组织中权力和责任的捆绑

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-06-27 DOI:10.1111/jems.12553
Susheng Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

决策权力通常与责任捆绑在一起。决策者通常要为失败负责。我们提出一种不完全契约方法来调查四种问责制:个人问责制、无问责制、集体问责制和反向问责制。我们认为一个组织由三个任务来定义:收入、权力和责任。这些分配是内生的,在均衡状态下共同决定的。我们的主要发现是:(1)权力和问责制通常(但并非总是)捆绑在平衡中;(2)个人问责与集体问责效率相同,无问责与反向问责效率相同;(3)如果权力机构能力很强,问责制就不可能是最优的;(4)控制权倾向于分配给个人收益和控制边际成本相对较小的管理者;(5)反向问责制一般劣于个人问责制,但如果权力机构能力很强,其边际成本和控制的个人收益足够小,反向问责制可能是最优的。
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Bundling of authority and accountability in organizations
Abstract Decision‐making authority is often bundled with accountability. Decision makers are usually made accountable for failure. We propose an incomplete‐contract approach to investigate four accountability systems: personal accountability, no accountability, collective accountability, and reverse accountability. We consider an organization defined by three assignments: income, authority, and accountability. These assignments are endogenously and jointly determined in equilibrium. Our main findings are: (1) authority and accountability are usually, but not always, bundled in equilibrium; (2) personal accountability and collective accountability are equally efficient, and no accountability and reverse accountability are equally efficient; (3) no accountability can be optimal if the authority is quite capable; (4) control tends to be assigned to managers whose personal benefit from and the marginal cost of control are relatively small; and (5) reverse accountability is generally inferior to personal accountability, but it can be optimal if the authority is quite capable and her marginal cost and personal benefit from control are sufficiently small.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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