信息心理与意识的信息整合理论

D. Gamez
{"title":"信息心理与意识的信息整合理论","authors":"D. Gamez","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400046","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to Aleksander and Morton's informational mind hypothesis, conscious minds are state structures that are created through iconic learning. Distributed representations of colors, edges, objects, etc. are linked with proprioceptive and motor information to generate the awareness of an out-there world. The uniqueness and indivisibility of these iconically learned states reflect the uniqueness and indivisibility of the world. This article summarizes the key claims of the informational mind hypothesis and considers them in relation to Tononi's information integration theory of consciousness. Some suggestions are made about how the informational mind hypothesis could be experimentally tested, and its significance for work on machine consciousness is considered.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Informational Mind and the Information Integration Theory of Consciousness\",\"authors\":\"D. Gamez\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/S1793843014400046\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to Aleksander and Morton's informational mind hypothesis, conscious minds are state structures that are created through iconic learning. Distributed representations of colors, edges, objects, etc. are linked with proprioceptive and motor information to generate the awareness of an out-there world. The uniqueness and indivisibility of these iconically learned states reflect the uniqueness and indivisibility of the world. This article summarizes the key claims of the informational mind hypothesis and considers them in relation to Tononi's information integration theory of consciousness. Some suggestions are made about how the informational mind hypothesis could be experimentally tested, and its significance for work on machine consciousness is considered.\",\"PeriodicalId\":418022,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Machine Consciousness\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Machine Consciousness\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400046\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400046","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

根据亚历山大和莫顿的信息思维假说,意识思维是通过标志性学习创造的状态结构。颜色、边缘、物体等的分布表征与本体感受和运动信息相联系,从而产生对外部世界的意识。这些标志性学习状态的独特性和不可分割性反映了世界的独特性和不可分割性。本文总结了信息心理假说的主要主张,并将其与托诺尼的意识信息整合理论联系起来进行了探讨。对信息心理假说的实验验证提出了一些建议,并对其在机器意识研究中的意义进行了思考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The Informational Mind and the Information Integration Theory of Consciousness
According to Aleksander and Morton's informational mind hypothesis, conscious minds are state structures that are created through iconic learning. Distributed representations of colors, edges, objects, etc. are linked with proprioceptive and motor information to generate the awareness of an out-there world. The uniqueness and indivisibility of these iconically learned states reflect the uniqueness and indivisibility of the world. This article summarizes the key claims of the informational mind hypothesis and considers them in relation to Tononi's information integration theory of consciousness. Some suggestions are made about how the informational mind hypothesis could be experimentally tested, and its significance for work on machine consciousness is considered.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness Robotic Dreams: A Computational Justification for the Post-Hoc Processing of Episodic Memories Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts : What Existing Artifacts Fail to Achieve (and Why), and Why They, Nevertheless, Can (and Do!) Make Moral Claims Upon Us A Novel Theory of Consciousness A Mechanistic Theory of Consciousness
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1