Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2275031
Shane Praiswater
AbstractThe doctrinal definitions of strategy regarding ‘ends, ways, and means’ imply an unrealistic linear process, which lulls military officers into unrealistic expectations before conflict and subverts their strategic roles once fighting begins. When it comes to actions taken during a conflict, there should be no separation between political, economic or military strategies, as death and destruction drive reciprocity between war and strategy. Shane Praiswater argues that despite the best efforts of pre-war military strategists, there is an unrecognised danger in attempting strategy before a conflict. Therefore, while generals briefing a literal war plan and objectives amid an emerging crisis will ask important questions regarding national interests, feasibility, risks and so on, they should not use the term strategy. Military leaders present plans, tactics and objectives derived from political guidance, but true strategy can only begin once the war starts. This essay is written from a US perspective but is applicable to any democratic system with a civilian-dominated chain of command. ◼ The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Air Force or Department of Defense.Notes1 Peter Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996), pp. 149–78; Eliot A Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002); Risa Brooks, ‘Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States’, International Security (Vol. 44, No. 4, 1 April 2020), pp. 7–44.2 Richard K Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, International Security (Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000), pp. 5–50.3 Eliot A Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002).4 While the point of this essay is not to create a new and perfect definition of strategy, it does argue that a significant level of violence is necessary to consider the processes involved. As Libiseller and Milevski discuss when considering hybrid or grey-zone conflicts, ambiguous concepts often create more ambiguity than the phenomena they attempt to describe. Libiseller and Milevski astutely observe that by focusing ‘exclusively on violence, Western thinking on war misses the nuance of Clausewitz’s definition’. It might be feasible that violence is not a necessary condition for a fashionably labelled grey-zone operation to be war. However, for the purposes of strategy, this essay argues that violence is a prerequisite for the processes that should drive leaders, regardless of whether a war is actually declared. A non-violent war, however that might look, will simply not drive the same emotions and decisions a violent conflict does. Chiara Libiseller and Lukas Milevski, ‘War and Peace: Reaffirming the Distinction’, Survival (Vol. 63, No. 1, February 2021),
弗里德曼，战略:历史。16斯特拉坎，战争的方向。17约翰·基泽利，“战略行为中的政治-军事动态”，战略研究杂志(第42卷，第2期，2019年2月)，第235-58.18页。这篇文章尊重地背离了格雷的有影响力的努力，不是以任何方式否定它，而是表明历史证明一旦冲突爆发，影响领导人的重大变化。科林·S·格雷:《战略桥梁:理论与实践》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2010)格雷将战略定义为“为了政治目的而使用或威胁使用有组织的武力的理论和实践”。科林·S·格雷，《现代战略》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，1999)，第20页Shawn Brimley和Loren Schulman，“Au Revoir QDR”，War on The Rocks, 2016年6月15日。22无论亨廷顿是否应对这些问题负责(他的辩护者坚持认为亨廷顿关注的是和平时期的行动)，他仍然被广泛引用于所有背景。瑞萨·布鲁克斯，“超越亨廷顿:今天的美国军事专业主义”，美国陆军战争学院季刊:参数(第51卷，第1期，2021年3月)，65-77.23页格雷戈里·达迪斯，威斯特摩兰的战争:重新评估美国在越南的战略(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2014)《克劳塞维茨与第一次世界大战》，《军事历史杂志》(第75卷，第2期，2011年4月)，第367-92.26页斯特拉肯:《战争的方向》，《克劳塞维茨与第一次世界大战》丹尼尔·马斯顿，《核时代的有限战争:美国在朝鲜的战略》，见哈尔·布兰德(主编)，《现代战略的新创造者:从古代世界到数字时代》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社，2023年)，第717-40.30页斯特拉罕:《理论中的战略》;《战略实践》，《战略研究杂志》(第42卷，第2期，2019年2月)，第171-90.32页Strachan:《战略理论》;实践中的策略”布鲁克斯，《专业主义的悖论》，第35页罗杰·奇克林，“第一次世界大战和全面战争理论:对英国和德国案例的反思，1914-1915”，罗杰·奇克林和斯蒂格Förster(编辑)，大战，全面战争:1914-1918年西线的战斗和动员，德国历史研究所出版物(剑桥:38 .玛丽·路易斯·凯利、艾丽卡·瑞恩和帕特里克·贾伦瓦塔纳诺，《美国前指挥官说，美国不知道为什么在阿富汗》，美国国家公共电台，2022年8月10日，2023年7月29日访问大卫·哈伯斯坦，《最好的和最聪明的》(纽约:百龄坛图书，1972年)，第39页威斯特摩兰的继任者克莱顿·艾布拉姆斯，以及他与尼克松和基辛格的关系也是如此。达迪斯和其他人记录了战略议程的不同程度，但战争促使将军和文职领导人在有争议的决定上达成一致，比如在老挝和柬埔寨的行动。41约翰·刘易斯·加迪斯:《遏制战略》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2005年)马斯顿，《核时代的有限战争:美国在朝鲜的战略》，第44页这种态度反映了利比塞勒和米列夫斯基的论点，即非传统战争仍然是战争，应该尊重克劳塞维茨的格言。Chiara Libiseller和Lukas Milevski，“战争与和平:重申区别”，《生存》(第63卷，第1期，2021年2月)，第101-12.45页。作者在定量意义上使用反事实，而不是作为另一种历史。例如，当考虑到希特勒如何干涉纳粹进入法国，并可能通过使敦刻尔克成为可能来帮助盟军时，一个反事实的练习让这种说法可信:如果希特勒没有放慢他所谓的“任务指挥将军”的速度，英国人可能无法撤离。“如果美国有一个不那么激进的核战略，苏联就会占领欧洲或发动核攻击”这样的声明经不起同样的普遍审查。Vladislav M Zubok和Hope M Harrison，“尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫的核教育”，载于John Gaddis等人编的《冷战政治家面对炸弹:1945年以来的核外交》(牛津大学出版社，1999年)，第47页尼科尔斯说:“我们都知道古巴导弹危机，因为它只是我们对世界常识的一部分，即使对那些没有经历过它的人来说也是如此。我想我们没有意识到以前有多危险。我一直认为1983年是我们差点失败的一年。” 是沃尔斯泰特关于威慑有多困难的看法错了，还是美国和苏联之间广为人知的意识形态差异不足以引发一场真正的危机?又或者，尽管缺乏一贯的做法，但美国还是设法应对了其威慑挑战?阿尔伯特·沃尔斯泰特，《恐怖的微妙平衡》，《外交事务》(Vol. 37, No. 2, 1959)，第211-34.57页。冲突双方的政策制定者都明白，使用核武器会引发对方的回应，而MAD对大规模报复的轻微修改并没有给前者带来任何更新的声望。托马斯·C·谢林，“流星、恶作剧和战争”，《原子科学家公报》(第16卷，第7期，1960年9月)，第292-300页。早在1955年，在苏联的洲际弹道导弹成为现实威胁之前，布罗迪就写道:“即使你先开枪，你也可能会死!”Bernard Brodie，“战略陷入死胡同”，Harper’s Magazine, 1955年10月，2023年4月14日。有代表参加的有影响力的军事演习证明，即使跨越核门槛也是困难的，正如卡恩和谢林所预测的那样，尽管以不同的方式，升级将需要参与者有意识的决定，他们仍然不愿牺牲他们的国家政策。见弗里德曼《肯尼迪的战争》59一些更勇敢的领导人可能会采取不同的路线，而且有现成的选择。例如，麦克诺顿在与谢林和非零和游戏合作，而麦克纳马拉在模仿前国务卿约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯(John Foster Dulles)(以言辞激烈而闻名)，这让北约盟国感到懊恼(有时也感到宽慰)。然而，考虑到没有已知的战时局势，即使是创造性的、不升级的核战略也可能是危险的，而且在任何情况下都有政治风险。简而言之，MAD对选民来说非常容易理解，对普通美国人来说可能是最令人安慰的“艰难”选择。60卡恩的阶梯通常被误解为一种单向机制，但更重要的是，卡恩明确地将战前行动与核战争分开。威慑作为一种战略很少考虑卡恩最著名的主张，即核战争不一定是自动存在的:卡恩特别关注揭穿平行核能力使战争不可想象的观念。他和布罗迪一样提醒读者，美国对北约的义务要求美国有能力打击苏联，即使苏联自己没有受到攻击。“发动一场全面热核战争的痛苦决定将是我们做出的”。他拒绝接受相互自杀的威胁能保证威慑的说法。参见弗里德曼和迈克尔斯的《核战略的演变》(Evolution of Nuclear Strategy)， 168.61页。谢林甚至指出，“无论我们喜欢与否，军事战略已经变成了暴力外交”。承认威慑使战略变成了一种非常陌生的东西，这与他1960年早些时候的言论相呼应，即威慑是一个“问题”，不一定是一种战略。托马斯·C·谢林，《武器与影响》(纽黑文，康涅狄格州:耶鲁大学出版社，1966年)，第33.62页。罗伯特·鲍威尔，《核威慑与有限报复战略》，《美国政治科学评论》(第83卷，第2期，1989年)，第503-19.63页。利比塞勒在讨论威慑时直言不讳，指出这不是战争，“因为使用武力的意图是前者而不是后者的条件”。Libiseller，“混合战争”作为一种学术时尚”64斯托克，《你认为你所知道的关于有限战争的一切都是错的》65页例如，战略与国际研究中心(CSIS)就问道:“战略在哪里?”在分析特朗普总统2017年的《国家安全战略》时，但读到科德斯曼的批评时，
{"title":"Reconsidering the Relationship Between War and Strategy","authors":"Shane Praiswater","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2275031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2275031","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe doctrinal definitions of strategy regarding ‘ends, ways, and means’ imply an unrealistic linear process, which lulls military officers into unrealistic expectations before conflict and subverts their strategic roles once fighting begins. When it comes to actions taken during a conflict, there should be no separation between political, economic or military strategies, as death and destruction drive reciprocity between war and strategy. Shane Praiswater argues that despite the best efforts of pre-war military strategists, there is an unrecognised danger in attempting strategy before a conflict. Therefore, while generals briefing a literal war plan and objectives amid an emerging crisis will ask important questions regarding national interests, feasibility, risks and so on, they should not use the term strategy. Military leaders present plans, tactics and objectives derived from political guidance, but true strategy can only begin once the war starts. This essay is written from a US perspective but is applicable to any democratic system with a civilian-dominated chain of command. ◼ The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Air Force or Department of Defense.Notes1 Peter Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996), pp. 149–78; Eliot A Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002); Risa Brooks, ‘Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States’, International Security (Vol. 44, No. 4, 1 April 2020), pp. 7–44.2 Richard K Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, International Security (Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000), pp. 5–50.3 Eliot A Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002).4 While the point of this essay is not to create a new and perfect definition of strategy, it does argue that a significant level of violence is necessary to consider the processes involved. As Libiseller and Milevski discuss when considering hybrid or grey-zone conflicts, ambiguous concepts often create more ambiguity than the phenomena they attempt to describe. Libiseller and Milevski astutely observe that by focusing ‘exclusively on violence, Western thinking on war misses the nuance of Clausewitz’s definition’. It might be feasible that violence is not a necessary condition for a fashionably labelled grey-zone operation to be war. However, for the purposes of strategy, this essay argues that violence is a prerequisite for the processes that should drive leaders, regardless of whether a war is actually declared. A non-violent war, however that might look, will simply not drive the same emotions and decisions a violent conflict does. Chiara Libiseller and Lukas Milevski, ‘War and Peace: Reaffirming the Distinction’, Survival (Vol. 63, No. 1, February 2021), ","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135869079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2273066
Tara Zammit
"Good Soldiers Don’t Rape: The Stories We Tell about Military Sexual Violence." The RUSI Journal, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Additional informationNotes on contributorsTara ZammitTara Zammit is a PhD Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and has been awarded the SSHRC-CRSH Department of National Defence MINDS Initiative Doctoral Award to undertake her research on women and LGBTQ + service personnel in the British Armed Forces. In addition to her doctoral studies, Zammit is a member of the Leadership Team for Women in Defence UK, a RUSI NextGen Ambassador, and a volunteer with the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.
{"title":"Good Soldiers Don’t Rape: The Stories We Tell about Military Sexual Violence","authors":"Tara Zammit","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2273066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2273066","url":null,"abstract":"\"Good Soldiers Don’t Rape: The Stories We Tell about Military Sexual Violence.\" The RUSI Journal, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Additional informationNotes on contributorsTara ZammitTara Zammit is a PhD Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and has been awarded the SSHRC-CRSH Department of National Defence MINDS Initiative Doctoral Award to undertake her research on women and LGBTQ + service personnel in the British Armed Forces. In addition to her doctoral studies, Zammit is a member of the Leadership Team for Women in Defence UK, a RUSI NextGen Ambassador, and a volunteer with the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135813295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733
Martin Verrier
The overestimation of Soviet airpower by the US started in the early 1940s. In this study, Martin Verrier focuses on US intelligence assessments of early Soviet jet fighters during the period 1945–53, comparing them with actual production numbers and technical details obtained from Russian and Soviet sources. This study contributes to the existing literature on aircraft and missile intelligence assessments, including the well-studied ‘Bomber gap’ and ‘Missile gap’.◼
{"title":"Overestimating Soviet Airpower","authors":"Martin Verrier","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2268733","url":null,"abstract":"The overestimation of Soviet airpower by the US started in the early 1940s. In this study, Martin Verrier focuses on US intelligence assessments of early Soviet jet fighters during the period 1945–53, comparing them with actual production numbers and technical details obtained from Russian and Soviet sources. This study contributes to the existing literature on aircraft and missile intelligence assessments, including the well-studied ‘Bomber gap’ and ‘Missile gap’.◼","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135267718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2265415
Anzhelika Solovyeva
While the threat of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine remains, it becomes ever more important to address the long history of confusion among Western analysts in trying to understand the Kremlin’s thinking. Anzhelika Solovyeva contends that while the Soviets were more serious and systematic in terms of deterrence than has often been assumed, layered deterrence and theatre-level war-fighting constitute two complementary but different paradigms of Russia’s current nuclear strategy.◼
《美国和苏联战略政策中的选择性核选项》，兰德公司，第2期。r -2034- dre(圣莫尼卡，加利福尼亚州:兰德公司，1976)，第42.30页。R·A·保尔森，《美国核武器在后冷战时代的作用》(蒙哥马利，AL:航空大学出版社，1994)，第11.31页。Jake Garn，“MX导弹系统的现状”，武装部队委员会听证会，众议院，第96届国会，第二次会议，1980年5月1日，第44页，2022.32年4月20日查阅。纽豪斯，《冷黎明》，第58-59.33页。Garthoff，“苏联政策中的相互威慑和战略武器限制”，第112.34页。艾米·伍尔夫，《俄罗斯的核武器:理论、力量和现代化》，美国国会研究服务处，第2期。R45861, 2022年4月21日(更新)，第6页，2022.35年4月20日访问。亚当斯基，《核不相干》，第112.36页。S Ivanov，“Sovetskaya Voennaya Doktrina i Strategiya”[“苏联军事学说和战略”]，Voennaya Mysl”(1969年第5期)，第47-48.37页。V Zemskov，《现代战争》，voenaya Mysl(1969年第5期)，第60.38页。V N Yakovlev(编)，Raketnyy Shchit Otechestva[祖国的导弹盾牌](莫斯科:战略火箭部队中央出版和印刷中心，1999)，第77.39页。V F Andreev，“voenno - strategicheskiy paret - Ob ' yektivnyy Faktor Sderzhivaniya Aggressive - Sil”[' yektivnyy Faktor Sderzhivaniya侵略的客观因素]，voenaya Mysl(1989年第2期)，第45.40页。劳伦斯·弗里德曼和杰弗里·迈克尔斯，《核战略的演变:新的、更新的和完全修订的》，第四版(伦敦:帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦出版社，2019年)，第320.41页。42.作者感谢其中一位匿名评论者强调了这一点。Hynek，“21世纪威慑相关模式中的导弹防御话语和实践”，第436.43页。纽豪斯，《冷黎明》，266-67.44页。奥拉·图南德，“威慑的逻辑”，《和平研究杂志》(第26卷，1989年第4期)，第353.45页。S . Shtrick，《在不使用核武器的情况下包围和消灭敌对行动中的敌人》，《维也纳月刊》(1968年第1期)，第58页;Krylov，“Raketno-Yadernyy Shchit Sovetskogo Gosudarstva”[苏联国家的核导弹防御系统]，第19-20.46页。H F Scott，“核时代的苏联军事学说”，见W C Frank和P S Gillette(编)，《从列宁到戈尔巴乔夫的苏联军事学说:1915-1991》(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992)，第182-83.47页。E Vishnevsky和Z Golomb，“不使用核武器的军事行动”，voenaya Mysl(1970年第2期)，第64.48页。V Zemskov，《现代战争的特征及其可能的行为方法》，《维也纳月刊》(1969年第7期，b)，第23.49页。德米特里·亚当斯基，“威慑:它的独特性，来源和影响”，在弗朗斯·奥辛和蒂姆·斯威吉斯(编辑)，NL军备荷兰军事研究年度回顾:威慑在21世纪-从理论和实践的见解(布雷达:斯普林格，2021年)，第165-66.50。伊万诺夫，《苏联军事学说与战略》，第48.51页。Raymond L Garthoff，《核时代的苏联战略》(纽约:Frederick A Praeger出版社，1960)，第107-10.52页。作者感谢维也纳裁军与防扩散中心(VCDNP)和詹姆斯·马丁防扩散研究中心的Nikolai Sokov博士于2022.53年1月13日在与作者的在线对话中强调了这一点。朱可夫，《真理报》，1956.54。泽姆斯科夫，《现代战争》，第24.55页。N Kopov，“原子炮的使用”，Voennyi Vestnik[军事先驱](1955年第3期)，第77.56页。Henry W . Schaefer，核军备控制:发展立场的过程(华盛顿特区:国防大学出版社，1986)，第77.57页。格特·克雷尔，《关于“灵活反应”的争论》，《和平建议公报》(第17卷第2期)，1986年，第132-33.58页。美国国会，《核战争的影响》，技术评估办公室，1979年，第4.59页。Steven Kull，“对硬目标杀伤能力感觉良好”，原子科学家公报(1988年7 / 8月)，第31.60页。俄罗斯联邦总统行政命令，“关于俄罗斯联邦核威慑国家政策的基本原则”，第355号，2020年6月2日。V . I Levshin, A . V . Nedelin和M . E . Sosnovsky，“论使用核武器以缓和敌对行动”，《维也纳月刊》(1999年第3期)，第2页。 文本。， 2022年2月24日，2023.87年5月10日访问。Lucy Movsesyan，“Putin Zayavil o Gotovnosti Ispol ' zovat”“Vse Imeyushchiyesya Sredstva”dlya Zashchity Rossii”[普京宣布准备使用“一切可用手段”保护俄罗斯”]，RTVI, 2022年9月21日，2023.88年5月10日。Andrey Kokoshin, Victor Esin和Alexander Shlyakhturov， ' Strategicheskoye Sderzhivaniye v Politike National ' noy Bezopasnosti Rossii '['俄罗斯国家安全政策中的战略威慑']，Nezavisimoye voennoye Obozreniye[独立军事评论]，2021年10月21日(b)， 2023.89年2月20日访问。作者感谢其中一位匿名评论者强调了这一点。Kevin Liffey主编，“克里姆林宫:俄罗斯愿意与乌克兰谈判，但不会放弃吞并的地区”，路透社，2023.91年2月28日。Steven Pifer，“反击普京在乌克兰使用核武器的威胁”，《原子科学家公报》，2022年10月10日，2023.92年4月20日访问。Alexander K Bollfrass和Stephen Herzog，“乌克兰战争与全球核秩序”，《生存》(第64卷，第4期，2022)，第10.93页。Giles et al.，《关于俄罗斯军事意图的神话和误解》，1994。Kalganov, Ryzhov和Soloviev，《战略威慑作为提供俄罗斯联邦国家安全的一个因素》，第12页;Kokoshin, Esin和Shlyakhturov，《战略威慑在俄罗斯国家安全政策中的作用》，《战略威慑在俄罗斯国家安全政策中的作用》，2021(a)，第95页。科科申，Esin和Shlyakhturov，“战略威慑在俄罗斯国家安全政策中的作用”[j]， 2021(a
{"title":"Moscow’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence and War","authors":"Anzhelika Solovyeva","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2265415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2265415","url":null,"abstract":"While the threat of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine remains, it becomes ever more important to address the long history of confusion among Western analysts in trying to understand the Kremlin’s thinking. Anzhelika Solovyeva contends that while the Soviets were more serious and systematic in terms of deterrence than has often been assumed, layered deterrence and theatre-level war-fighting constitute two complementary but different paradigms of Russia’s current nuclear strategy.◼","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135884627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2254979
Jacqui Grainger
Jacqui Grainger explores the beginnings of RUSI, from the creation of the United Service Journal to the founding of the Institute, and the man behind their inception: Henry Colburn.■
{"title":"Henry Colburn’s United Service Journal and the Founding of RUSI","authors":"Jacqui Grainger","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2254979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2254979","url":null,"abstract":"Jacqui Grainger explores the beginnings of RUSI, from the creation of the United Service Journal to the founding of the Institute, and the man behind their inception: Henry Colburn.■","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134975526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2260639
Carlos Solar
"Un Ejército de Todos." The RUSI Journal, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Additional informationNotes on contributorsCarlos SolarCarlos Solar is Senior Research Fellow in Latin American Security at RUSI.
“Un ejaccito de Todos。”入寺期刊，印刷前(印刷前)，第1-2页的附加信息撰稿人说明卡洛斯太阳能卡洛斯太阳能是在入寺拉丁美洲安全的高级研究员。
{"title":"Un Ejército de Todos","authors":"Carlos Solar","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2260639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2260639","url":null,"abstract":"\"Un Ejército de Todos.\" The RUSI Journal, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Additional informationNotes on contributorsCarlos SolarCarlos Solar is Senior Research Fellow in Latin American Security at RUSI.","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135596563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2250389
Paul Stott
While the shipbuilding industry in the UK is at a stage of maturity that would not ordinarily warrant a government strategy, the government has developed what is in essence an industrial strategy to maintain the ability to build warships. This strategy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, and has developed to encompass commercial as well as naval shipbuilding. It aims to reverse the level of industry maturity through the stimulation of competition and exporting, and to improve the procurement process to reduce costs. The strategy is pervaded by a tendency to view the industry in the context of its history and the recovery of past shipbuilding glories – an aim of the shipbuilding industry in the UK for around a century. The fundamental need is to provide the UK with the ability to produce warships that represent value for money to the Treasury, and this does not require the ‘recovery of past glories’. New thinking based solely on objectivity, unconstrained by the past, may increase the potential to achieve this goal. Paul Stott uses a new data set to examine the UK government’s National Shipbuilding Strategy and considers its potential for success. ◼
{"title":"Shipbuilding Policy in the UK: The Legacy of a Century of Decline and its Influence on Naval Procurement","authors":"Paul Stott","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2023.2250389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2250389","url":null,"abstract":"While the shipbuilding industry in the UK is at a stage of maturity that would not ordinarily warrant a government strategy, the government has developed what is in essence an industrial strategy to maintain the ability to build warships. This strategy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, and has developed to encompass commercial as well as naval shipbuilding. It aims to reverse the level of industry maturity through the stimulation of competition and exporting, and to improve the procurement process to reduce costs. The strategy is pervaded by a tendency to view the industry in the context of its history and the recovery of past shipbuilding glories – an aim of the shipbuilding industry in the UK for around a century. The fundamental need is to provide the UK with the ability to produce warships that represent value for money to the Treasury, and this does not require the ‘recovery of past glories’. New thinking based solely on objectivity, unconstrained by the past, may increase the potential to achieve this goal. Paul Stott uses a new data set to examine the UK government’s National Shipbuilding Strategy and considers its potential for success. ◼","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135858845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-15DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2020.1769299
E. Grove, M. Alexander
{"title":"Obituary: Professor Colin S Gray","authors":"E. Grove, M. Alexander","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2020.1769299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1769299","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071847.2020.1769299","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43731948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：