{"title":"自治与法治","authors":"R. Manrique","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00359.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I am concerned with the belief that the moral value of the rule of law is based upon some kind of connection between the rule of law and the respect and promotion of personal autonomy. I identify and analyse two possible connections: the rule of law as a sufficient condition for the respect and promotion of personal autonomy, and the rule of law as a necessary condition for personal autonomy. My conclusion is that neither of these two connections grants the moral value of the rule of law.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Autonomy and the Rule of Law\",\"authors\":\"R. Manrique\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00359.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper I am concerned with the belief that the moral value of the rule of law is based upon some kind of connection between the rule of law and the respect and promotion of personal autonomy. I identify and analyse two possible connections: the rule of law as a sufficient condition for the respect and promotion of personal autonomy, and the rule of law as a necessary condition for personal autonomy. My conclusion is that neither of these two connections grants the moral value of the rule of law.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431450,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-05-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00359.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00359.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I am concerned with the belief that the moral value of the rule of law is based upon some kind of connection between the rule of law and the respect and promotion of personal autonomy. I identify and analyse two possible connections: the rule of law as a sufficient condition for the respect and promotion of personal autonomy, and the rule of law as a necessary condition for personal autonomy. My conclusion is that neither of these two connections grants the moral value of the rule of law.