一个教室和一个诊断,或者,暂停的珍贵

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 ANTHROPOLOGY Polar-Political and Legal Anthropology Review Pub Date : 2023-09-29 DOI:10.1111/plar.12538
Ridhima Sharma
{"title":"一个教室和一个诊断,或者,暂停的珍贵","authors":"Ridhima Sharma","doi":"10.1111/plar.12538","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It was late September last year. I was a few weeks into a graduate seminar that had quickly turned into one of my favorites. Anthropology of the Otherwise taught by Dr Naisargi Dave at the University of Toronto over the Fall of 2022. Drawing on the concept of “otherwise worlds” by Elizabeth Povinelli (2012), the seminar explored what is not there yet, and what might be1, the world as it is and it is becoming, and what political and ethical alternatives exist in worlds that are determined to deplete and exhaust. Some thinkers, some teachers, some books, and some classmates make it possible to truly inhabit and practice the creative pulse of thought; they take us to places we did not know exist—they create places. The otherwise seminar was one of those experiences, taking me to a different place each week. But in some ways, also the same—from another route, another angle, another field of view and possibility, all in wonderful company. Dionne Brand's A Map to the Door of No Return one week. Political manifestos, another. Freud and psychoanalysis in the middle. Around the same time, another kind of world-making was underway in my life. A loved one who had been a cherished presence for many years and lived in another continent (let's call him Sunflower—or just S, oh the fear of not being taken seriously!) was starting to act in ways that I could not comprehend. I had known and loved S for many years. More importantly, I liked him very much. But I had begun to find it straining to like him. I would find out 3 months later that these were the beginnings of what would be diagnosed as S's “first manic episode”. I would make an emergency visit to India and make possible his “forced sedation” and hospitalization at a psychiatric facility. In what follows, I write about the coming in contact of these two moments—the otherwise classroom and S's diagnosis, and how this serendipitous contact aided what can sometimes appear to be the most difficult thing to do—just getting by, possibly as an otherwise practice and an ethic of alongside-ness. Here, I think about that (ongoing) moment and some questions it raises about ethical and political ways of “becoming” in the world alongside one another. In doing so, I think about what it means to take care of each another and what is there to do, if anything at all, when we are exhausted—by diagnosis, by caregiving, by the limits that an oppressive world forces upon us, and, perhaps by the limits of politics and ethics themselves? Can an otherwise world emerge amid such exhaustion and what might it look like? For better or for worse, I have often seen the world through my classroom notes (what a privilege to have inhabited classrooms that make that possible!). In the face of a diagnosis that felt totalizing and all-engulfing, the body (re)turned, almost intuitively, to the otherwise classroom experience where, as if, presciently enough, the question at stake was: How to register context and history without letting them ingest us? How to get by and make room for otherwise narratives and contexts to emerge when a deterministic context (in this case, the context of the diagnosis) seeks to do the opposite: to limit the possibility of emergence, to fix (Dave, 2023). In entering into a retrospective conversation with the otherwise classroom and an ongoing experience of living alongside S as he lives “under the description of manic depression” (Martin 2009), I think somewhat obliquely, with two related questions raised by Elizabeth Povinelli in her 2012 essay “The Will to be Otherwise/ The Effort of Endurance”—Where does an otherwise world (what Foucault calls autrement) emerge from? And significantly, what “political and theoretical weight” can be given to the “exhausting conditions” of the spaces in and against which the otherwise emerges? These questions are the edifice of my reflection on politics and ethics of diagnosis and caregiving, the effort they call for, and what textures of the otherwise might emerge amidst such effort. Ex·​haus·​tion: the act or process of exhausting; the state of being exhausted; neurosis following overstrain or overexertion (as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary). Thirteen days of Sunflower's hospitalization had passed. We were allowed no meetings or communication with him. Every two days, a nurse would call with a general update— “He is sleeping a lot”. “He is asking for you”. “He wants his phone and laptop”. “He asked for a notebook—we have given him one”. “You can't meet him yet”. “He is cutting out newspaper clippings and collecting them in a bag”. “He did not eat lunch today”. “He is asking for you”. How did we get here? Did it all begin when S left from India on a student exchange program to Germany? It had felt like an escape to him, even if a short-lived one. He was so happy. He, in fact, had been the first one to notice that his happiness felt “a bit excessive”. Before leaving for Germany, S had been pursuing his master's in cinematography at a “highly reputed” university in India. Like many other public institutions that have been systematically dismantled by the ruling Hindu fascist dispensation, this institute too had witnessed multiple attacks on its autonomy, leadership, curriculum etc.2 There were also various complex issues endemic to the institute and the larger structure it inhabited, which preceded and exceeded the Hindu nationalist attacks. Students had been organizing multiple strikes and protests over the years since 2015—against the hijacking of the institute by the Hindu nationalist government, the lack of important resources including equipment and technical staff, unsafe working conditions for students resulting in tragic accidents, improper and arbitrary course plans, exclusionary admission and hiring policies, indefinitely delayed timelines. S, like many others, had started feeling consumed and trapped with no view of an exit. His master's degree that was supposed to have ended in 2020 was still ongoing in late 2022. And, two of his friends had died by suicide on the residential campus, within a span of a few months—all shortly before his exchange program. Some version of this essay can be written as an ethnography of exhaustion. Perhaps, S's mania was an expression of his exhaustion. Perhaps, it was his body's rebellion against this very exhaustion—its own language of pausing. But this, I wonder in hindsight. While Sunflower was at the hospital, I was afraid of another kind of exhaustion—one that can stem from diagnosis and treatment. Separated from S and left to frantically peruse overwhelming amount of literature, I wondered what it means to be labeled and reduced by diagnosis. On especially bad days, I let the dark corners of the internet sink me into debilitating anxieties of the side-effects of Lithium and Risperdal. I may also have been haunted by the guilt of acting on “behalf of” S. Didn't S keep saying how happy he was? Was it right for me to get him hospitalized against his will? Can I get “will” and “consent” to mean something else here? There seemed to be a cruelty, as necessary as the doctors said it was, in “treating” precisely that which felt like happiness to Sunflower—something he was just beginning to feel after a long, long time. That guilt had become an ever-present knot in the chest. Then, there were days of anger, frustration, and resentment. Am I tied by the determinism, burden, and finality of S's diagnosis too? When will I go back to my life? What will happen to all my new beginnings and my recently-started PhD? Perhaps, I was afraid. Of my own exhaustion. As time has passed, some of these questions have morphed into a different texture. In the following sections, I jump between the otherwise classroom and the context of Sunflower's manic depression to pose three related questions about an exhausting and yet, an emerging otherwise world. These are questions about living as political and ethical subjects—about the role of closure and conversation as ethico-political precondition, and the preciousness of a pause in a world that demands that we be knowing, speaking subjects. In The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study (2013), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney ask what lies beyond, beneath, despite and amidst broken institutions—the university, the prison, the settlement (let us add here, the hospital). Their answer—the “undercommons” is conceived as a “thought of an outside, a nonplace […]—the nonplace that must be thought outside to be sensed inside” (39). Always in hiding and eluding knowability or governability, the undercommons is inhabited by the marginal and the otherwise. I want to dwell here on just one aspect of the undercommons: its committed resistance to two related, dearly-held entities: politics and critique. Moten and Harney argue that with an already-defined “subject” and “principle of decision” (2013,18), “politics” encloses and regulates that which must flourish. Following a similar cartography of determinism, “critique endangers the sociality it is supposed to defend” (19)—it pins down and fixes that which is moving. The potential of the undercommons lies in its refusal to be pinned down. “Every time it tries to represent our will, we're unwilling. Every time it tries to take root, we're gone (because we're already here, moving)” (ibid,19). The Undercommons, thus, is “wary of critique” and a determinate “politics” (ibid, 38). A reading of Undercommons in the otherwise classroom had prompted reflection on dominant idioms of doing politics. A question that emerged for me throughout the seminar, then, had to do with the limits of imagining conversation as the precondition for or a necessary part of doing politics—What is lost in imagining conversation (talking to, talking across/despite difference, speaking up and other such metaphors for political speech) as the infrastructure on which politics is built? What would it mean to think of an otherwise world that is neither swallowed by the fantasy and the fatigue of tireless conversation nor diminished by its erasure or impossibility? Naisargi Dave (2023) would perhaps respond with “Indifference to difference”—that is, an ethic of living with the other that does not cannibalize its otherness and does not anchor itself in the anthropological desire for difference. Indifference to difference, she writes, is “an indifference to the thatness of others: not acquiring, not desiring, not appalled, not in thrall, not celebrating, not hankering, not assimilating, not repairing, not normalizing, not consuming, not anthropologizing, not staring” (2023: 1). Neither Moten and Harney's critique of “politics and critique” nor Dave's ethic of “indifference to difference” are a call for political insularity—far from it. They are both considerations of and protests against the normalizing impulse of politics. For Moten and Harney, it is a kind of “anti-politics”; for Dave, it is what she calls the “depolitical”: “an ongoing refusal to be determined, decided for, enclosed, made useful, or made sensible through and for lines of force” (2023, 84). When confronted with caregiving (or simply living alongside), in the context of manic depression, I find myself thinking with Moten and Harney's critique of the political and Dave's ethic of “indifference to the thatness of the other”—both, I think, would invite a questioning of the centrality of conversation in the imagination of a political and ethical otherwise. In the early days of navigating the experience, I saw some version of this “indifference” in one of my companions in this experience—S's mother. On many days, between arranging for the hospital bills and future course of action, we talked about illness, parenting, caregiving, substance abuse, and other things that one or both of us had been confronted with, without warning. The contrast in our approaches made apparent the difference in our languages: mine was a response of words (too many words—aimed at understanding, resolving, trying to undo professional and financial damages, to iron out creases; later, aimed at eliciting words from S too) and hers was a language of silence. On days when I yelled and fought her wisdom with my “I know better” attitude, she would grow quieter. Not as a mark of anger or some vengeful passive aggressiveness but as a language of care, to protect herself and even me, from the wound of words. I envied her a little. Silence didn't always come easily to me. The S who was permitted to leave the hospital after 15 days was said to have “significantly improved with still poor insight”. In a world that seemed to have been taken over by mood charts and mood-monitoring apps, second and third and fourth consultations with psychiatrists, therapy for S and his caregivers, support groups, medication, more medication to mitigate side effects of earlier medication, conversation really failed S and I. Conversation failed, or at least proved deeply inadequate, not in the least because it became impossible to have a “reasonable conversation” but precisely because conversation as ethical and political precondition, presumes a certain notion of “reason” and “rational”. And the determinative kernel of conversation is what the “manic S” exposed. Often, conversation aims to resolve, it seeks closure and determinacy via language. Like diagnosis? Can conversation inhabit the folds of uncertainty between posing or identifying a problem (diagnosis) and solving it away (treatment)? Far from fully rejecting conversation as a cherished way of doing, I want to think here with ethics and politics that inhabit what Povinelli calls the pause or interval, what Deleuze and Parnet (2007) think of as “stuttering in one's own language” and what King, Navarro, and Smith call speaking with “amateur-ness” King et al.. (2020). For my part, in practice, this has begun to translate into leaving S alone. Out of respect for his solitude. This also means slowly learning to give up on a stubborn insistence on both the idea of the “pre-mania” or “pre- bipolar” S as well as his diagnosis as the legitimate metric of his personhood. To learn this is to learn that he is, of course, not defined by (or reduced to) his diagnosis, but also that the manic S, the one who writes at an urgent pace, whose hurt and joy begin to be articulated as music and film scripts, who seems to be driven by a feverish angst of productivity only to then collapse under its burden—is also Sunflower, one who lives in this world and has been produced by it, who is exhausted in/ by this world and strives in it. He is not a crisis to be resolved in the here and now by the weight of conversation. S is learning to live in a world that asks him to turn his mood and mind into a number or emoticon on an app and monitors the shifts in medication. He is constantly haunted by well-wishers’ “how are you feeling?”. This is a world of management of feeling, which seeks to bring some measure of predictability into a not-fully knowable process. Through this process, both Sunflower and I have wondered about another kind of exhaustion—one that I have briefly alluded to earlier –the exhaustion from repair. That which is meant to repair—the psychiatric ward, the medicine, the monitoring apps—perhaps also cause their own scars? In the world of capital, relief can not only be capitalized to cause more injury but injury itself can be made to look like respite. In Bipolar Expeditions, anthropologist Emily Martin (2009) discusses the perverse fascination that American society has with manic behavior and how individuals with mania are harnessed to “stoke the economy”. In certain settings in the US, specialty firms teach people how to be manic in order to be more productive (2009, 53). In his talk titled “More than a Manifesto: A Poet's Essay” (part of the otherwise syllabus) Fred Moten (2018)3, says that critique can sometimes do what chemotherapy (and I add, diagnosis) does—burning that which is meant to be repaired. Is it cancer or chemo? Is it bipolar or lithium? Is it the fatigue of oppression or the weight of political struggle? How is the otherwise to be imagined in such a world? The question of the place of exhaustion and rest owes its formulation, in part, to Povinelli's discussion of “the relationship between willful curiosity and risk, potentiality and exhaustion” (2012, 454). Perhaps, one could invert the same question to ask, and that might be truer to the spirit of Povinelli's inquiry—will we be exhausted in/ by the otherwise world? In sitting with Foucault's “stubborn questions” (ibid, 471) about the sources of an otherwise world, Povinelli argues that the otherwise demands an endurance of risk of subjectification and worldliness. Drawing upon American pragmatists like William James and Charles Sanders Peirce who foreground this endurance, she underlines thought as the “effort of attention”. It is this thought that forms the precondition of ethical action. Thought is effort as life-work, directed as ethical action towards transformation of the self and what Povinelli describes as breaking the “clerical hold of thought and refashioning it as experiment on the self in the world” (ibid, 472). The pragmatists, especially James, thinks of this self-experimentation as an ethic of constantly “trying out” and as Povinelli notes, this “trying” shares a “curious symmetry” with Foucault's ascesis (ibid). I want to think briefly with this politics of thought that Povinelli sketches out for us via Foucault, James and Peirce (also, Agamben). To cultivate a politics of thought, of ethical action directed first and foremost towards the self, of the effort of trying things, is also to note that the possibilities of an otherwise world emerge from within the exhausting conditions of the world. This is perhaps what Dave calls “a relation of unfolding immanence” (Dave, 2023, 7). My sense is, and I have hinted above, that this immanent action which is crucial to Moten and Harney's “undercommons”, Dave's “indifference to difference” and the pragmatists’ “thought as effort” is constantly confronted with (even, exhausted by) the limits and injuries of conversation as ethical and political action; the potential of its freedom emerges from the precious pause. Sunflower's mania has been created by this world—its fascist, capital-driven, productivist logics. But as he continues to show in his everyday living, it is by quietly residing within the folds of this very world that multiple other worlds emerge. At several points through the course of the initial months when very little seemed to be making sense, I found asking myself: Do I really know Sunflower? Where does S end and the episode begin? Where does maleness and caste end, and manic depression begin? Or does the self exist precisely to make the episode consistent?4 Perhaps, all my conversations with him and with friends were an attempt to align his diagnosis with my existing knowledge of him. Now, however, I am trying to think through another kind of ethical endeavor: one that does not trace its route and cartography based on the lines of already-existing knowledge of another and is open to creating its own new knowledges, contexts, and conversations. What does living alongside Sunflower look like, if the stuff of our relation is constituted not by knowledge of one another but what psychoanalyst Adam Phillips (2012) calls “not knowing” and the possibility of a “something else” it generates. This “something else” resonates again with Dave's ethic of “indifference to difference” which does not owe fidelity to any one context or any one frame of knowledge. She points out that contexts (which we think of as indispensable, already-existing preconditions for knowledges) fix and determine, and thus, in telling us what matters, they tell us that certain other things don't matter at all (Dave, 2019). Calls for context also become calls for ethical and political consistency—“to normalize, to exhaust, and to restore otherwise gestures to existing, familiar, lines of force” (Dave, 2023, 75). In her critique of context and thus, consistency, thus lies another vision of politics. If the otherwise can move across contexts, refusing to be tamed by the demands for consistency, what is its tense? Very early on, with the curve of Sunflower's manic depression, it emerged that our lives might straddle between what emerges from the here and now (we act a certain way in a certain moment because what else is there to do?—my emergency travel to India on a 28-h flight, my decision to get him hospitalized despite his strong protest) and is open to deferral to an unknown future. Deferral, not necessarily as an investment in a better future but a willingness to not demand everything instantly, from the (context of the) present. The temporality of an otherwise world or a will for an otherwise life mimics the temporality of uncertainty—or of Phillip's “not knowing” and Dave's “depolitical”. It is akin to what James calls the “unfinished world” which “has a future and is yet uncompleted”. What Dave described in the otherwise classroom as the “double emptiness” of “what is not there yet and what might be”5. What Ben Lerner (2016) calls (in a different context—of poetic failure) as learning to live in the space between what one is moved to do and what one can do. After spending a few months in India, I returned to my other life in North America. Sunflower joined me about 3 months later. To very different degrees and in different ways, we are both (learning to) recalibrate our lives and ecosystems. While attending to the pragmatics of building a life in a new country—learning its ways, finding work etc., Sunflower walks a lot, watches dogs play, practices tennis, cooks, and always pauses to look at the shiny, black squirrels on his way to anywhere. He talks about missing parts of his manic self and how it gave him something that life seemed to have stolen from him. He does the needful, as instructed by his doctor, to prevent/manage another episode. They have labeled him a “very stable patient”. With some time having passed, we both try to see the episode through each other's eyes. “Trying out”, getting by, living alongside, dwelling in the interval. I try to be what Winnicott et al. (1986) call the “good enough” caregiver—not perfect, not consistent, hopefully not ingested, just “good enough”. Depending on the emphasis and the chosen frames of writing and reading, this piece can be read as a caregiver's account. Or perhaps, an ethnography of broken institutions. Perhaps, a rumination on what forms of relationality become possible when we think of the alongside-ness of joy and grief, annihilation and proliferation, crisis and the ordinary. Importantly, an ode to an otherwise classroom. With shifts in rhythms, it can be an account of the unholy union of fascism and capitalism and what they do to personhoods. Far from being conclusive, this piece wants to dwell in an unfinished, unfolding world that refuses to be contained by the certainty and determinacy of conversation, knowledge, context, politics, ethics—above all, their diagnostic and curative impulse. Refusing exhaustion neither by the weight of the present nor tethered to the hopes of a better future, it wants to dwell in an in-between non-place, a pause, or a stutter, that doesn't feel obligated to finality, closure, or certainty. This silent dwelling seems necessary to the politics of thought and ethical self-transformation. After all, it is the humility of the pause that vitalizes the effort and creates what Winnicott may call a “happy enough” life. This piece owes its existence to the discussions and readings in the Otherwise seminar. It's very first draft was written as a paper for the seminar. Thank you, Professor Naisargi Dave, for the inspiring seminar and feedback. I am grateful to all my otherwise classmates, especially Muntasir Chowdhury, Noha Fikry, Diana Richani, Jehuda Tjahjadi, Samuel Huard and Louis Plottel. Thank you to the reviewers and editors whose incredible feedback helped me sharpen this piece, particularly around exhaustion.","PeriodicalId":56256,"journal":{"name":"Polar-Political and Legal Anthropology Review","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An otherwise classroom and a diagnosis, or, the preciousness of a pause\",\"authors\":\"Ridhima Sharma\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/plar.12538\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It was late September last year. I was a few weeks into a graduate seminar that had quickly turned into one of my favorites. Anthropology of the Otherwise taught by Dr Naisargi Dave at the University of Toronto over the Fall of 2022. Drawing on the concept of “otherwise worlds” by Elizabeth Povinelli (2012), the seminar explored what is not there yet, and what might be1, the world as it is and it is becoming, and what political and ethical alternatives exist in worlds that are determined to deplete and exhaust. Some thinkers, some teachers, some books, and some classmates make it possible to truly inhabit and practice the creative pulse of thought; they take us to places we did not know exist—they create places. The otherwise seminar was one of those experiences, taking me to a different place each week. But in some ways, also the same—from another route, another angle, another field of view and possibility, all in wonderful company. Dionne Brand's A Map to the Door of No Return one week. Political manifestos, another. Freud and psychoanalysis in the middle. Around the same time, another kind of world-making was underway in my life. A loved one who had been a cherished presence for many years and lived in another continent (let's call him Sunflower—or just S, oh the fear of not being taken seriously!) was starting to act in ways that I could not comprehend. I had known and loved S for many years. More importantly, I liked him very much. But I had begun to find it straining to like him. I would find out 3 months later that these were the beginnings of what would be diagnosed as S's “first manic episode”. I would make an emergency visit to India and make possible his “forced sedation” and hospitalization at a psychiatric facility. In what follows, I write about the coming in contact of these two moments—the otherwise classroom and S's diagnosis, and how this serendipitous contact aided what can sometimes appear to be the most difficult thing to do—just getting by, possibly as an otherwise practice and an ethic of alongside-ness. Here, I think about that (ongoing) moment and some questions it raises about ethical and political ways of “becoming” in the world alongside one another. In doing so, I think about what it means to take care of each another and what is there to do, if anything at all, when we are exhausted—by diagnosis, by caregiving, by the limits that an oppressive world forces upon us, and, perhaps by the limits of politics and ethics themselves? Can an otherwise world emerge amid such exhaustion and what might it look like? For better or for worse, I have often seen the world through my classroom notes (what a privilege to have inhabited classrooms that make that possible!). In the face of a diagnosis that felt totalizing and all-engulfing, the body (re)turned, almost intuitively, to the otherwise classroom experience where, as if, presciently enough, the question at stake was: How to register context and history without letting them ingest us? How to get by and make room for otherwise narratives and contexts to emerge when a deterministic context (in this case, the context of the diagnosis) seeks to do the opposite: to limit the possibility of emergence, to fix (Dave, 2023). In entering into a retrospective conversation with the otherwise classroom and an ongoing experience of living alongside S as he lives “under the description of manic depression” (Martin 2009), I think somewhat obliquely, with two related questions raised by Elizabeth Povinelli in her 2012 essay “The Will to be Otherwise/ The Effort of Endurance”—Where does an otherwise world (what Foucault calls autrement) emerge from? And significantly, what “political and theoretical weight” can be given to the “exhausting conditions” of the spaces in and against which the otherwise emerges? These questions are the edifice of my reflection on politics and ethics of diagnosis and caregiving, the effort they call for, and what textures of the otherwise might emerge amidst such effort. Ex·​haus·​tion: the act or process of exhausting; the state of being exhausted; neurosis following overstrain or overexertion (as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary). Thirteen days of Sunflower's hospitalization had passed. We were allowed no meetings or communication with him. Every two days, a nurse would call with a general update— “He is sleeping a lot”. “He is asking for you”. “He wants his phone and laptop”. “He asked for a notebook—we have given him one”. “You can't meet him yet”. “He is cutting out newspaper clippings and collecting them in a bag”. “He did not eat lunch today”. “He is asking for you”. How did we get here? Did it all begin when S left from India on a student exchange program to Germany? It had felt like an escape to him, even if a short-lived one. He was so happy. He, in fact, had been the first one to notice that his happiness felt “a bit excessive”. Before leaving for Germany, S had been pursuing his master's in cinematography at a “highly reputed” university in India. Like many other public institutions that have been systematically dismantled by the ruling Hindu fascist dispensation, this institute too had witnessed multiple attacks on its autonomy, leadership, curriculum etc.2 There were also various complex issues endemic to the institute and the larger structure it inhabited, which preceded and exceeded the Hindu nationalist attacks. Students had been organizing multiple strikes and protests over the years since 2015—against the hijacking of the institute by the Hindu nationalist government, the lack of important resources including equipment and technical staff, unsafe working conditions for students resulting in tragic accidents, improper and arbitrary course plans, exclusionary admission and hiring policies, indefinitely delayed timelines. S, like many others, had started feeling consumed and trapped with no view of an exit. His master's degree that was supposed to have ended in 2020 was still ongoing in late 2022. And, two of his friends had died by suicide on the residential campus, within a span of a few months—all shortly before his exchange program. Some version of this essay can be written as an ethnography of exhaustion. Perhaps, S's mania was an expression of his exhaustion. Perhaps, it was his body's rebellion against this very exhaustion—its own language of pausing. But this, I wonder in hindsight. While Sunflower was at the hospital, I was afraid of another kind of exhaustion—one that can stem from diagnosis and treatment. Separated from S and left to frantically peruse overwhelming amount of literature, I wondered what it means to be labeled and reduced by diagnosis. On especially bad days, I let the dark corners of the internet sink me into debilitating anxieties of the side-effects of Lithium and Risperdal. I may also have been haunted by the guilt of acting on “behalf of” S. Didn't S keep saying how happy he was? Was it right for me to get him hospitalized against his will? Can I get “will” and “consent” to mean something else here? There seemed to be a cruelty, as necessary as the doctors said it was, in “treating” precisely that which felt like happiness to Sunflower—something he was just beginning to feel after a long, long time. That guilt had become an ever-present knot in the chest. Then, there were days of anger, frustration, and resentment. Am I tied by the determinism, burden, and finality of S's diagnosis too? When will I go back to my life? What will happen to all my new beginnings and my recently-started PhD? Perhaps, I was afraid. Of my own exhaustion. As time has passed, some of these questions have morphed into a different texture. In the following sections, I jump between the otherwise classroom and the context of Sunflower's manic depression to pose three related questions about an exhausting and yet, an emerging otherwise world. These are questions about living as political and ethical subjects—about the role of closure and conversation as ethico-political precondition, and the preciousness of a pause in a world that demands that we be knowing, speaking subjects. In The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study (2013), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney ask what lies beyond, beneath, despite and amidst broken institutions—the university, the prison, the settlement (let us add here, the hospital). Their answer—the “undercommons” is conceived as a “thought of an outside, a nonplace […]—the nonplace that must be thought outside to be sensed inside” (39). Always in hiding and eluding knowability or governability, the undercommons is inhabited by the marginal and the otherwise. I want to dwell here on just one aspect of the undercommons: its committed resistance to two related, dearly-held entities: politics and critique. Moten and Harney argue that with an already-defined “subject” and “principle of decision” (2013,18), “politics” encloses and regulates that which must flourish. Following a similar cartography of determinism, “critique endangers the sociality it is supposed to defend” (19)—it pins down and fixes that which is moving. The potential of the undercommons lies in its refusal to be pinned down. “Every time it tries to represent our will, we're unwilling. Every time it tries to take root, we're gone (because we're already here, moving)” (ibid,19). The Undercommons, thus, is “wary of critique” and a determinate “politics” (ibid, 38). A reading of Undercommons in the otherwise classroom had prompted reflection on dominant idioms of doing politics. A question that emerged for me throughout the seminar, then, had to do with the limits of imagining conversation as the precondition for or a necessary part of doing politics—What is lost in imagining conversation (talking to, talking across/despite difference, speaking up and other such metaphors for political speech) as the infrastructure on which politics is built? What would it mean to think of an otherwise world that is neither swallowed by the fantasy and the fatigue of tireless conversation nor diminished by its erasure or impossibility? Naisargi Dave (2023) would perhaps respond with “Indifference to difference”—that is, an ethic of living with the other that does not cannibalize its otherness and does not anchor itself in the anthropological desire for difference. Indifference to difference, she writes, is “an indifference to the thatness of others: not acquiring, not desiring, not appalled, not in thrall, not celebrating, not hankering, not assimilating, not repairing, not normalizing, not consuming, not anthropologizing, not staring” (2023: 1). Neither Moten and Harney's critique of “politics and critique” nor Dave's ethic of “indifference to difference” are a call for political insularity—far from it. They are both considerations of and protests against the normalizing impulse of politics. For Moten and Harney, it is a kind of “anti-politics”; for Dave, it is what she calls the “depolitical”: “an ongoing refusal to be determined, decided for, enclosed, made useful, or made sensible through and for lines of force” (2023, 84). When confronted with caregiving (or simply living alongside), in the context of manic depression, I find myself thinking with Moten and Harney's critique of the political and Dave's ethic of “indifference to the thatness of the other”—both, I think, would invite a questioning of the centrality of conversation in the imagination of a political and ethical otherwise. In the early days of navigating the experience, I saw some version of this “indifference” in one of my companions in this experience—S's mother. On many days, between arranging for the hospital bills and future course of action, we talked about illness, parenting, caregiving, substance abuse, and other things that one or both of us had been confronted with, without warning. The contrast in our approaches made apparent the difference in our languages: mine was a response of words (too many words—aimed at understanding, resolving, trying to undo professional and financial damages, to iron out creases; later, aimed at eliciting words from S too) and hers was a language of silence. On days when I yelled and fought her wisdom with my “I know better” attitude, she would grow quieter. Not as a mark of anger or some vengeful passive aggressiveness but as a language of care, to protect herself and even me, from the wound of words. I envied her a little. Silence didn't always come easily to me. The S who was permitted to leave the hospital after 15 days was said to have “significantly improved with still poor insight”. In a world that seemed to have been taken over by mood charts and mood-monitoring apps, second and third and fourth consultations with psychiatrists, therapy for S and his caregivers, support groups, medication, more medication to mitigate side effects of earlier medication, conversation really failed S and I. Conversation failed, or at least proved deeply inadequate, not in the least because it became impossible to have a “reasonable conversation” but precisely because conversation as ethical and political precondition, presumes a certain notion of “reason” and “rational”. And the determinative kernel of conversation is what the “manic S” exposed. Often, conversation aims to resolve, it seeks closure and determinacy via language. Like diagnosis? Can conversation inhabit the folds of uncertainty between posing or identifying a problem (diagnosis) and solving it away (treatment)? Far from fully rejecting conversation as a cherished way of doing, I want to think here with ethics and politics that inhabit what Povinelli calls the pause or interval, what Deleuze and Parnet (2007) think of as “stuttering in one's own language” and what King, Navarro, and Smith call speaking with “amateur-ness” King et al.. (2020). For my part, in practice, this has begun to translate into leaving S alone. Out of respect for his solitude. This also means slowly learning to give up on a stubborn insistence on both the idea of the “pre-mania” or “pre- bipolar” S as well as his diagnosis as the legitimate metric of his personhood. To learn this is to learn that he is, of course, not defined by (or reduced to) his diagnosis, but also that the manic S, the one who writes at an urgent pace, whose hurt and joy begin to be articulated as music and film scripts, who seems to be driven by a feverish angst of productivity only to then collapse under its burden—is also Sunflower, one who lives in this world and has been produced by it, who is exhausted in/ by this world and strives in it. He is not a crisis to be resolved in the here and now by the weight of conversation. S is learning to live in a world that asks him to turn his mood and mind into a number or emoticon on an app and monitors the shifts in medication. He is constantly haunted by well-wishers’ “how are you feeling?”. This is a world of management of feeling, which seeks to bring some measure of predictability into a not-fully knowable process. Through this process, both Sunflower and I have wondered about another kind of exhaustion—one that I have briefly alluded to earlier –the exhaustion from repair. That which is meant to repair—the psychiatric ward, the medicine, the monitoring apps—perhaps also cause their own scars? In the world of capital, relief can not only be capitalized to cause more injury but injury itself can be made to look like respite. In Bipolar Expeditions, anthropologist Emily Martin (2009) discusses the perverse fascination that American society has with manic behavior and how individuals with mania are harnessed to “stoke the economy”. In certain settings in the US, specialty firms teach people how to be manic in order to be more productive (2009, 53). In his talk titled “More than a Manifesto: A Poet's Essay” (part of the otherwise syllabus) Fred Moten (2018)3, says that critique can sometimes do what chemotherapy (and I add, diagnosis) does—burning that which is meant to be repaired. Is it cancer or chemo? Is it bipolar or lithium? Is it the fatigue of oppression or the weight of political struggle? How is the otherwise to be imagined in such a world? The question of the place of exhaustion and rest owes its formulation, in part, to Povinelli's discussion of “the relationship between willful curiosity and risk, potentiality and exhaustion” (2012, 454). Perhaps, one could invert the same question to ask, and that might be truer to the spirit of Povinelli's inquiry—will we be exhausted in/ by the otherwise world? In sitting with Foucault's “stubborn questions” (ibid, 471) about the sources of an otherwise world, Povinelli argues that the otherwise demands an endurance of risk of subjectification and worldliness. Drawing upon American pragmatists like William James and Charles Sanders Peirce who foreground this endurance, she underlines thought as the “effort of attention”. It is this thought that forms the precondition of ethical action. Thought is effort as life-work, directed as ethical action towards transformation of the self and what Povinelli describes as breaking the “clerical hold of thought and refashioning it as experiment on the self in the world” (ibid, 472). The pragmatists, especially James, thinks of this self-experimentation as an ethic of constantly “trying out” and as Povinelli notes, this “trying” shares a “curious symmetry” with Foucault's ascesis (ibid). I want to think briefly with this politics of thought that Povinelli sketches out for us via Foucault, James and Peirce (also, Agamben). To cultivate a politics of thought, of ethical action directed first and foremost towards the self, of the effort of trying things, is also to note that the possibilities of an otherwise world emerge from within the exhausting conditions of the world. This is perhaps what Dave calls “a relation of unfolding immanence” (Dave, 2023, 7). My sense is, and I have hinted above, that this immanent action which is crucial to Moten and Harney's “undercommons”, Dave's “indifference to difference” and the pragmatists’ “thought as effort” is constantly confronted with (even, exhausted by) the limits and injuries of conversation as ethical and political action; the potential of its freedom emerges from the precious pause. Sunflower's mania has been created by this world—its fascist, capital-driven, productivist logics. But as he continues to show in his everyday living, it is by quietly residing within the folds of this very world that multiple other worlds emerge. At several points through the course of the initial months when very little seemed to be making sense, I found asking myself: Do I really know Sunflower? Where does S end and the episode begin? Where does maleness and caste end, and manic depression begin? Or does the self exist precisely to make the episode consistent?4 Perhaps, all my conversations with him and with friends were an attempt to align his diagnosis with my existing knowledge of him. Now, however, I am trying to think through another kind of ethical endeavor: one that does not trace its route and cartography based on the lines of already-existing knowledge of another and is open to creating its own new knowledges, contexts, and conversations. What does living alongside Sunflower look like, if the stuff of our relation is constituted not by knowledge of one another but what psychoanalyst Adam Phillips (2012) calls “not knowing” and the possibility of a “something else” it generates. This “something else” resonates again with Dave's ethic of “indifference to difference” which does not owe fidelity to any one context or any one frame of knowledge. She points out that contexts (which we think of as indispensable, already-existing preconditions for knowledges) fix and determine, and thus, in telling us what matters, they tell us that certain other things don't matter at all (Dave, 2019). Calls for context also become calls for ethical and political consistency—“to normalize, to exhaust, and to restore otherwise gestures to existing, familiar, lines of force” (Dave, 2023, 75). In her critique of context and thus, consistency, thus lies another vision of politics. If the otherwise can move across contexts, refusing to be tamed by the demands for consistency, what is its tense? Very early on, with the curve of Sunflower's manic depression, it emerged that our lives might straddle between what emerges from the here and now (we act a certain way in a certain moment because what else is there to do?—my emergency travel to India on a 28-h flight, my decision to get him hospitalized despite his strong protest) and is open to deferral to an unknown future. Deferral, not necessarily as an investment in a better future but a willingness to not demand everything instantly, from the (context of the) present. The temporality of an otherwise world or a will for an otherwise life mimics the temporality of uncertainty—or of Phillip's “not knowing” and Dave's “depolitical”. It is akin to what James calls the “unfinished world” which “has a future and is yet uncompleted”. What Dave described in the otherwise classroom as the “double emptiness” of “what is not there yet and what might be”5. What Ben Lerner (2016) calls (in a different context—of poetic failure) as learning to live in the space between what one is moved to do and what one can do. After spending a few months in India, I returned to my other life in North America. Sunflower joined me about 3 months later. To very different degrees and in different ways, we are both (learning to) recalibrate our lives and ecosystems. While attending to the pragmatics of building a life in a new country—learning its ways, finding work etc., Sunflower walks a lot, watches dogs play, practices tennis, cooks, and always pauses to look at the shiny, black squirrels on his way to anywhere. He talks about missing parts of his manic self and how it gave him something that life seemed to have stolen from him. He does the needful, as instructed by his doctor, to prevent/manage another episode. They have labeled him a “very stable patient”. With some time having passed, we both try to see the episode through each other's eyes. “Trying out”, getting by, living alongside, dwelling in the interval. I try to be what Winnicott et al. (1986) call the “good enough” caregiver—not perfect, not consistent, hopefully not ingested, just “good enough”. Depending on the emphasis and the chosen frames of writing and reading, this piece can be read as a caregiver's account. Or perhaps, an ethnography of broken institutions. Perhaps, a rumination on what forms of relationality become possible when we think of the alongside-ness of joy and grief, annihilation and proliferation, crisis and the ordinary. Importantly, an ode to an otherwise classroom. With shifts in rhythms, it can be an account of the unholy union of fascism and capitalism and what they do to personhoods. Far from being conclusive, this piece wants to dwell in an unfinished, unfolding world that refuses to be contained by the certainty and determinacy of conversation, knowledge, context, politics, ethics—above all, their diagnostic and curative impulse. Refusing exhaustion neither by the weight of the present nor tethered to the hopes of a better future, it wants to dwell in an in-between non-place, a pause, or a stutter, that doesn't feel obligated to finality, closure, or certainty. This silent dwelling seems necessary to the politics of thought and ethical self-transformation. After all, it is the humility of the pause that vitalizes the effort and creates what Winnicott may call a “happy enough” life. This piece owes its existence to the discussions and readings in the Otherwise seminar. It's very first draft was written as a paper for the seminar. Thank you, Professor Naisargi Dave, for the inspiring seminar and feedback. I am grateful to all my otherwise classmates, especially Muntasir Chowdhury, Noha Fikry, Diana Richani, Jehuda Tjahjadi, Samuel Huard and Louis Plottel. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

那是去年9月底。我参加了几个星期的研究生研讨会,它很快就变成了我最喜欢的研讨会之一。奈萨吉·戴夫博士于2022年秋季在多伦多大学教授的《另类人类学》课程。利用Elizabeth Povinelli(2012)的“其他世界”概念,研讨会探讨了尚未存在的东西,以及可能存在的东西,世界的现状和正在成为,以及在决心耗尽和耗尽的世界中存在哪些政治和伦理替代方案。一些思想家、一些老师、一些书籍和一些同学使我们有可能真正地居住和实践创造性思维的脉搏;他们把我们带到我们不知道存在的地方——他们创造了地方。另外的研讨会就是其中一种经历,每周带我去不同的地方。但在某些方面,也是一样的——从另一条路线、另一个角度、另一个视角和可能性来看,所有这些都有美好的陪伴。迪翁·布兰德的《通往不归路之门的地图》另一个是政治宣言。弗洛伊德和精神分析在中间。大约在同一时间,另一种世界观正在我的生活中进行。一个生活在另一个大陆多年来一直被我珍视的人(让我们叫他向日葵吧——或者就叫他S,哦,害怕不被认真对待!)开始以我无法理解的方式行事。我认识S并爱她很多年了。更重要的是,我非常喜欢他。但我开始觉得很难喜欢上他。3个月后,我发现这是S“第一次躁狂发作”的开始。我会紧急访问印度,让他“强制镇静”,并在精神病院住院治疗。在接下来的文章中,我写下了这两个时刻的接触——课堂和S的诊断,以及这种偶然的接触如何帮助有时看起来最困难的事情——仅仅是通过,可能作为一种实践和一种并行的伦理。在这里,我思考了这个(正在进行的)时刻,以及它引发的关于在世界上彼此“成为”的道德和政治方式的一些问题。在这样做的过程中,我思考相互照顾意味着什么,当我们被诊断、被照顾、被一个压迫性的世界强加给我们的限制、也许是被政治和道德本身的限制所耗尽时,我们该做些什么,如果有的话?在这种精疲力竭的情况下,会出现另一个世界吗?它会是什么样子?不管是好是坏,我经常通过我的课堂笔记来观察这个世界(能有一个让这成为可能的教室是多么的荣幸啊!)面对一种让人感觉无所适从、无所不为的诊断,我们的身体(重新)几乎是本能地转向了课堂体验,在那里,似乎有足够的先见之明,关键的问题是:如何在不被语境和历史吞噬的情况下记录下来?当确定性情境(在本例中是诊断情境)试图做相反的事情时,如何通过并为其他叙事和情境的出现腾出空间:限制出现的可能性,修复(Dave, 2023)。在进入与其他教室的回顾性对话和与S一起生活的持续经历中,因为他生活在“躁狂抑郁症的描述下”(Martin 2009),我有点间接地思考伊丽莎白波维内利在她2012年的文章“不一样的意志/耐力的努力”中提出的两个相关问题-另一个世界(福柯称之为治疗)从哪里出现?值得注意的是,对于空间的“令人筋疲力尽的条件”,可以给予什么样的“政治和理论权重”?这些问题是我对诊断和护理的政治和伦理、它们所需要的努力以及在这些努力中可能出现的其他纹理的反思的大厦。耗尽:耗尽的行为或过程;筋疲力尽:筋疲力尽的状态;过度紧张或过度劳累后的神经症(根据韦氏词典的定义)。葵花的住院治疗已经过去了十三天。我们不被允许与他会面或交流。每隔两天,一名护士就会打电话来汇报情况——“他睡得太多了”。“他在找你。”“他想要他的手机和笔记本电脑”。“他要一个笔记本——我们给了他一个。”“你还不能见他。”“他正在剪下剪报,把它们装进一个袋子里。”“他今天没吃午饭。”“他在找你。”我们是怎么走到这一步的?这一切是从S从印度去德国交换学生开始的吗?对他来说,这就像是一种逃避,即使是短暂的逃避。他很高兴。事实上,他是第一个意识到自己的幸福“有点过度”的人。 在前往德国之前,S一直在印度一所“声誉很高”的大学攻读电影硕士学位。就像许多其他被印度教法西斯统治系统地拆除的公共机构一样,该研究所也目睹了对其自主权、领导力、课程等的多次攻击。2在印度教民族主义攻击之前,该研究所及其所处的更大结构也存在各种复杂的问题。自2015年以来,学生们组织了多次罢工和抗议活动,反对印度教民族主义政府劫持学院,缺乏包括设备和技术人员在内的重要资源,学生的不安全工作条件导致悲惨事故,不当和武断的课程计划,排斥性录取和招聘政策,无限期推迟时间表。S和其他许多人一样,开始感到精疲力竭,陷入困境,看不到出口。他的硕士学位本应在2020年结束,但到2022年底仍在继续。而且,他的两个朋友在几个月的时间里自杀了,就在他的交换项目开始前不久。这篇文章的某些版本可以写成一本关于疲惫的民族志。也许,S的狂躁是他疲惫的一种表现。也许,这是他的身体对这种疲惫的反抗——它自己的停顿语言。但事后我想知道。葵花在医院的时候,我害怕另一种疲惫——一种源于诊断和治疗的疲惫。我和S分开了,只能疯狂地阅读大量文献,我想知道被诊断给贴上标签、被贬低意味着什么。在特别糟糕的日子里,我让互联网的黑暗角落让我陷入对锂和利培酮副作用的焦虑中。我也可能一直被“代表”S行事的罪恶感所困扰,S不是一直在说他有多开心吗?我违背他的意愿送他住院对吗?我能让"意愿"和"同意"在这里有别的意思吗?就像医生们说的那样,在“治疗”葵花觉得是幸福的东西时,似乎有一种残忍,这是必要的——葵花在很长很长一段时间之后才开始感受到幸福。那种负罪感已经成为我心中永远存在的一个结。然后是愤怒、沮丧和怨恨的日子。我是否也被S的诊断的决定论、负担和终局性所束缚?我什么时候才能回到我的生活?我所有的新开始和我最近开始的博士学位将会发生什么?也许,我害怕。我自己的疲惫。随着时间的流逝,这些问题中的一些已经演变成不同的结构。在接下来的章节中,我将在“另类”的课堂和葵花躁狂抑郁症的背景之间跳跃,提出三个相关的问题,这些问题涉及到一个令人疲惫但正在出现的另类世界。这些是关于作为政治和伦理主体生活的问题——关于封闭和对话作为伦理-政治前提的作用,以及在一个要求我们成为了解和说话主体的世界中暂停的珍贵。在《地下:逃亡计划和黑人研究》(2013)一书中,弗雷德·莫滕和斯特凡诺·哈尼探讨了在破碎的机构——大学、监狱、定居点(让我们在这里加上医院)——之外、之下、之外和之中存在着什么。他们的回答——“地下公地”被认为是一种“外部的思想,一种非场所[…]——一种必须在外部被思考才能在内部被感知的非场所”(39)。在隐藏和逃避可知性或可治理性的过程中,下层公地总是由边缘和其他的人居住。在这里,我只想谈谈下层社会的一个方面:它对两个相关的、牢牢掌握的实体——政治和批评——的坚决抵制。Moten和Harney认为,有了一个已经定义的“主体”和“决策原则”(2013,18),“政治”包围和规范了那些必须蓬勃发展的东西。按照类似的决定论的制图,“批判危及它本应捍卫的社会”(19)——它束缚并固定了正在运动的东西。下层社会的潜力在于它拒绝被压制。“每次它试图代表我们的意愿,我们都不愿意。每当它试图扎根时,我们就走了(因为我们已经在这里,正在移动)”(同上,19)。因此,下层社会“对批判持谨慎态度”,是一种决定性的“政治”(同上,38)。在另一间教室里阅读《地下议会》(Undercommons),引发了人们对政界主流习语的反思。 在整个研讨会中,一个问题浮现在我的脑海中,这个问题与把对话想象成政治活动的先决条件或必要部分的局限性有关——把对话想象成政治活动的基础设施(对话、跨越/无视差异、畅所欲言以及其他类似于政治演讲的隐喻)时,我们失去了什么?想象一个不被幻想和不知疲倦的谈话所吞噬,也不因其抹去或不可能而减少的另一个世界,这意味着什么?Naisargi Dave(2023)可能会用“对差异的冷漠”来回应——这是一种与他人一起生活的伦理,不会蚕食他者,也不会将自己锚定在人类学对差异的渴望中。她写道,对差异的冷漠是“对他人的冷漠:不获取,不渴望,不震惊,不被奴役,不庆祝,不渴望,不同化,不修复,不正常化,不消费,不人类学,不盯着”(2023:1)。莫滕和哈尼对“政治与批判”的批判和戴夫的“对差异的冷漠”伦理都不是政治孤立的呼吁——远非如此。它们既是对政治常态化冲动的思考,也是对政治常态化冲动的抗议。对莫滕和哈尼来说,这是一种“反政治”;对戴夫来说,这就是她所说的“去政治”:“一种持续的拒绝被决定、被决定、被封闭、被有用或被明智地通过武力线”(2023,84)。在躁狂抑郁症的背景下,当面对照顾(或只是生活在一起)时,我发现自己在思考莫滕和哈尼对政治的批判和戴夫的“对他人的冷漠”的伦理——我认为,这两者都会引发对对话在政治和伦理想象中的中心地位的质疑。在经历这段经历的早期,我在我的一个同伴——s的母亲身上看到了这种“冷漠”的某种版本。有很多天,在安排医院账单和未来行动的过程中,我们谈论疾病、养育子女、照顾他人、滥用药物,以及其他我们一个或两个都毫无征兆地遇到的事情。我们在方法上的差异明显地反映了我们语言上的差异:我的语言是一种回应(太多的语言),旨在理解、解决、试图消除职业和经济上的损害,消除分歧;后来,为了从S那里引出话来,她的语言是沉默的。当我用“我知道得更清楚”的态度对她大吼大叫,挑战她的智慧时,她会变得更安静。不是作为愤怒的标志,也不是某种报复的被动攻击,而是作为一种关心的语言,保护她自己,甚至是我,免受言语的伤害。我有点羡慕她。沉默对我来说并不总是那么容易。S在15天后被允许出院,据说“病情有了明显好转,但视力仍不佳”。在一个似乎已经被情绪图表和情绪监测应用程序接管的世界里,与精神科医生进行第二次、第三次和第四次咨询,为S和他的护理人员提供治疗,支持小组,药物治疗,更多的药物来减轻早期药物的副作用,对话真的失败了S和i。不是因为“合理的对话”变得不可能,而是因为对话作为伦理和政治的先决条件,假定了某种“理性”和“理性”的概念。谈话的决定性核心是“狂躁的S”所暴露的东西。通常,对话的目的是解决问题,它通过语言寻求结束和确定性。像诊断?在提出或发现问题(诊断)和解决问题(治疗)之间的不确定性中,对话能否存在?我并没有完全拒绝将对话作为一种珍贵的行为方式,我想在这里用伦理和政治来思考波维内利所说的停顿或间隔,德勒兹和帕内特(2007)认为的“用自己的语言说话”,以及金、纳瓦罗和史密斯所说的“业余”金等人所说的。(2020)。就我而言,在实践中,这已经开始转化为对S置之不理。出于对他孤独的尊重。这也意味着要慢慢学会放弃对“前躁狂症”或“前躁郁症”的顽固坚持,以及将他的诊断作为他人格的合法标准。 学习这是学习他,当然,不是由(或减少)他的诊断,而且狂热的年代,谁写紧急速度,其伤害和快乐开始的音乐和电影脚本,似乎是由一个狂热的焦虑的生产力也崩溃在其负担是向日葵,人生活在这个世界上,已经由谁是筋疲力尽的/这个世界而努力。他不是一个危机,不能在此时此地通过谈话的重量来解决。S正在学习生活在这样一个世界,这个世界要求他把自己的情绪和思想转化为应用程序上的数字或表情符号,并监控药物的变化。他经常被祝福者的“你感觉怎么样?”这是一个情感管理的世界,它试图将某种程度的可预测性带入一个不完全可知的过程。在这个过程中,葵花和我都对另一种疲惫产生了疑问——我之前已经简单提到过的那种疲惫——修理带来的疲惫。那些旨在修复的东西——精神病病房、药物、监控应用——也许也会造成它们自己的伤疤?在资本的世界里,救济不仅可以被利用来造成更多的伤害,而且伤害本身也可以被做成喘息的样子。在《两极探险》一书中,人类学家艾米丽·马丁(2009)讨论了美国社会对躁狂行为的反常迷恋,以及躁狂患者是如何被利用来“刺激经济”的。在美国的某些环境中,专业公司会教人们如何变得躁狂,以提高生产力(2009,53)。弗雷德·莫滕(Fred Moten, 2018)在题为《不仅仅是宣言:诗人的散文》(这是教学大纲的一部分)的演讲中说,批评有时能起到化疗(我加上一句,诊断)的作用——烧毁本应修复的东西。是癌症还是化疗?是双极的还是锂离子的?是压迫的疲劳还是政治斗争的重压?在这样一个世界里,如何想象另一种情况呢?精疲力竭和休息的位置问题,在一定程度上要归功于波维内利关于“任性的好奇心和风险、潜力和精疲力竭之间的关系”的讨论(2012,454)。也许,一个人可以把同样的问题反过来问,这可能更符合波维内利的探究精神——我们会在另一个世界里筋疲力尽吗?在与福柯关于另一个世界的来源的“顽固问题”(同上,471)坐在一起时,波维内利认为,另一个世界需要忍受主体化和世俗性的风险。借鉴威廉·詹姆斯和查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯等美国实用主义者对这种耐力的重视,她强调思想是“注意力的努力”。正是这种思想构成了伦理行为的前提。思想是作为生活工作的努力,是指向自我转变的伦理行动,波维内利将其描述为打破“对思想的神职控制,并将其重新塑造为对世界上自我的实验”(同上,472)。实用主义者,尤其是詹姆斯,认为这种自我实验是一种不断“尝试”的伦理,正如波维内利所指出的,这种“尝试”与福柯的苦行有一种“奇怪的对称性”(同上)。我想简要地思考一下波维内利通过福柯,詹姆斯和皮尔斯(还有阿甘本)为我们描绘的思想政治。培养一种思想政治,一种首先以自我为导向的道德行为,一种尝试事物的努力,也就是注意到另一个世界的可能性从世界的令人筋疲力尽的条件中出现。这也许就是戴夫所说的“一种展开内在的关系”(戴夫,2023,7)。我的感觉是,我在上面已经暗示过,这种内在的行动对莫滕和哈尼的“下层社会”、戴夫的“对差异的冷漠”和实用主义者的“思想作为努力”至关重要,它不断面临(甚至被耗尽)对话作为道德和政治行动的限制和伤害;它的自由潜力从宝贵的停顿中浮现出来。向日葵的狂热是由这个世界创造出来的——它的法西斯主义、资本驱动、生产主义逻辑。但正如他在日常生活中继续展示的那样,正是通过安静地居住在这个世界的褶皱中,多个其他世界才浮现出来。在最初的几个月里,有几次我似乎都不太明白,我开始问自己:我真的了解向日葵吗?S在哪里结束,情节从哪里开始?男权和种姓制度在哪里结束,躁狂抑郁症在哪里开始?或者自我的存在是为了使情节一致吗?也许,我和他以及朋友们的所有谈话都是为了把他的诊断和我对他的现有了解结合起来。 我要感谢我所有的同学,尤其是蒙塔希尔·乔杜里、诺亚·菲克里、戴安娜·里哈尼、杰胡达·塔贾迪、塞缪尔·沃德和路易斯·普洛特尔。感谢审稿人和编辑,他们的反馈让我的文章更加精进,尤其是关于疲劳的部分。
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An otherwise classroom and a diagnosis, or, the preciousness of a pause
It was late September last year. I was a few weeks into a graduate seminar that had quickly turned into one of my favorites. Anthropology of the Otherwise taught by Dr Naisargi Dave at the University of Toronto over the Fall of 2022. Drawing on the concept of “otherwise worlds” by Elizabeth Povinelli (2012), the seminar explored what is not there yet, and what might be1, the world as it is and it is becoming, and what political and ethical alternatives exist in worlds that are determined to deplete and exhaust. Some thinkers, some teachers, some books, and some classmates make it possible to truly inhabit and practice the creative pulse of thought; they take us to places we did not know exist—they create places. The otherwise seminar was one of those experiences, taking me to a different place each week. But in some ways, also the same—from another route, another angle, another field of view and possibility, all in wonderful company. Dionne Brand's A Map to the Door of No Return one week. Political manifestos, another. Freud and psychoanalysis in the middle. Around the same time, another kind of world-making was underway in my life. A loved one who had been a cherished presence for many years and lived in another continent (let's call him Sunflower—or just S, oh the fear of not being taken seriously!) was starting to act in ways that I could not comprehend. I had known and loved S for many years. More importantly, I liked him very much. But I had begun to find it straining to like him. I would find out 3 months later that these were the beginnings of what would be diagnosed as S's “first manic episode”. I would make an emergency visit to India and make possible his “forced sedation” and hospitalization at a psychiatric facility. In what follows, I write about the coming in contact of these two moments—the otherwise classroom and S's diagnosis, and how this serendipitous contact aided what can sometimes appear to be the most difficult thing to do—just getting by, possibly as an otherwise practice and an ethic of alongside-ness. Here, I think about that (ongoing) moment and some questions it raises about ethical and political ways of “becoming” in the world alongside one another. In doing so, I think about what it means to take care of each another and what is there to do, if anything at all, when we are exhausted—by diagnosis, by caregiving, by the limits that an oppressive world forces upon us, and, perhaps by the limits of politics and ethics themselves? Can an otherwise world emerge amid such exhaustion and what might it look like? For better or for worse, I have often seen the world through my classroom notes (what a privilege to have inhabited classrooms that make that possible!). In the face of a diagnosis that felt totalizing and all-engulfing, the body (re)turned, almost intuitively, to the otherwise classroom experience where, as if, presciently enough, the question at stake was: How to register context and history without letting them ingest us? How to get by and make room for otherwise narratives and contexts to emerge when a deterministic context (in this case, the context of the diagnosis) seeks to do the opposite: to limit the possibility of emergence, to fix (Dave, 2023). In entering into a retrospective conversation with the otherwise classroom and an ongoing experience of living alongside S as he lives “under the description of manic depression” (Martin 2009), I think somewhat obliquely, with two related questions raised by Elizabeth Povinelli in her 2012 essay “The Will to be Otherwise/ The Effort of Endurance”—Where does an otherwise world (what Foucault calls autrement) emerge from? And significantly, what “political and theoretical weight” can be given to the “exhausting conditions” of the spaces in and against which the otherwise emerges? These questions are the edifice of my reflection on politics and ethics of diagnosis and caregiving, the effort they call for, and what textures of the otherwise might emerge amidst such effort. Ex·​haus·​tion: the act or process of exhausting; the state of being exhausted; neurosis following overstrain or overexertion (as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary). Thirteen days of Sunflower's hospitalization had passed. We were allowed no meetings or communication with him. Every two days, a nurse would call with a general update— “He is sleeping a lot”. “He is asking for you”. “He wants his phone and laptop”. “He asked for a notebook—we have given him one”. “You can't meet him yet”. “He is cutting out newspaper clippings and collecting them in a bag”. “He did not eat lunch today”. “He is asking for you”. How did we get here? Did it all begin when S left from India on a student exchange program to Germany? It had felt like an escape to him, even if a short-lived one. He was so happy. He, in fact, had been the first one to notice that his happiness felt “a bit excessive”. Before leaving for Germany, S had been pursuing his master's in cinematography at a “highly reputed” university in India. Like many other public institutions that have been systematically dismantled by the ruling Hindu fascist dispensation, this institute too had witnessed multiple attacks on its autonomy, leadership, curriculum etc.2 There were also various complex issues endemic to the institute and the larger structure it inhabited, which preceded and exceeded the Hindu nationalist attacks. Students had been organizing multiple strikes and protests over the years since 2015—against the hijacking of the institute by the Hindu nationalist government, the lack of important resources including equipment and technical staff, unsafe working conditions for students resulting in tragic accidents, improper and arbitrary course plans, exclusionary admission and hiring policies, indefinitely delayed timelines. S, like many others, had started feeling consumed and trapped with no view of an exit. His master's degree that was supposed to have ended in 2020 was still ongoing in late 2022. And, two of his friends had died by suicide on the residential campus, within a span of a few months—all shortly before his exchange program. Some version of this essay can be written as an ethnography of exhaustion. Perhaps, S's mania was an expression of his exhaustion. Perhaps, it was his body's rebellion against this very exhaustion—its own language of pausing. But this, I wonder in hindsight. While Sunflower was at the hospital, I was afraid of another kind of exhaustion—one that can stem from diagnosis and treatment. Separated from S and left to frantically peruse overwhelming amount of literature, I wondered what it means to be labeled and reduced by diagnosis. On especially bad days, I let the dark corners of the internet sink me into debilitating anxieties of the side-effects of Lithium and Risperdal. I may also have been haunted by the guilt of acting on “behalf of” S. Didn't S keep saying how happy he was? Was it right for me to get him hospitalized against his will? Can I get “will” and “consent” to mean something else here? There seemed to be a cruelty, as necessary as the doctors said it was, in “treating” precisely that which felt like happiness to Sunflower—something he was just beginning to feel after a long, long time. That guilt had become an ever-present knot in the chest. Then, there were days of anger, frustration, and resentment. Am I tied by the determinism, burden, and finality of S's diagnosis too? When will I go back to my life? What will happen to all my new beginnings and my recently-started PhD? Perhaps, I was afraid. Of my own exhaustion. As time has passed, some of these questions have morphed into a different texture. In the following sections, I jump between the otherwise classroom and the context of Sunflower's manic depression to pose three related questions about an exhausting and yet, an emerging otherwise world. These are questions about living as political and ethical subjects—about the role of closure and conversation as ethico-political precondition, and the preciousness of a pause in a world that demands that we be knowing, speaking subjects. In The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study (2013), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney ask what lies beyond, beneath, despite and amidst broken institutions—the university, the prison, the settlement (let us add here, the hospital). Their answer—the “undercommons” is conceived as a “thought of an outside, a nonplace […]—the nonplace that must be thought outside to be sensed inside” (39). Always in hiding and eluding knowability or governability, the undercommons is inhabited by the marginal and the otherwise. I want to dwell here on just one aspect of the undercommons: its committed resistance to two related, dearly-held entities: politics and critique. Moten and Harney argue that with an already-defined “subject” and “principle of decision” (2013,18), “politics” encloses and regulates that which must flourish. Following a similar cartography of determinism, “critique endangers the sociality it is supposed to defend” (19)—it pins down and fixes that which is moving. The potential of the undercommons lies in its refusal to be pinned down. “Every time it tries to represent our will, we're unwilling. Every time it tries to take root, we're gone (because we're already here, moving)” (ibid,19). The Undercommons, thus, is “wary of critique” and a determinate “politics” (ibid, 38). A reading of Undercommons in the otherwise classroom had prompted reflection on dominant idioms of doing politics. A question that emerged for me throughout the seminar, then, had to do with the limits of imagining conversation as the precondition for or a necessary part of doing politics—What is lost in imagining conversation (talking to, talking across/despite difference, speaking up and other such metaphors for political speech) as the infrastructure on which politics is built? What would it mean to think of an otherwise world that is neither swallowed by the fantasy and the fatigue of tireless conversation nor diminished by its erasure or impossibility? Naisargi Dave (2023) would perhaps respond with “Indifference to difference”—that is, an ethic of living with the other that does not cannibalize its otherness and does not anchor itself in the anthropological desire for difference. Indifference to difference, she writes, is “an indifference to the thatness of others: not acquiring, not desiring, not appalled, not in thrall, not celebrating, not hankering, not assimilating, not repairing, not normalizing, not consuming, not anthropologizing, not staring” (2023: 1). Neither Moten and Harney's critique of “politics and critique” nor Dave's ethic of “indifference to difference” are a call for political insularity—far from it. They are both considerations of and protests against the normalizing impulse of politics. For Moten and Harney, it is a kind of “anti-politics”; for Dave, it is what she calls the “depolitical”: “an ongoing refusal to be determined, decided for, enclosed, made useful, or made sensible through and for lines of force” (2023, 84). When confronted with caregiving (or simply living alongside), in the context of manic depression, I find myself thinking with Moten and Harney's critique of the political and Dave's ethic of “indifference to the thatness of the other”—both, I think, would invite a questioning of the centrality of conversation in the imagination of a political and ethical otherwise. In the early days of navigating the experience, I saw some version of this “indifference” in one of my companions in this experience—S's mother. On many days, between arranging for the hospital bills and future course of action, we talked about illness, parenting, caregiving, substance abuse, and other things that one or both of us had been confronted with, without warning. The contrast in our approaches made apparent the difference in our languages: mine was a response of words (too many words—aimed at understanding, resolving, trying to undo professional and financial damages, to iron out creases; later, aimed at eliciting words from S too) and hers was a language of silence. On days when I yelled and fought her wisdom with my “I know better” attitude, she would grow quieter. Not as a mark of anger or some vengeful passive aggressiveness but as a language of care, to protect herself and even me, from the wound of words. I envied her a little. Silence didn't always come easily to me. The S who was permitted to leave the hospital after 15 days was said to have “significantly improved with still poor insight”. In a world that seemed to have been taken over by mood charts and mood-monitoring apps, second and third and fourth consultations with psychiatrists, therapy for S and his caregivers, support groups, medication, more medication to mitigate side effects of earlier medication, conversation really failed S and I. Conversation failed, or at least proved deeply inadequate, not in the least because it became impossible to have a “reasonable conversation” but precisely because conversation as ethical and political precondition, presumes a certain notion of “reason” and “rational”. And the determinative kernel of conversation is what the “manic S” exposed. Often, conversation aims to resolve, it seeks closure and determinacy via language. Like diagnosis? Can conversation inhabit the folds of uncertainty between posing or identifying a problem (diagnosis) and solving it away (treatment)? Far from fully rejecting conversation as a cherished way of doing, I want to think here with ethics and politics that inhabit what Povinelli calls the pause or interval, what Deleuze and Parnet (2007) think of as “stuttering in one's own language” and what King, Navarro, and Smith call speaking with “amateur-ness” King et al.. (2020). For my part, in practice, this has begun to translate into leaving S alone. Out of respect for his solitude. This also means slowly learning to give up on a stubborn insistence on both the idea of the “pre-mania” or “pre- bipolar” S as well as his diagnosis as the legitimate metric of his personhood. To learn this is to learn that he is, of course, not defined by (or reduced to) his diagnosis, but also that the manic S, the one who writes at an urgent pace, whose hurt and joy begin to be articulated as music and film scripts, who seems to be driven by a feverish angst of productivity only to then collapse under its burden—is also Sunflower, one who lives in this world and has been produced by it, who is exhausted in/ by this world and strives in it. He is not a crisis to be resolved in the here and now by the weight of conversation. S is learning to live in a world that asks him to turn his mood and mind into a number or emoticon on an app and monitors the shifts in medication. He is constantly haunted by well-wishers’ “how are you feeling?”. This is a world of management of feeling, which seeks to bring some measure of predictability into a not-fully knowable process. Through this process, both Sunflower and I have wondered about another kind of exhaustion—one that I have briefly alluded to earlier –the exhaustion from repair. That which is meant to repair—the psychiatric ward, the medicine, the monitoring apps—perhaps also cause their own scars? In the world of capital, relief can not only be capitalized to cause more injury but injury itself can be made to look like respite. In Bipolar Expeditions, anthropologist Emily Martin (2009) discusses the perverse fascination that American society has with manic behavior and how individuals with mania are harnessed to “stoke the economy”. In certain settings in the US, specialty firms teach people how to be manic in order to be more productive (2009, 53). In his talk titled “More than a Manifesto: A Poet's Essay” (part of the otherwise syllabus) Fred Moten (2018)3, says that critique can sometimes do what chemotherapy (and I add, diagnosis) does—burning that which is meant to be repaired. Is it cancer or chemo? Is it bipolar or lithium? Is it the fatigue of oppression or the weight of political struggle? How is the otherwise to be imagined in such a world? The question of the place of exhaustion and rest owes its formulation, in part, to Povinelli's discussion of “the relationship between willful curiosity and risk, potentiality and exhaustion” (2012, 454). Perhaps, one could invert the same question to ask, and that might be truer to the spirit of Povinelli's inquiry—will we be exhausted in/ by the otherwise world? In sitting with Foucault's “stubborn questions” (ibid, 471) about the sources of an otherwise world, Povinelli argues that the otherwise demands an endurance of risk of subjectification and worldliness. Drawing upon American pragmatists like William James and Charles Sanders Peirce who foreground this endurance, she underlines thought as the “effort of attention”. It is this thought that forms the precondition of ethical action. Thought is effort as life-work, directed as ethical action towards transformation of the self and what Povinelli describes as breaking the “clerical hold of thought and refashioning it as experiment on the self in the world” (ibid, 472). The pragmatists, especially James, thinks of this self-experimentation as an ethic of constantly “trying out” and as Povinelli notes, this “trying” shares a “curious symmetry” with Foucault's ascesis (ibid). I want to think briefly with this politics of thought that Povinelli sketches out for us via Foucault, James and Peirce (also, Agamben). To cultivate a politics of thought, of ethical action directed first and foremost towards the self, of the effort of trying things, is also to note that the possibilities of an otherwise world emerge from within the exhausting conditions of the world. This is perhaps what Dave calls “a relation of unfolding immanence” (Dave, 2023, 7). My sense is, and I have hinted above, that this immanent action which is crucial to Moten and Harney's “undercommons”, Dave's “indifference to difference” and the pragmatists’ “thought as effort” is constantly confronted with (even, exhausted by) the limits and injuries of conversation as ethical and political action; the potential of its freedom emerges from the precious pause. Sunflower's mania has been created by this world—its fascist, capital-driven, productivist logics. But as he continues to show in his everyday living, it is by quietly residing within the folds of this very world that multiple other worlds emerge. At several points through the course of the initial months when very little seemed to be making sense, I found asking myself: Do I really know Sunflower? Where does S end and the episode begin? Where does maleness and caste end, and manic depression begin? Or does the self exist precisely to make the episode consistent?4 Perhaps, all my conversations with him and with friends were an attempt to align his diagnosis with my existing knowledge of him. Now, however, I am trying to think through another kind of ethical endeavor: one that does not trace its route and cartography based on the lines of already-existing knowledge of another and is open to creating its own new knowledges, contexts, and conversations. What does living alongside Sunflower look like, if the stuff of our relation is constituted not by knowledge of one another but what psychoanalyst Adam Phillips (2012) calls “not knowing” and the possibility of a “something else” it generates. This “something else” resonates again with Dave's ethic of “indifference to difference” which does not owe fidelity to any one context or any one frame of knowledge. She points out that contexts (which we think of as indispensable, already-existing preconditions for knowledges) fix and determine, and thus, in telling us what matters, they tell us that certain other things don't matter at all (Dave, 2019). Calls for context also become calls for ethical and political consistency—“to normalize, to exhaust, and to restore otherwise gestures to existing, familiar, lines of force” (Dave, 2023, 75). In her critique of context and thus, consistency, thus lies another vision of politics. If the otherwise can move across contexts, refusing to be tamed by the demands for consistency, what is its tense? Very early on, with the curve of Sunflower's manic depression, it emerged that our lives might straddle between what emerges from the here and now (we act a certain way in a certain moment because what else is there to do?—my emergency travel to India on a 28-h flight, my decision to get him hospitalized despite his strong protest) and is open to deferral to an unknown future. Deferral, not necessarily as an investment in a better future but a willingness to not demand everything instantly, from the (context of the) present. The temporality of an otherwise world or a will for an otherwise life mimics the temporality of uncertainty—or of Phillip's “not knowing” and Dave's “depolitical”. It is akin to what James calls the “unfinished world” which “has a future and is yet uncompleted”. What Dave described in the otherwise classroom as the “double emptiness” of “what is not there yet and what might be”5. What Ben Lerner (2016) calls (in a different context—of poetic failure) as learning to live in the space between what one is moved to do and what one can do. After spending a few months in India, I returned to my other life in North America. Sunflower joined me about 3 months later. To very different degrees and in different ways, we are both (learning to) recalibrate our lives and ecosystems. While attending to the pragmatics of building a life in a new country—learning its ways, finding work etc., Sunflower walks a lot, watches dogs play, practices tennis, cooks, and always pauses to look at the shiny, black squirrels on his way to anywhere. He talks about missing parts of his manic self and how it gave him something that life seemed to have stolen from him. He does the needful, as instructed by his doctor, to prevent/manage another episode. They have labeled him a “very stable patient”. With some time having passed, we both try to see the episode through each other's eyes. “Trying out”, getting by, living alongside, dwelling in the interval. I try to be what Winnicott et al. (1986) call the “good enough” caregiver—not perfect, not consistent, hopefully not ingested, just “good enough”. Depending on the emphasis and the chosen frames of writing and reading, this piece can be read as a caregiver's account. Or perhaps, an ethnography of broken institutions. Perhaps, a rumination on what forms of relationality become possible when we think of the alongside-ness of joy and grief, annihilation and proliferation, crisis and the ordinary. Importantly, an ode to an otherwise classroom. With shifts in rhythms, it can be an account of the unholy union of fascism and capitalism and what they do to personhoods. Far from being conclusive, this piece wants to dwell in an unfinished, unfolding world that refuses to be contained by the certainty and determinacy of conversation, knowledge, context, politics, ethics—above all, their diagnostic and curative impulse. Refusing exhaustion neither by the weight of the present nor tethered to the hopes of a better future, it wants to dwell in an in-between non-place, a pause, or a stutter, that doesn't feel obligated to finality, closure, or certainty. This silent dwelling seems necessary to the politics of thought and ethical self-transformation. After all, it is the humility of the pause that vitalizes the effort and creates what Winnicott may call a “happy enough” life. This piece owes its existence to the discussions and readings in the Otherwise seminar. It's very first draft was written as a paper for the seminar. Thank you, Professor Naisargi Dave, for the inspiring seminar and feedback. I am grateful to all my otherwise classmates, especially Muntasir Chowdhury, Noha Fikry, Diana Richani, Jehuda Tjahjadi, Samuel Huard and Louis Plottel. Thank you to the reviewers and editors whose incredible feedback helped me sharpen this piece, particularly around exhaustion.
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CiteScore
1.40
自引率
9.10%
发文量
28
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