Vassilios Paipais, ed. Theology and World Politics: Metaphysics, Genealogies, Political Theologies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Pp. xiv + 349. Political theology represents one of the most fundamental subfields of contemporary political theory and international political theory. Since the 1920s, when Carl Schmitt introduced the respective terminology in the broader field of social and political sciences, political theology has developed in a dynamic way, composing, one way or another, a broader interdisciplinary field in which philosophy, theology, and politics are fruitfully interconnected.
{"title":"Toward a Theopolitical of the “International”","authors":"Spiros Makris","doi":"10.3817/0623203171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0623203171","url":null,"abstract":"Vassilios Paipais, ed. Theology and World Politics: Metaphysics, Genealogies, Political Theologies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Pp. xiv + 349. Political theology represents one of the most fundamental subfields of contemporary political theory and international political theory. Since the 1920s, when Carl Schmitt introduced the respective terminology in the broader field of social and political sciences, political theology has developed in a dynamic way, composing, one way or another, a broader interdisciplinary field in which philosophy, theology, and politics are fruitfully interconnected.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76126321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the spring of 2021, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, received a non-paper titled “West Balkans—A Way Forward.” The scandalous paper envisaged a redrawing of several national borders in the West Balkans. Among other changes, it proposed “the unification of Kosovo and Albania” and the “joining of larger parts of the Republika Srpska’s territory with Serbia.”1 However, this scandalous proposition, which the EU preferred to meet with silence, was not limited to a redrawing of the borders. What was also scandalous was the ratio of the proposed territorial changes. The redrawing was proposed along the lines of ethnic majorities populating the regions in question (Albanians in Kosovo or Serbs in the Republika Srpska). While the state borders were drawn following a logic of ethnicity, the idea of a multiethnic nation seemed to exceed the imagination of the paper’s authors. For them, nations were to be ethnically homogeneous.
{"title":"Constitutional Origins of Ethnic Nationalism: Cultural Aporia of a Nation-State","authors":"Zaal Andronikashvili","doi":"10.3817/0323202123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0323202123","url":null,"abstract":"In the spring of 2021, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, received a non-paper titled “West Balkans—A Way Forward.” The scandalous paper envisaged a redrawing of several national borders in the West Balkans. Among other changes, it proposed “the unification of Kosovo and Albania” and the “joining of larger parts of the Republika Srpska’s territory with Serbia.”1 However, this scandalous proposition, which the EU preferred to meet with silence, was not limited to a redrawing of the borders. What was also scandalous was the ratio of the proposed territorial changes. The redrawing was proposed along the lines of ethnic majorities populating the regions in question (Albanians in Kosovo or Serbs in the Republika Srpska). While the state borders were drawn following a logic of ethnicity, the idea of a multiethnic nation seemed to exceed the imagination of the paper’s authors. For them, nations were to be ethnically homogeneous.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77372892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1. Introduction Constructing narratives that can combat people’s unease about their sense of belonging, by providing a sense of certainty and steadfastness, is a recurrent affect in the history of humanity.1 Perhaps change is, however, the only constant in this history. Over a hundred years ago, Max Weber bemoaned the transition to a rationalized modernity as “the disenchantment of the world,”2 which in turn had been inspired by similar concerns expressed by Friedrich Schiller in his poem “The Gods of Greece” (“Die Götter Griechenlands”) at the end of the eighteenth century.3 Intensifying scholarly debates across the humanities and social sciences, asking questions about what people experience as fundamental changes to the fabric of their lived realities and how they cope with it, further indicate that Western societies are in transition in the present day. There is, however, disagreement over whether the human condition simply observes changes or whether it transforms into a qualitatively new stage, one that has been termed postmodernity, late modernity, and liquid modernity.4 Nevertheless, there is a consensus among scholars that contemporary realities unfold in contrast to social imaginaries that have defined Western societies and senses of belonging since the “global transformation” took place in the nineteenth century. This transformation still “underpins core aspects of contemporary international relations,” as Barry Buzan and George Lawson contend.5 Even today, social imaginaries are narrated—and criticized as such—in grand terms, often with a focus on the nation and a (however conceived) glorious future.
{"title":"Identity Discourses in Western Late Modernity and the Notion of “Liminal Space”","authors":"H. Behr, Felix Rösch","doi":"10.3817/0323202103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0323202103","url":null,"abstract":"1. Introduction Constructing narratives that can combat people’s unease about their sense of belonging, by providing a sense of certainty and steadfastness, is a recurrent affect in the history of humanity.1 Perhaps change is, however, the only constant in this history. Over a hundred years ago, Max Weber bemoaned the transition to a rationalized modernity as “the disenchantment of the world,”2 which in turn had been inspired by similar concerns expressed by Friedrich Schiller in his poem “The Gods of Greece” (“Die Götter Griechenlands”) at the end of the eighteenth century.3 Intensifying scholarly debates across the humanities and social sciences, asking questions about what people experience as fundamental changes to the fabric of their lived realities and how they cope with it, further indicate that Western societies are in transition in the present day. There is, however, disagreement over whether the human condition simply observes changes or whether it transforms into a qualitatively new stage, one that has been termed postmodernity, late modernity, and liquid modernity.4 Nevertheless, there is a consensus among scholars that contemporary realities unfold in contrast to social imaginaries that have defined Western societies and senses of belonging since the “global transformation” took place in the nineteenth century. This transformation still “underpins core aspects of contemporary international relations,” as Barry Buzan and George Lawson contend.5 Even today, social imaginaries are narrated—and criticized as such—in grand terms, often with a focus on the nation and a (however conceived) glorious future.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83743649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Queer theory has a problem. This problem does not belong uniquely to queer theory, for it is common to and has consequences for all theory— social, psychological, literary, natural scientific, or otherwise—that seeks categories for the explanation of human phenomena. Queer theory, however, encounters and embodies this problem in uniquely significant ways. Queer theory seems, in fact, to have developed largely out of the friction generated by this problem in other earlier forms of theory—and may thus, ironically, contain the only adequate answer to it.1 This problem is also hardly new, for it has exercised philosophers and critics from Kierkegaard to Feyerabend, from Kant to Žižek, from Schelling to de Man, Adorno, and Butler. It is the misery and the majesty of all theory. It is the tyranny of the universal over the particular.
{"title":"Queer Ontogeny and the Circuits of Sexuality; or, On the Queerness of Theory","authors":"Kevin S. Amidon","doi":"10.3817/0923204101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0923204101","url":null,"abstract":"Queer theory has a problem. This problem does not belong uniquely to queer theory, for it is common to and has consequences for all theory— social, psychological, literary, natural scientific, or otherwise—that seeks categories for the explanation of human phenomena. Queer theory, however, encounters and embodies this problem in uniquely significant ways. Queer theory seems, in fact, to have developed largely out of the friction generated by this problem in other earlier forms of theory—and may thus, ironically, contain the only adequate answer to it.1 This problem is also hardly new, for it has exercised philosophers and critics from Kierkegaard to Feyerabend, from Kant to Žižek, from Schelling to de Man, Adorno, and Butler. It is the misery and the majesty of all theory. It is the tyranny of the universal over the particular.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135007537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The reasons why individual nations and even individual people subscribe to notions of human rights vary enormously. Rationales range from idealism to realpolitik and sound in competing registers of theology, social contract, nature, utility, and game theory.1 Pervasive in discussions of human rights is the dignity of each person as both a reality and a normative guide. Capacious and ambiguous, this notion of dignity may invite agreement precisely because different people project different meanings onto it. Its recognition, though, can inspire attitudes of respect and civility even when we disagree. Dignity thus serves less as a foundation and more as a lodestar, an aspiration. Justice Thurgood Marshall once explained, “A child born to a [B]lack mother in a state like Mississippi… has exactly the same rights as a white baby born to the wealthiest person in the United States. It’s not true, but I challenge anyone to say it is not a goal worth working for.”2
{"title":"Dignity and Human Rights: Aspirations and Challenges in an Age of Political Divisions, Distrust, and AI","authors":"M. Minow","doi":"10.3817/0623203021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0623203021","url":null,"abstract":"The reasons why individual nations and even individual people subscribe to notions of human rights vary enormously. Rationales range from idealism to realpolitik and sound in competing registers of theology, social contract, nature, utility, and game theory.1 Pervasive in discussions of human rights is the dignity of each person as both a reality and a normative guide. Capacious and ambiguous, this notion of dignity may invite agreement precisely because different people project different meanings onto it. Its recognition, though, can inspire attitudes of respect and civility even when we disagree. Dignity thus serves less as a foundation and more as a lodestar, an aspiration. Justice Thurgood Marshall once explained, “A child born to a [B]lack mother in a state like Mississippi… has exactly the same rights as a white baby born to the wealthiest person in the United States. It’s not true, but I challenge anyone to say it is not a goal worth working for.”2","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90580120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1. Introduction It is an increasingly accepted protocol to situate oneself discursively in order to approach a set of problems. This protocol, consolidated by Donna Haraway’s famous “situated knowledge,” is also evident in everyday Indigenous Australian practice.1 I begin, therefore, with my long association with the Goolarabooloo community in Broome, North-West Australia, and in particular with Paddy Roe, who started teaching me in the late 1970s. This text attempts to translate his sense of belonging to that territory, an attachment he had to struggle to maintain, both in the face of ongoing destructive colonization and also in the face of other Aboriginal territorial claims. These collective attachments are therefore inflected by history—not just settler history, but Indigenous history that has changed in relation to colonization. These changes are wrought through overwhelmingly rapid material changes, shifting institutional alliances, contested concepts, and new practices. This ethnographic history is an attempt to provide an overview of some of these changes in the North-West corner of Australia over the last forty years.
{"title":"Belonging in Aboriginal Australia: A Political “Cosmography”","authors":"S. Muecke","doi":"10.3817/0323202067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0323202067","url":null,"abstract":"1. Introduction It is an increasingly accepted protocol to situate oneself discursively in order to approach a set of problems. This protocol, consolidated by Donna Haraway’s famous “situated knowledge,” is also evident in everyday Indigenous Australian practice.1 I begin, therefore, with my long association with the Goolarabooloo community in Broome, North-West Australia, and in particular with Paddy Roe, who started teaching me in the late 1970s. This text attempts to translate his sense of belonging to that territory, an attachment he had to struggle to maintain, both in the face of ongoing destructive colonization and also in the face of other Aboriginal territorial claims. These collective attachments are therefore inflected by history—not just settler history, but Indigenous history that has changed in relation to colonization. These changes are wrought through overwhelmingly rapid material changes, shifting institutional alliances, contested concepts, and new practices. This ethnographic history is an attempt to provide an overview of some of these changes in the North-West corner of Australia over the last forty years.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78928240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Lloyd Dusenbury, The Innocence of Pontius Pilate: How the Roman Trial of Jesus Shaped History. London: Hurst Publishers, 2021. Pp. 272. The Innocence of Pontius Pilate by David L. Dusenbury of the Danube Institute is a profound reflection on the differentiation of secular and religious authority that should excite theologians, historians, believers, as well as historical sociologists. The point of departure is the question of the innocence or guilt of Pilate, the Roman magistrate who condemned Jesus to death, which has been a contested issue from soon after Jesus died to modern New Testament criticism. Was Pilate guilty of the highest crime— deicide—or had he been, in some sense, innocent or even just? More interesting than a mere overview of how different epochs and authors received the Pilate story, Dusenbury’s book investigates the ramifications of the only sense in which Pilate was innocent: he was innocent of an understanding of a kingdom not of this earth. As Paul puts it succinctly in I Corinthians: “None of the rulers of this age (saeculum) understood this [other kingdom]—for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (55).
{"title":"The Early Christian Origins of Secularization","authors":"Eric Hendriks-Kim","doi":"10.3817/0323202155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0323202155","url":null,"abstract":"David Lloyd Dusenbury, The Innocence of Pontius Pilate: How the Roman Trial of Jesus Shaped History. London: Hurst Publishers, 2021. Pp. 272. The Innocence of Pontius Pilate by David L. Dusenbury of the Danube Institute is a profound reflection on the differentiation of secular and religious authority that should excite theologians, historians, believers, as well as historical sociologists. The point of departure is the question of the innocence or guilt of Pilate, the Roman magistrate who condemned Jesus to death, which has been a contested issue from soon after Jesus died to modern New Testament criticism. Was Pilate guilty of the highest crime— deicide—or had he been, in some sense, innocent or even just? More interesting than a mere overview of how different epochs and authors received the Pilate story, Dusenbury’s book investigates the ramifications of the only sense in which Pilate was innocent: he was innocent of an understanding of a kingdom not of this earth. As Paul puts it succinctly in I Corinthians: “None of the rulers of this age (saeculum) understood this [other kingdom]—for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (55).","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72777743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When the U.S. State Department Commission on Unalienable Rights issued its report1 on August 26, 2020, one of the questions most frequently asked by journalists was: “What do you expect to become of it?” Or, as one put it more bluntly, “What will prevent this report from just accumulating dust on some forgotten library shelf?”
{"title":"The Commission on Unalienable Rights: Where Do We Go from Here?","authors":"M. Glendon","doi":"10.3817/0623203011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0623203011","url":null,"abstract":"When the U.S. State Department Commission on Unalienable Rights issued its report1 on August 26, 2020, one of the questions most frequently asked by journalists was: “What do you expect to become of it?” Or, as one put it more bluntly, “What will prevent this report from just accumulating dust on some forgotten library shelf?”","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76569133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As we near the semicentennial of the 1976 publication of the first volume of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, for all its influence in the interim, this work remains today extraordinarily challenging in relation to our sexual mores. In this article, I will attempt to reapply its insights to analyze contemporary trends in sexuality and gender. Questions that I will consider include the continuing applicability of Foucault’s analyses, to what extent and how they may need to be revised in light of historical developments, and what reading Foucault can tell us about our contemporary conjuncture. I will argue that volume 1 of The History of Sexuality remains highly relevant in this regard, although I will also indicate some ways in which things have moved on since Foucault’s time, and thus in which his thesis might be modified. Despite Foucault having apparently been extremely influential on academic thinking about sex, we seem nonetheless to have become or remained “other Victorians,” perversely mimicking the nineteenth-century sexology that Foucault pilloried. I will argue that we have continued to believe exactly the great myths about sex that Foucault sought to dispense with: namely, that sexuality has primarily been shaped by historic “repression,” that sexuality needs to be “liberated” from this repression, and that there is a “truth of sex” that is on the side of freedom. These beliefs have all mutated, however, to the extent that questions of sex (like many other social questions) are increasingly oriented around individual identities and the supposed sovereignty of the individual to determine their own truth.
{"title":"<i>We, Voluntary Victorians: Foucault’s</i>History of Sexuality<i>Volume 1 Revisited</i>","authors":"Mark G. E. Kelly","doi":"10.3817/0923204081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0923204081","url":null,"abstract":"As we near the semicentennial of the 1976 publication of the first volume of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, for all its influence in the interim, this work remains today extraordinarily challenging in relation to our sexual mores. In this article, I will attempt to reapply its insights to analyze contemporary trends in sexuality and gender. Questions that I will consider include the continuing applicability of Foucault’s analyses, to what extent and how they may need to be revised in light of historical developments, and what reading Foucault can tell us about our contemporary conjuncture. I will argue that volume 1 of The History of Sexuality remains highly relevant in this regard, although I will also indicate some ways in which things have moved on since Foucault’s time, and thus in which his thesis might be modified. Despite Foucault having apparently been extremely influential on academic thinking about sex, we seem nonetheless to have become or remained “other Victorians,” perversely mimicking the nineteenth-century sexology that Foucault pilloried. I will argue that we have continued to believe exactly the great myths about sex that Foucault sought to dispense with: namely, that sexuality has primarily been shaped by historic “repression,” that sexuality needs to be “liberated” from this repression, and that there is a “truth of sex” that is on the side of freedom. These beliefs have all mutated, however, to the extent that questions of sex (like many other social questions) are increasingly oriented around individual identities and the supposed sovereignty of the individual to determine their own truth.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135006886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the great achievements of American history has been the development of a broad consensus that racial discrimination has no place in our society, to the point that there is virtually no one who would openly espouse racist views. Even the divisions concerning affirmative action presume an underlying consensus that racial discrimination needs to be opposed and eliminated. The primary dispute is about the means of achieving a society without racism. Thus, in their differing reactions to the Supreme Court’s ruling against affirmative action in college admissions in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times still agreed on the basic goal of eliminating racial discrimination.1 The disagreements are about the means to this end. In fact, there are good reasons to conclude that the end of affirmative action will help Blacks and Hispanics.
{"title":"The End of Affirmative Action Will Help Blacks and Hispanics","authors":"Pan Pan","doi":"10.3817/0923204163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0923204163","url":null,"abstract":"One of the great achievements of American history has been the development of a broad consensus that racial discrimination has no place in our society, to the point that there is virtually no one who would openly espouse racist views. Even the divisions concerning affirmative action presume an underlying consensus that racial discrimination needs to be opposed and eliminated. The primary dispute is about the means of achieving a society without racism. Thus, in their differing reactions to the Supreme Court’s ruling against affirmative action in college admissions in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times still agreed on the basic goal of eliminating racial discrimination.1 The disagreements are about the means to this end. In fact, there are good reasons to conclude that the end of affirmative action will help Blacks and Hispanics.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135006889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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