{"title":"高估苏联的空中力量","authors":"Martin Verrier","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The overestimation of Soviet airpower by the US started in the early 1940s. In this study, Martin Verrier focuses on US intelligence assessments of early Soviet jet fighters during the period 1945–53, comparing them with actual production numbers and technical details obtained from Russian and Soviet sources. This study contributes to the existing literature on aircraft and missile intelligence assessments, including the well-studied ‘Bomber gap’ and ‘Missile gap’.◼","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Overestimating Soviet Airpower\",\"authors\":\"Martin Verrier\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The overestimation of Soviet airpower by the US started in the early 1940s. In this study, Martin Verrier focuses on US intelligence assessments of early Soviet jet fighters during the period 1945–53, comparing them with actual production numbers and technical details obtained from Russian and Soviet sources. This study contributes to the existing literature on aircraft and missile intelligence assessments, including the well-studied ‘Bomber gap’ and ‘Missile gap’.◼\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The overestimation of Soviet airpower by the US started in the early 1940s. In this study, Martin Verrier focuses on US intelligence assessments of early Soviet jet fighters during the period 1945–53, comparing them with actual production numbers and technical details obtained from Russian and Soviet sources. This study contributes to the existing literature on aircraft and missile intelligence assessments, including the well-studied ‘Bomber gap’ and ‘Missile gap’.◼