宪法道德:一个印度框架

IF 1.3 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW American Journal of Comparative Law Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI:10.1093/ajcl/avad029
Nakul Nayak
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的十几年里,印度法院已经形成了一种观点,即印度宪法中固有的一种道德被称为宪法道德(CM)。宪法宪法作为一种解释手段,帮助法院在有争议的案件中确定宪法文本的含义。然而,围绕CM的基本问题仍未得到解决:法院在判例法中采用了哪些方法论举措来部署CM ?什么司法前提和逻辑在CM中起作用?并且,考虑到CM的路径依赖,CM对印度宪法和宪法理论有什么影响?本文试图通过三个层次的分析来解决这些问题。首先,本文探讨了印度宪法的思想史,以确定印度宪法的主要起草者B.R. ambedkar是如何对宪法进行概念化的。其次,它开发了一个框架,将CM置于印度法院所理解的位置。法院对“道德规范”赋予了两种截然不同的含义:(i)“道德规范”是一种虚构,将“道德规范”的含义锚定为对基本权利的限制,(ii)制度行为者即使在法律不指导其行为时也有义务遵循道德政治实践。本文列出了这两种说法,并从各自的角度进行了分析。最后,概述了宪法制度的发展给印度宪法理论带来的两个问题。随着印度最高法院准备就法院是否可以继续将刑法作为一种解释手段展开听证会,刑法的规范性吸引力将受到审查。我所开发的框架和分析可以作为对配置管理进行批评和辩护的基础。
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Constitutional Morality: An Indian Framework
Abstract Over the last dozen years, Indian courts have formulated the idea that, inherent in the Indian Constitution, lies a type of morality referred to as constitutional morality (CM). CM acts as an interpretive device to help courts ascertain the meaning of the Constitution’s text in contested cases. Fundamental questions around CM, however, remain unaddressed: What are the methodological moves that courts have adopted to deploy CM in case law? What judicial premises and logics are at work in CM? And, given CM’s path dependence, what implications does CM have for Indian constitutional law and theory? This Article attempts to address these questions, using three levels of analysis. First, it explores the intellectual history of CM to ascertain how B.R. Ambedkar—the chief draftsperson of India’s Constitution—conceptualized it. Second, it develops a framework that situates CM as understood by Indian courts. Courts have given two distinct meanings to CM: (i) CM as a fiction that anchors the meaning of “morality” understood as a restriction to fundamental rights, and (ii) as an obligation on institutional actors to follow ethical political practices even when the law does not guide their conduct. This Article charts out both accounts and analyzes them on their own terms. Finally, it sketches two problems that the development of CM presents for Indian constitutional theory. As the Indian Supreme Court gears up to commence hearings on whether courts may continue to use CM as an interpretive device, the normative attractiveness of CM will be under the scanner. The framework and analyses I have developed can act as a foundation on which critiques and defenses of CM can take place.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
20.00%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: The American Journal of Comparative Law is a scholarly quarterly journal devoted to comparative law, comparing the laws of one or more nations with those of another or discussing one jurisdiction"s law in order for the reader to understand how it might differ from that of the United States or another country. It publishes features articles contributed by major scholars and comments by law student writers. The American Society of Comparative Law, Inc. (ASCL), formerly the American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc., is an organization of institutional and individual members devoted to study, research, and write on foreign and comparative law as well as private international law.
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