董事会性别构成对违反贷款契约的影响

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI:10.1111/corg.12561
Md Samsul Alam, Muhammad Atif, Douglas Cumming, Md Shahidul Islam
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究问题/议题 我们研究了董事会性别多元化在减少违反贷款契约方面的作用。我们还研究了这种关系是否受到女性独立董事的影响。最后,我们研究了这种关系的渠道。 研究结果/启示 根据性别社会化和多元化理论,我们的研究结果表明,董事会性别多元化的公司不太可能违反贷款契约。我们还发现,与女性董事人数较少的董事会相比,女性董事人数较多的董事会对违反贷款契约的影响更大,这与临界质量理论是一致的。我们的结果还表明,这种负面关系源于女性独立董事而非女性执行董事。我们的渠道分析表明,这种关系是通过契约的严格程度、公司的财务业绩和更好的公司治理来实现的。我们的进一步分析表明,在女性占主导地位的行业和陷入财务困境的公司中,以及在董事经验更丰富的公司中,这种关系更为明显。通过一系列敏感性和内生性测试,我们的结果是稳健的。 理论/学术意义 我们为研究董事会性别多样性与贷款契约之间联系的新兴文献做出了贡献。我们填补了这一文献流中的空白,首次提供了实证证据,证明董事会中的女性董事通过在贷款交易过程中提高综合讨价还价能力、改善公司财务业绩和确保良好的公司治理,减少了违反贷款契约的行为。我们的研究还为越来越多的关于女性董事(独立董事和执行董事)和临界质量对公司政策的不同影响的文献做出了贡献。 实践者/政策含义 这一发现对管理者、投资者和政策制定者具有重要的政策含义。鉴于违反贷款契约的情况日益频繁,性别多元化董事会的存在应成为债权人关注贷款问题的一个有力指标。此外,我们的研究还为目前关于董事会性别多元化的商业案例的讨论增添了新的内容。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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The impact of board gender composition on loan covenant violations

Research Question/Issue

We examine the role of board gender diversity in attenuating loan covenant violations. We also investigate whether the relationship is influenced by female independent directors. Finally, we examine the channels of this relationship.

Research Findings/Insights

Drawing on gender socialization and diversity theories, our findings show that firms with gender-diverse boards are less likely to violate loan covenants. We also find that boards with more female directors have a stronger impact on loan covenant violations than those with fewer female directors, consistent with critical mass theory. Our results also suggest that the negative relationship stems from female independent directors rather than from female executive directors. Our channel analyses indicate that the relationship is routed through covenant strictness, the financial performance of firms, and better corporate governance. Our further analysis demonstrates that the relationship is pronounced in female-dominated industries and financially distressed firms, as well as in firms whose directors have greater experience. Our results are robust across a series of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We contribute to an emerging strand of literature that examines the link between board gender diversity and loan covenants. We fill a gap in this stream of literature by providing the first empirical evidence that female directors in the boardroom reduce loan covenant violations through their greater integrative bargaining skills during loan deals, improving firm financial performance, and ensuring good corporate governance. Our study also contributes to the growing literature on the differential effects on corporate policies of female directors (independent and executive) and critical mass.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This finding offers significant policy implications for managers, investors, and policymakers. Given the growing frequency of loan covenant violations, the presence of a gender-diverse board should serve as a potent indicator to creditors who have a concern regarding loans. In addition, our study adds to the ongoing debate regarding the business case of board gender diversity.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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