{"title":"不可兑换损失和murabaha:伊斯兰政治风险保险公司的一种恢复选择","authors":"Mohamed El-Fatih Hamid, Mirghani Hassan","doi":"10.33102/mjsl.vol11no2.435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to illustrate the primacy of the Shari’a-compliant murabaha transaction as a means of inconvertibility loss recovery by Islamic political risk insurers. In practical terms, the risk most likely to occur in an underdeveloped Muslim country is the risk of the local currency becoming inconvertible because of a certain action or inaction by the authorities of the host country which is the destination of an export trade transaction, or a foreign direct investment covered under a political risk insurance policy. The political risk insurance (PRI) operator most concerned with the subject of this paper is the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC), a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group. Where the PRI operator is established within the auspices of a lending agency which lends in local currency, and provided that the necessary legal arrangements are in place, the PRI’s local currency holdings could be passed on to the lending agency in the host country and the foreign currency equivalent thereof paid over to the PRI operator at its head office. In countries where a lender is not extending local currency financing and a speedy economic recovery is not expected, an attractive alternative for a PRI operator, as the authors argue, is the utilization of the local currency in murabaha transactions. PRI operators’ apprehension about the risk of inconvertibility finds expression in denial of the inconvertibility coverage altogether. Where this is not the case, a PRI operator may impose recovery ceilings, demand the expiry of extended waiting periods, as well as compliance with a variety of other conditions prior to recovery. This paper argues that such measures are self-defeating. A Shari’a-compliant PRI operator is necessarily established to provide coverage against commercial and non-commercial risks in poor Muslim countries. To deny or restrict inconvertibility risk coverage in such countries is unacceptable. Murabaha is a panacea for currency inconvertibility: it is the most popular form of Islamic financing in the world, it is easy to structure, and its profits are almost certainly rewarding. While the risk of non-payment of the price by overseas buyers of Muslim country exports is minimal, risks associated with murabahacould be further minimized by means of export credit insurance coverage by local export promotion agencies.","PeriodicalId":34345,"journal":{"name":"Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"INCONVERTIBILITY LOSS AND MURABAHA: A RECOVERY OPTION FOR ISLAMIC POLITICAL RISK INSURERS\",\"authors\":\"Mohamed El-Fatih Hamid, Mirghani Hassan\",\"doi\":\"10.33102/mjsl.vol11no2.435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper attempts to illustrate the primacy of the Shari’a-compliant murabaha transaction as a means of inconvertibility loss recovery by Islamic political risk insurers. In practical terms, the risk most likely to occur in an underdeveloped Muslim country is the risk of the local currency becoming inconvertible because of a certain action or inaction by the authorities of the host country which is the destination of an export trade transaction, or a foreign direct investment covered under a political risk insurance policy. The political risk insurance (PRI) operator most concerned with the subject of this paper is the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC), a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group. Where the PRI operator is established within the auspices of a lending agency which lends in local currency, and provided that the necessary legal arrangements are in place, the PRI’s local currency holdings could be passed on to the lending agency in the host country and the foreign currency equivalent thereof paid over to the PRI operator at its head office. In countries where a lender is not extending local currency financing and a speedy economic recovery is not expected, an attractive alternative for a PRI operator, as the authors argue, is the utilization of the local currency in murabaha transactions. PRI operators’ apprehension about the risk of inconvertibility finds expression in denial of the inconvertibility coverage altogether. Where this is not the case, a PRI operator may impose recovery ceilings, demand the expiry of extended waiting periods, as well as compliance with a variety of other conditions prior to recovery. This paper argues that such measures are self-defeating. A Shari’a-compliant PRI operator is necessarily established to provide coverage against commercial and non-commercial risks in poor Muslim countries. To deny or restrict inconvertibility risk coverage in such countries is unacceptable. Murabaha is a panacea for currency inconvertibility: it is the most popular form of Islamic financing in the world, it is easy to structure, and its profits are almost certainly rewarding. While the risk of non-payment of the price by overseas buyers of Muslim country exports is minimal, risks associated with murabahacould be further minimized by means of export credit insurance coverage by local export promotion agencies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":34345,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.33102/mjsl.vol11no2.435\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.33102/mjsl.vol11no2.435","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
INCONVERTIBILITY LOSS AND MURABAHA: A RECOVERY OPTION FOR ISLAMIC POLITICAL RISK INSURERS
This paper attempts to illustrate the primacy of the Shari’a-compliant murabaha transaction as a means of inconvertibility loss recovery by Islamic political risk insurers. In practical terms, the risk most likely to occur in an underdeveloped Muslim country is the risk of the local currency becoming inconvertible because of a certain action or inaction by the authorities of the host country which is the destination of an export trade transaction, or a foreign direct investment covered under a political risk insurance policy. The political risk insurance (PRI) operator most concerned with the subject of this paper is the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC), a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group. Where the PRI operator is established within the auspices of a lending agency which lends in local currency, and provided that the necessary legal arrangements are in place, the PRI’s local currency holdings could be passed on to the lending agency in the host country and the foreign currency equivalent thereof paid over to the PRI operator at its head office. In countries where a lender is not extending local currency financing and a speedy economic recovery is not expected, an attractive alternative for a PRI operator, as the authors argue, is the utilization of the local currency in murabaha transactions. PRI operators’ apprehension about the risk of inconvertibility finds expression in denial of the inconvertibility coverage altogether. Where this is not the case, a PRI operator may impose recovery ceilings, demand the expiry of extended waiting periods, as well as compliance with a variety of other conditions prior to recovery. This paper argues that such measures are self-defeating. A Shari’a-compliant PRI operator is necessarily established to provide coverage against commercial and non-commercial risks in poor Muslim countries. To deny or restrict inconvertibility risk coverage in such countries is unacceptable. Murabaha is a panacea for currency inconvertibility: it is the most popular form of Islamic financing in the world, it is easy to structure, and its profits are almost certainly rewarding. While the risk of non-payment of the price by overseas buyers of Muslim country exports is minimal, risks associated with murabahacould be further minimized by means of export credit insurance coverage by local export promotion agencies.