Existing studies on cross holding usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper, by considering different upstream market structures, highlights the importance of upstream market on downstream firms’ incentives to engage cross holding and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may engage cross holding. We find that first, the two firms will engage cross holding if the upstream market is oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, cross holding may stimulate the total production, as well as consumer welfare and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of duopoly and the two firms involved in cross holding are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the common free-rider in the literature may become a victim of cross holding. More specifically, the firm that is not involved in cross holding, outsider, suffers a loss from cross holding when the upstream market is triopoly, or the upstream market is duopoly and the outsider shares the same supplier with the acquired firm. Our main results are robust to a general n-firms framework.
{"title":"Upstream Market Structure and Downstream Cross Holding","authors":"Jie Shuai, Mengyuan Xia, Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3189303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3189303","url":null,"abstract":"Existing studies on cross holding usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper, by considering different upstream market structures, highlights the importance of upstream market on downstream firms’ incentives to engage cross holding and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may engage cross holding. We find that first, the two firms will engage cross holding if the upstream market is oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, cross holding may stimulate the total production, as well as consumer welfare and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of duopoly and the two firms involved in cross holding are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the common free-rider in the literature may become a victim of cross holding. More specifically, the firm that is not involved in cross holding, outsider, suffers a loss from cross holding when the upstream market is triopoly, or the upstream market is duopoly and the outsider shares the same supplier with the acquired firm. Our main results are robust to a general n-firms framework.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134406030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christian von Falkenhausen, M. Fleischmann, C. Bode
Responsiveness is considered a “basis of competition” attribute of supply chain performance (APICS 2016). Nonetheless, there remains ambiguity under which conditions a supply chain that is fast enough to fulfill customers’ lead time requirements constitutes competitive advantage. We examine the benefits and costs associated with supply chain responsiveness using secondary data from a leading chemicals manufacturer. Our results indicate that responsiveness can improve financial performance in two distinct ways: either by matching supply and demand or by decreasing supply-chain-related costs depending on the characteristics of the products that are being sold. Based on these findings, this study advances well-known frameworks in supply chain strategy (Fisher’s framework) and performance management (SCOR model).
{"title":"Performance Outcomes of Responsiveness: When Should Supply Chains Be Fast?","authors":"Christian von Falkenhausen, M. Fleischmann, C. Bode","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2985445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985445","url":null,"abstract":"Responsiveness is considered a “basis of competition” attribute of supply chain performance (APICS 2016). Nonetheless, there remains ambiguity under which conditions a supply chain that is fast enough to fulfill customers’ lead time requirements constitutes competitive advantage. We examine the benefits and costs associated with supply chain responsiveness using secondary data from a leading chemicals manufacturer. Our results indicate that responsiveness can improve financial performance in two distinct ways: either by matching supply and demand or by decreasing supply-chain-related costs depending on the characteristics of the products that are being sold. Based on these findings, this study advances well-known frameworks in supply chain strategy (Fisher’s framework) and performance management (SCOR model).","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126978653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-27DOI: 10.1108/BPMJ-05-2015-0060
Irene Kilubi
– The purpose of this paper is to analyse the intellectual structure and research fronts of discipline of supply chain risk management (SCRM), in order to identify the knowledge groups in the research area to date, as well as to reveal any relationships between these subfields and the central influential trends. , – By means of a bibliometric study, the 32 most co-cited articles on SCRM published in 16 top business-related academic journals are analysed using multivariate statistical techniques, i.e. multi-dimensional scaling, cluster analysis and correspondence factor analysis. , – The results demonstrate a clearly identifiable structure as a result of the performed co-citation analysis. The conducted cluster analysis and factor bring forward that the research field is arranged in five different areas of interest: explaining supply chain (SC) risk phenomena, concepts, frameworks and insights of SCRM; modelling risks for SCs; inventory risks affecting supply efficiency; SC and product design methods; and SC risk mitigating strategies. , – Overall, the intellectual structure of SCRM is first examined through a bibliometric approach using quantitative techniques – for improved understanding of its origins, and to identify the state of the science – and to offer suggestions for future studies that could cover current gaps. This study represents the potential to advance the SCRM literature landscape.
{"title":"Investigating Current Paradigms in Supply Chain Risk Management – A Bibliometric Study","authors":"Irene Kilubi","doi":"10.1108/BPMJ-05-2015-0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/BPMJ-05-2015-0060","url":null,"abstract":"– The purpose of this paper is to analyse the intellectual structure and research fronts of discipline of supply chain risk management (SCRM), in order to identify the knowledge groups in the research area to date, as well as to reveal any relationships between these subfields and the central influential trends. , – By means of a bibliometric study, the 32 most co-cited articles on SCRM published in 16 top business-related academic journals are analysed using multivariate statistical techniques, i.e. multi-dimensional scaling, cluster analysis and correspondence factor analysis. , – The results demonstrate a clearly identifiable structure as a result of the performed co-citation analysis. The conducted cluster analysis and factor bring forward that the research field is arranged in five different areas of interest: explaining supply chain (SC) risk phenomena, concepts, frameworks and insights of SCRM; modelling risks for SCs; inventory risks affecting supply efficiency; SC and product design methods; and SC risk mitigating strategies. , – Overall, the intellectual structure of SCRM is first examined through a bibliometric approach using quantitative techniques – for improved understanding of its origins, and to identify the state of the science – and to offer suggestions for future studies that could cover current gaps. This study represents the potential to advance the SCRM literature landscape.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125068705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies mergers in two-sided markets by estimating a structural supply-and-demand model using data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in U.S. radio. It makes two main contributions. First, it identifies the conflicting incentives of merged firms to exercise market power on both sides of the market (listeners and advertisers). Second, it disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and changes in supplied ad quantity. I find that between 1996 and 2006 listener welfare increased by 0.2% ( 0.3% from extra variety, -0.1% from changes in ad quantity) and advertiser welfare decreased by 21% per-year (it is composed of 17% drop from variety changes, and extra 5% drop from ad quantity adjustments).
{"title":"Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: Examination of the U.S. Radio Industry","authors":"Przemysław Jeziorski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1700763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1700763","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies mergers in two-sided markets by estimating a structural supply-and-demand model using data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in U.S. radio. It makes two main contributions. First, it identifies the conflicting incentives of merged firms to exercise market power on both sides of the market (listeners and advertisers). Second, it disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and changes in supplied ad quantity. I find that between 1996 and 2006 listener welfare increased by 0.2% ( 0.3% from extra variety, -0.1% from changes in ad quantity) and advertiser welfare decreased by 21% per-year (it is composed of 17% drop from variety changes, and extra 5% drop from ad quantity adjustments).","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116607400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two types of contractual solutions have been proposed for resolving incentive conflicts in vertical relationships: formal and relational i.e., enforceable or not by third parties. Much is known about the optimal structure of formal contracts, but relatively little is known about the structure of relational contracts. We study a core feature of the latter: the conditions leading to continuation of the relationship, whose prospect gives relational contracts their force. We build a formal model of a vertical relationship between two parties that endogenizes the choice of the minimum performance necessary for continuation as a function of the values of contractibles, noncontractibles, and outside options. The model highlights a basic trade-off between providing strong incentives for the present incentive effect and safeguarding relationships for the future termination effect. The stable relationships that follow from a more forgiving contract are more important under certain conditions when a lot of value is jointly created by exchange partners, i.e., high contractible value, high noncontractible value, or unattractive outside options; however, strong incentives from a less forgiving contract are more important under other conditions when a formal contract is insufficient and a relational contract is most important, i.e., high noncontractible relative to contractible value. We discuss implications for the choice of governance of interorganizational relationships.
{"title":"Forgiveness in Vertical Relationships: Incentive and Termination Effects","authors":"Bart S. Vanneste, D. Frank","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1982597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1982597","url":null,"abstract":"Two types of contractual solutions have been proposed for resolving incentive conflicts in vertical relationships: formal and relational i.e., enforceable or not by third parties. Much is known about the optimal structure of formal contracts, but relatively little is known about the structure of relational contracts. We study a core feature of the latter: the conditions leading to continuation of the relationship, whose prospect gives relational contracts their force. We build a formal model of a vertical relationship between two parties that endogenizes the choice of the minimum performance necessary for continuation as a function of the values of contractibles, noncontractibles, and outside options. The model highlights a basic trade-off between providing strong incentives for the present incentive effect and safeguarding relationships for the future termination effect. The stable relationships that follow from a more forgiving contract are more important under certain conditions when a lot of value is jointly created by exchange partners, i.e., high contractible value, high noncontractible value, or unattractive outside options; however, strong incentives from a less forgiving contract are more important under other conditions when a formal contract is insufficient and a relational contract is most important, i.e., high noncontractible relative to contractible value. We discuss implications for the choice of governance of interorganizational relationships.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124234993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Davis, J. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, J. Lerner, Javier Miranda
The impact of private equity on employment outcomes arouses considerable controversy. Critics claim that private equity buyouts bring huge job losses, while private equity groups claim large employment gains. To address the issue, we construct and analyze a new dataset that overcomes many of the limitations in previous research. We examine U.S. private equity transactions from 1980 to 2005, following 4,500 target firms and more than 200,000 establishments before and after acquisition by private equity groups. We compare employment outcomes at target firms and their establishments to controls that have no private equity ties and that are similar in terms of industry, size and age. Our key findings are as follows: (1) Employment declines at target establishments relative to controls in the wake of private equity buyouts. (2) Target establishments create roughly as many new jobs as control establishments post-buyout, but they destroy old jobs at a much faster pace. (3) However, target firms also create new jobs in new establishments at a much faster pace than control firms. Once we account for new establishments opened post-buyout, the net job loss at target firms relative to controls is about 3-4% of initial employment. (4) The sum of gross job creation and destruction rates is much higher at target firms than at controls in the wake of private equity buyouts. (5) These effects differ considerably across broad industry groups and between public-toprivate and private-to-private transactions. Taken together, our results suggest that private equity groups act as a catalyst for creative destruction in the labor market, and that their employment effects vary greatly by sector and type of target.
{"title":"Private Equity and Employment","authors":"S. Davis, J. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, J. Lerner, Javier Miranda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1919055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1919055","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of private equity on employment outcomes arouses considerable controversy. Critics claim that private equity buyouts bring huge job losses, while private equity groups claim large employment gains. To address the issue, we construct and analyze a new dataset that overcomes many of the limitations in previous research. We examine U.S. private equity transactions from 1980 to 2005, following 4,500 target firms and more than 200,000 establishments before and after acquisition by private equity groups. We compare employment outcomes at target firms and their establishments to controls that have no private equity ties and that are similar in terms of industry, size and age. Our key findings are as follows: (1) Employment declines at target establishments relative to controls in the wake of private equity buyouts. (2) Target establishments create roughly as many new jobs as control establishments post-buyout, but they destroy old jobs at a much faster pace. (3) However, target firms also create new jobs in new establishments at a much faster pace than control firms. Once we account for new establishments opened post-buyout, the net job loss at target firms relative to controls is about 3-4% of initial employment. (4) The sum of gross job creation and destruction rates is much higher at target firms than at controls in the wake of private equity buyouts. (5) These effects differ considerably across broad industry groups and between public-toprivate and private-to-private transactions. Taken together, our results suggest that private equity groups act as a catalyst for creative destruction in the labor market, and that their employment effects vary greatly by sector and type of target.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116249027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The cross-border M&A activity has become a highly popular form of corporate activity, and it has become one important type of the foreign direct investment (FDI) as well. The objective of this paper is to examine the consequence of financial depth and the cross-border M&A activity. One of the questions this paper tries to answer is whether the depth of financial markets and other institutional factors play key roles in the M&A decision of firms? We also examine whether the different financial systems and legal systems affect M&A behavior.
{"title":"Financial Depth and Cross-Border M&A Activity","authors":"Shiow-Ying Wen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1869445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1869445","url":null,"abstract":"The cross-border M&A activity has become a highly popular form of corporate activity, and it has become one important type of the foreign direct investment (FDI) as well. The objective of this paper is to examine the consequence of financial depth and the cross-border M&A activity. One of the questions this paper tries to answer is whether the depth of financial markets and other institutional factors play key roles in the M&A decision of firms? We also examine whether the different financial systems and legal systems affect M&A behavior.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123823100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the importance of international trade on intermediate goods, the literature did not pay much attention to this aspect in determining the effects of trade liberalisation in the presence of labour unions. We take up this issue here and show the effects of trade liberalisation on the final goods and/or the intermediate goods, where the domestic firm pays unionised wage and imports intermediate goods from another country. We show that trade liberalisation on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (reduces) the unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic profit. Trade liberalisation on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase or reduce the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure, the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods producer, the union’s objective function and input substitution, yet they affect the results quantitatively.
{"title":"The Effects of Trade Liberalisation in a Vertical Structure","authors":"L. Yao, A. Mukherjee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1722088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1722088","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the importance of international trade on intermediate goods, the literature did not pay much attention to this aspect in determining the effects of trade liberalisation in the presence of labour unions. We take up this issue here and show the effects of trade liberalisation on the final goods and/or the intermediate goods, where the domestic firm pays unionised wage and imports intermediate goods from another country. We show that trade liberalisation on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (reduces) the unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic profit. Trade liberalisation on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase or reduce the domestic unionised wage, labour union’s utility and the domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure, the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods producer, the union’s objective function and input substitution, yet they affect the results quantitatively.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121472942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In July 2010, the management of Reliance Power Ltd and Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. announced merger of the two companies and the share exchange ratio was later set at 1:4. Much has been talked and written in financial press on the validity of this swap ratio. In the present study, we have applied three different approaches - discounted cash flow approach, market value approach and Conn and Nielsen model - to calculate share swap ratio between the two companies. Our analysis shows that the swap ratio fixed the management has been justified.
{"title":"Determination of Swap Ratio in Merger: Case of Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. and Reliance Power Ltd. Merger","authors":"Ravi Agarwal, Vignesh Ramakrishnan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1651451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1651451","url":null,"abstract":"In July 2010, the management of Reliance Power Ltd and Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. announced merger of the two companies and the share exchange ratio was later set at 1:4. Much has been talked and written in financial press on the validity of this swap ratio. In the present study, we have applied three different approaches - discounted cash flow approach, market value approach and Conn and Nielsen model - to calculate share swap ratio between the two companies. Our analysis shows that the swap ratio fixed the management has been justified.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123838123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article argues that organizational sociology would do well to revisit James March’s famed imagery of the business firm as a political coalition in light of today’s decentralized production regimes. Specifically, we show that the increased tendency of firms to coordinate the design and making of highly complex products across organizational boundaries has fundamentally altered and been altered by the politics of coalition building. This is demonstrated using a 15 year longitudinal qualitative case study of the vertical production network that revolves about Fiat Auto. In those years, Fiat went from one of the most vertically integrated automakers in Europe, to one of the least vertically integrated, and has in the wake of a severe crisis now swung back the other way. We argue that this evolution cannot adequately be understood without reference to an interplay of inter- and intra-firm relations, including especially to the spilling of intra-organizational rivalries across firm boundaries, and to the effects of cross-firm coalitions on intra-organizational fights. Analyzing this evolution and these relations from a 'political' perspective allows us to better understand the behavior not merely of particular firms, but also of interacting networks of firms in a world of blurred – but existent – organizational boundaries.
{"title":"The (Vertical) Network Firm as a Political Coalition: The Reorganization of Fiat Auto","authors":"Josh Whitford, Francesco Zirpoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1426860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1426860","url":null,"abstract":"The article argues that organizational sociology would do well to revisit James March’s famed imagery of the business firm as a political coalition in light of today’s decentralized production regimes. Specifically, we show that the increased tendency of firms to coordinate the design and making of highly complex products across organizational boundaries has fundamentally altered and been altered by the politics of coalition building. This is demonstrated using a 15 year longitudinal qualitative case study of the vertical production network that revolves about Fiat Auto. In those years, Fiat went from one of the most vertically integrated automakers in Europe, to one of the least vertically integrated, and has in the wake of a severe crisis now swung back the other way. We argue that this evolution cannot adequately be understood without reference to an interplay of inter- and intra-firm relations, including especially to the spilling of intra-organizational rivalries across firm boundaries, and to the effects of cross-firm coalitions on intra-organizational fights. Analyzing this evolution and these relations from a 'political' perspective allows us to better understand the behavior not merely of particular firms, but also of interacting networks of firms in a world of blurred – but existent – organizational boundaries.","PeriodicalId":170425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Vertical & Horizontal Integration (Topic)","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123176694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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