公司法市场重组

R. Romano
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引用次数: 3

摘要

公司在众多的市场中运作——产品市场、劳动力市场、资本市场。这一章关注的市场是公司在所有其他市场中成功运作的先决条件,因为正是这个市场构建了公司的组织结构和治理:公司法市场。在美国,法律环境的两个特征为公司法作为一种产品的概念化提供了信息:(1)公司法是各州而不是国家政府的领域;(2)在内务原则下,公司受其公司法管辖的州是其法定注册地所在的州。这种安排为公司提供了一种选择,他们可以从各州中选择适用的法律,而不管他们的实际位置如何,因此有了这样的概念,即各州通过公司注册费(称为特许经营税)向公司提供产品。值得注意的是,在过去的一个世纪里,特拉华州这个小州一直是市场的领导者,它是绝大多数美国公司的注册地。关于公司法市场的争论在很大程度上集中在特拉华州的主导地位是否有利。本章的第一部分分析了美国公司法市场的动态,其最好的特征是各州争夺公司章程,以及与这种市场组织对谁有利的问题相关的数据——经理还是股东——并解释了为什么特拉华州一直处于主导地位。鉴于上市公司对经济的相对重要性、更广泛的文献以及本章的篇幅限制,重点是上市公司市场。本章第二部分转而解释特拉华州作为卓越的公司州的持久性。这是美国公司法的一大特色。还有其他联邦公司法制度,但类似的“特拉华州”现象并不存在。最后对本章进行了总结,并对今后的研究提出了建议。
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The Market for Corporate Law Redux
Corporations operate in numerous markets -- product markets, labor markets, capital markets. This chapter focuses on the market that is the prerequisite for firms’ successful operation in all other markets, as it is the market that frames their organizational structure and governance: the market for corporate law. In the United States, two features of the legal landscape have informed such a conceptualization of corporate law as a product: (1) corporate law is the domain of the states rather than the national government; and (2) under the internal affairs doctrine, the state whose corporate law governs a firm is the state of its statutory domicile. This arrangement provides firms with a choice, they can select their governing law from among the states regardless of their physical location, hence the notion that states offer a product that corporations purchase, by means of incorporation fees (referred to as franchise taxes). For the past century, remarkably, one small state, Delaware, has been the market leader, serving as the domicile for the overwhelming majority of U.S. corporations. The debate over the market for corporate law has focused, in large part, on whether the phenomenon of Delaware’s dominance is for the better.The first part of the chapter analyzes the dynamics of the U.S. market for corporate law, which can best be characterized as states competing for corporate charters, along with data pertinent to the question of whom this market organization benefits -- managers or shareholders -- and explanations why Delaware has had a persistent and commanding position. The focus is on the market for public corporations, given their relative importance to the economy, the more extensive literature, and space limitations for this chapter. The second part of the chapter turns to explain Delaware’s persistence as the preeminent incorporation state. This is a distinctive feature of U.S. corporate law. There are other federal systems of corporate law, but a similar “Delaware” phenomenon does not exist. The chapter concludes with a summary and suggestions for future research.
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