Balancing opportunity: Between the presumption of innocence and res judicata

The criminal-political justification of the principle of opportunity is undoubtedly of significant importance for criminal justice, with multiple and diverse objectives and functions. Despite the fact that the application of this criminal procedural mechanism in public prosecution practice has been ongoing for over two decades, research results indicate that essential questions regarding its legal and procedural nature remain veiled in dilemmas even today - whether the suspect subject to its application should be considered innocent, and whether the decision to dismiss a criminal complaint based on the principle of opportunity can be equated with the res judicata. The paper presents specific research results regarding the interpretation of the effects of applying the principle of opportunity in criminal proceedings and the legal effects of decisions to dismiss criminal complaints based on the principle of opportunity in civil proceedings for compensation of damages arising from a "criminal act." By analyzing the concepts expressed in criminal legal science and utilizing the comparative legal method to a certain relevant extent, the authors aim to, starting from the procedural guarantee of the presumption of innocence, highlight the risks of equating the decision to dismiss a criminal complaint based on the application of the principle of opportunity with a final judgment. The primary de lege ferenda proposal is to establish a prohibition on criminal prosecution for the same criminal offense in cases of applying the principle of opportunity.