsibility; this bears also on responsibility in a weak-willed agent. Finally, Watson asserts that freedom is not just about responsibility; it’s also about having a capacity to direct your life in a certain way. He hopes to investigate this further.
{"title":"Transcript of an Interview with Gary Watson","authors":"Sarah Buss","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This is a transcript of an interview with Gary Watson conducted by Sarah Buss on November 3, 2016. It commences with some autobiographical context: Watson became interested in philosophy after high school upon meeting a philosophy major at an artist’s colony. The study of political philosophy drew him into considering freedom and responsibility, and autonomy. The case of Harris is covered as an investigation of normative competency. Problems with the notion of weak will and self-control are discussed. Asked for any important changes in his thinking, Watson responds that he conflated issues of autonomy and of responsibility; this bears also on responsibility in a weak-willed agent. Finally, Watson asserts that freedom is not just about responsibility; it’s also about having a capacity to direct your life in a certain way. He hopes to investigate this further.","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122387456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0002
Michael McKenna
This chapter provides a compatibilist theory of freedom and responsibility built from key elements of Gary Watson’s important essays on these topics. Its aim is the construction of something like a Watsonian theory of freedom and responsibility, using important elements of Watson’s views— preserving his centrally important proposed mesh theory—but also departing from them at critical points. Three features of Watson’s work are addressed. First, that acting freely is explained in terms of acting in accord with one’s evaluative commitments. Second, that Watson’s view is a version of a reasons-responsive theory. The chapter examines his notion of responsiveness or sensitivity to reasons and looks at how it differs from those of others who have developed a reasons-responsive view? Third, Watson’s deepening of our understanding of moral responsibility, by way of both his critical assessment of Strawson’s views and his own work on the topic. How should we understand morally responsible agency in light of his contributions?
{"title":"Watsonian Compatibilism","authors":"Michael McKenna","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a compatibilist theory of freedom and responsibility built from key elements of Gary Watson’s important essays on these topics. Its aim is the construction of something like a Watsonian theory of freedom and responsibility, using important elements of Watson’s views— preserving his centrally important proposed mesh theory—but also departing from them at critical points. Three features of Watson’s work are addressed. First, that acting freely is explained in terms of acting in accord with one’s evaluative commitments. Second, that Watson’s view is a version of a reasons-responsive theory. The chapter examines his notion of responsiveness or sensitivity to reasons and looks at how it differs from those of others who have developed a reasons-responsive view? Third, Watson’s deepening of our understanding of moral responsibility, by way of both his critical assessment of Strawson’s views and his own work on the topic. How should we understand morally responsible agency in light of his contributions?","PeriodicalId":115966,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133937346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：