基于Stackelberg游戏的众包声望任务分配机制

Xiaosheng Wu, Shengling Wang, Chun-Chi Liu, Weiman Sun, Chenyu Wang
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引用次数: 3

摘要

众包是近年来出现的一种新模式。它可以处理请求者发布的任务,请求者希望工人接受任务并完成它。在众包中,使用声誉机制来评估员工避免低质量工作的能力是一个常见的例子。因此,本文将信誉机制融入众包的任务分配和投标价格中。然而,对于一些请求者来说,对工作人员的评价作为请求者的私人信息被暴露是不可取的。挑战在于如何在完成上述任务的同时不暴露请求者的私有信息。另一个重要的挑战是寻找沟通渠道并获得必要的信息,从而获得最佳的利益激励机制,因为大多数研究者都关注于工人和请求者之间的竞争关系。本文提出了基于Stackelberg博弈模型的声誉机制框架,以关注工作者和请求者之间的合作。在这两个阶段中,工作人员和请求者相互观察对方的策略或相互分享他们的信息,以使自己的利益最大化。首先,在Stackelberggame模型的基础上构建了该框架,并讨论了其优点。随后,我们研究了每种策略的最优策略,给出了其计算过程,并分析了唯一的Stackelberg均衡。最后,我们对框架进行了仿真,并使用不同的数值参数来测试对游戏性能的影响。
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Stackelberg Game Based Tasks Assignment Mechanism Using Reputation in Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing is a new paradigm emerged in recentyears. It can deal with the tasks posted by the requestor, who wants the worker to accept the task and finish it. Incrowdsourcing, it is a common case that using the reputationmechanism estimates worker's ability to avoid that the workercontributes low-quality work. Therefore, the reputation mechanismis integrated into the crowdsourcing for the tasks assignmentand the biding price in this paper. However, it is undesirable forsome requestors that the evaluation for workers, as requestors'private information, is exposed. The challenge is to finish the tasksmentioned above with keeping the requestors' private informationfrom exposing. Another important challenge with insufficientattention resides in finding the communication channels and getthe necessary information, which can obtain optimal benefit inincentive mechanism, as most of researchers focus on competitiverelationship between the worker and requestor. In this paper, wepropose the novel framework using the reputation mechanismbased on the Stackelberg game model to focus on the cooperationbetween workers and requestors. There are two stages whereworkers and requestors observe each others' strategies or sharetheir information to each other to maximize their own benefit. Firstly, we formulate the framework based on the Stackelberggame model and discuss its advantage. Subsequently, we study theoptimal strategies of each, give the process that how to calculateit, and analyse the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium. Finally, wesimulate our the framework and use different numerical valueparameters to test the effect on the performance of the games.
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