基于网络物理孪生方法的智能电网网络安全研究

Ömer Sen, Florian Schmidtke, F. Carere, F. Santori, Andreas Ulbig, A. Monti
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在信息和通信技术日益渗透到配电网中带来诸多好处的同时,它也带来了新的威胁,特别是通过网络攻击。为了提供应对此类威胁的对策基础,本文通过在安全、隔离和受控的实验室环境中将电网复制为网络物理孪生体,研究了网络攻击对智能电网的影响和表现。目前,检测未经授权的第三方对电网运营商中央监控系统的入侵,特别是对电网周边的攻击,是一个重大挑战。开发和验证检测和防止对电力系统的协调和定时攻击的方法不仅取决于来自此类攻击场景的数据的可用性和质量,还取决于合适的现实调查环境。然而,为了创造一个全面的调查环境,需要一个真实的研究对象,以深入研究电网运行的关键网络攻击,并使用真实数据评估其对电网的影响。在本文中,我们在网络攻击案例研究的背景下使用微电网演示了我们的网络物理孪生方法。
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Investigating the Cybersecurity of Smart Grids Based on Cyber-Physical Twin Approach
While the increasing penetration of information and communication technology into distribution grid brings numerous benefits, it also opens up a new threat landscape, particularly through cyberattacks. To provide a basis for countermeasures against such threats, this paper addresses the investigation of the impact and manifestations of cyberattacks on smart grids by replicating the power grid in a secure, isolated, and controlled laboratory environment as a cyber-physical twin. Currently, detecting intrusions by unauthorized third parties into the central monitoring and control system of grid operators, especially attacks within the grid perimeter, is a major challenge. The development and validation of methods to detect and prevent coordinated and timed attacks on electric power systems depends not only on the availability and quality of data from such attack scenarios, but also on suitable realistic investigation environments. However, to create a comprehensive investigation environment, a realistic representation of the study object is required to thoroughly investigate critical cyberattacks on grid operations and evaluate their impact on the power grid using real data. In this paper, we demonstrate our cyber-physical twin approach using a microgrid in the context of a cyberattack case study.
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