上游市场结构与下游交叉持股

Jie Shuai, Mengyuan Xia, Chenhang Zeng
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引用次数: 2

摘要

现有的交叉持股研究往往忽略了垂直相关市场的影响。本文通过考虑不同的上游市场结构,强调了上游市场对下游企业交叉持股动机的重要性以及由此产生的福利影响。在主模型中,我们假设下游市场有三家公司,其中两家可能会交叉持股。我们发现,首先,如果上游市场是寡头垄断(三寡头或双寡头),两家公司将进行交叉控股。第二,交叉持有可以刺激总产出,也可以刺激消费者福利和社会福利。这种情况发生在上游市场由双寡头垄断构成,并且参与交叉控股的两家公司由不同的供应商提供。第三,文学作品中常见的搭便车者可能成为交叉持有的受害者。更具体地说,当上游市场为三方垄断,或上游市场为双寡头垄断,且外部企业与被收购企业共享同一供应商时,没有参与交叉控股的外部企业遭受交叉控股损失。我们的主要结果对于一般的n-公司框架是稳健的。
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Upstream Market Structure and Downstream Cross Holding
Existing studies on cross holding usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper, by considering different upstream market structures, highlights the importance of upstream market on downstream firms’ incentives to engage cross holding and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may engage cross holding. We find that first, the two firms will engage cross holding if the upstream market is oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, cross holding may stimulate the total production, as well as consumer welfare and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of duopoly and the two firms involved in cross holding are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the common free-rider in the literature may become a victim of cross holding. More specifically, the firm that is not involved in cross holding, outsider, suffers a loss from cross holding when the upstream market is triopoly, or the upstream market is duopoly and the outsider shares the same supplier with the acquired firm. Our main results are robust to a general n-firms framework.
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