Queer Ontogeny and the Circuits of Sexuality; or, On the Queerness of Theory

Queer theory has a problem. This problem does not belong uniquely to queer theory, for it is common to and has consequences for all theory— social, psychological, literary, natural scientific, or otherwise—that seeks categories for the explanation of human phenomena. Queer theory, however, encounters and embodies this problem in uniquely significant ways. Queer theory seems, in fact, to have developed largely out of the friction generated by this problem in other earlier forms of theory—and may thus, ironically, contain the only adequate answer to it.1 This problem is also hardly new, for it has exercised philosophers and critics from Kierkegaard to Feyerabend, from Kant to Žižek, from Schelling to de Man, Adorno, and Butler. It is the misery and the majesty of all theory. It is the tyranny of the universal over the particular.