Seven Kinds of Decisions Sports Coaches Make

AbstractThis article presents typology of coaching decisions based on the kinds of cognitive processes involved, with the aim of helping coaches improve their decisions by helping them better understand the many kinds of decisions they make. The typology has seven primary types – Snap, Simulation, Rule, Metaphor, Analogy, Story, and Pros and Cons – and another special type, Meta. The authors briefly describe each decision type and list some of their strengths and pitfalls. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The need for this typology became clear to both authors in work we were separately doing with elite sports coaches as consultants or trainers. To develop the typology, we reviewed models of decision making from cognitive science, psychology of judgment and decision making, and related fields. We were particularly interested in identifying the types of decisions people frequently make without the need for any training (i.e., “natural” or spontaneous modes of decision making). The seven primary types emerged from this background research. We then checked our list of types against the academic literature on coaching decision making, and against our own experience working directly with coaches. We “reframed” the types by developing a set of labels we hoped would (1) intuitively highlight the essence of each type and its differences with the others, and (2) be clear, useful and memorable for sports coaches. Finally, we sought out compelling, real-world examples of sports coaches making decisions with each of the types.2 There are many such breakdowns in both the academic literature and in more popular works. Our breakdown is similar to that provided in March (Citation2009). We do not treat carrying out the selected option, or implementation, as part of decision making; it is what happens when you follow through on a decision.3 The less valid the environment, the more difficult it is to develop genuine expertise in snap decision making, and when the stakes are high, the more valuable any increment of expertise becomes. In weakly valid environments, great coaches’ snap decisions will be only marginally more reliable than those of average coaches, but such marginal differences can have a big impact on overall success.4 More accurately, simulation decisions are one variant of recognition-primed decisions. Klein (Citation2017) presented three variants, and simulation decisions are the third or “integrated” variant. The first is equivalent to snap decisions in our typology, and the second is an intermediate case. In our view, “simulation decision” is a more useful label in the context of this typology than “recognition-primed decision, integrated variant,” bringing out in a more simple and useful way what makes these decisions distinctively different to the other types.5 Klein and Crandall (Citation1995, Citation1996) have argued that mental simulation can lead to several types of decision errors, including overconfidence in the likelihood that a course of action will be successful, explaining away disconfirming evidence by finding counterexplanations, and failing to perform a thorough mental simulation to investigate the risks of carrying out a course of action.6 They do.Additional informationNotes on contributors Ger PostGer Post (ger.post@unimelb.edu.au) is a lecturer in the Department of Anatomy & Physiology at the University of Melbourne in Melbourne, Australia.Tim van GelderTim van Gelder is director of the Hunt Lab for Intelligence Research, University of Melbourne in Melbourne, Australia.