Scholars in recent years have shown interest in challenging the historical origins of international law and its normative claims to universality. This Article challenges the prevailing conceptions of Islamic international law (al-siyar), first set out in English-language scholarship by Majid Khadduri, as primarily an ad-hoc response to the failed aspiration of a universal Muslim commonwealth. It shows that Islamic international law, in its classical phase (eighth–thirteenth centuries), as first formulated by Iraqi, and later, Central Asian, scholars (who together later came to be known as Ḥanafīs), understood all legal order as being rooted in sovereignty and territoriality, with shared religion a secondary concern. This theory of legal order arose out of an understanding of political order as emerging from a natural and universal condition of war that is incidental to the individual’s natural sovereignty. I trace the genealogy of this conception to the founding moment of the Muslim commonwealth and describe its manifestation in classical Ḥanafī solutions to a series of cases in “private international law.”
{"title":"Sovereignty, Territoriality, and Private International Law in Classical Muslim International Law","authors":"Mohammad Fadel","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avae007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avae007","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars in recent years have shown interest in challenging the historical origins of international law and its normative claims to universality. This Article challenges the prevailing conceptions of Islamic international law (al-siyar), first set out in English-language scholarship by Majid Khadduri, as primarily an ad-hoc response to the failed aspiration of a universal Muslim commonwealth. It shows that Islamic international law, in its classical phase (eighth–thirteenth centuries), as first formulated by Iraqi, and later, Central Asian, scholars (who together later came to be known as Ḥanafīs), understood all legal order as being rooted in sovereignty and territoriality, with shared religion a secondary concern. This theory of legal order arose out of an understanding of political order as emerging from a natural and universal condition of war that is incidental to the individual’s natural sovereignty. I trace the genealogy of this conception to the founding moment of the Muslim commonwealth and describe its manifestation in classical Ḥanafī solutions to a series of cases in “private international law.”","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"254 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140568845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Seeking inspiration from different legal systems in order to solve common policy problems is a core enterprise of comparative law. However, dominant understandings in comparative law and regulatory theory about how norms, rules, and formal institutions move across borders are increasingly inadequate in the face of modern transnational policy challenges. Solving transnational problems requires regulatory innovation, complex coordination, and even competition among private and public actors in multiple jurisdictions, as well as much faster policy responses than most countries can achieve either domestically or multilaterally. Accelerating solutions to emerging transnational problems therefore demands a new focus within comparative law on how transnational legal innovation works and how to leverage its benefits faster on both a global and local scale. This Article proposes a conceptual framework to ground this effort—a “network innovation” model of transnational law formation. Building on earlier literatures on legal transplant, policy diffusion, institutional change, and transnational legal ordering, as well as studies of firm-level innovation, this approach recognizes that new norms, rules, and other institutions are sourced from, coordinated by, and transmitted through transnational networks of public and private actors. Moving beyond prior literatures, however, it views transnational law formation as an aggregating process of innovation where the resulting outputs are the complex product of multiple experimental sites and sources. This approach offers a more accurate descriptive account of transnational regulatory change and points to network innovation processes as central to solving common or collective transnational problems. This Article illustrates the proposed framework with case studies of efforts to build sustainable financial systems. It concludes by suggesting strategies to accelerate network innovation and considering how this theoretical paradigm might inform new directions in comparative law.
{"title":"Beyond Transplant: A Network Innovation Model of Transnational Regulatory Change","authors":"Virginia Harper Ho","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad039","url":null,"abstract":"Seeking inspiration from different legal systems in order to solve common policy problems is a core enterprise of comparative law. However, dominant understandings in comparative law and regulatory theory about how norms, rules, and formal institutions move across borders are increasingly inadequate in the face of modern transnational policy challenges. Solving transnational problems requires regulatory innovation, complex coordination, and even competition among private and public actors in multiple jurisdictions, as well as much faster policy responses than most countries can achieve either domestically or multilaterally. Accelerating solutions to emerging transnational problems therefore demands a new focus within comparative law on how transnational legal innovation works and how to leverage its benefits faster on both a global and local scale. This Article proposes a conceptual framework to ground this effort—a “network innovation” model of transnational law formation. Building on earlier literatures on legal transplant, policy diffusion, institutional change, and transnational legal ordering, as well as studies of firm-level innovation, this approach recognizes that new norms, rules, and other institutions are sourced from, coordinated by, and transmitted through transnational networks of public and private actors. Moving beyond prior literatures, however, it views transnational law formation as an aggregating process of innovation where the resulting outputs are the complex product of multiple experimental sites and sources. This approach offers a more accurate descriptive account of transnational regulatory change and points to network innovation processes as central to solving common or collective transnational problems. This Article illustrates the proposed framework with case studies of efforts to build sustainable financial systems. It concludes by suggesting strategies to accelerate network innovation and considering how this theoretical paradigm might inform new directions in comparative law.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139949485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Assessments of London’s relationship with Strasbourg tend to highlight recent discontent about perceived infringements of parliamentary sovereignty by the European Court of Human Rights. The British criticism is, in short, that this is not what we signed up for. But this complaint is not new. This Article argues against understanding this story as one in which this relationship only recently soured. A recurrent theme in the United Kingdom’s involvement with the institutions of the Council of Europe, especially its human rights commission and court, has been the dawning realization, again and again, that the treaties and institutions that the United Kingdom’s own lawyers and diplomats were so instrumental in devising for an emergent Council of Europe could and would be applied to its own foreign and domestic interests. It is ironic that the United Kingdom should have been so central to crafting human rights instruments from which it later sought to exempt itself. The irony is heightened by the frequency with which this founding member state realized, opposed, and then accepted the implications of its actions. An unexpected consequence of this ironic refrain of exceptionalism may be to reinforce the objective legitimacy of the system’s most challenged institutions. After all, it is hard to allege an infringement of parliamentary sovereignty if the state’s ministers repeatedly choose to abide by the (sometimes changing) treaty obligations they helped establish. On the other hand, when ministers in high dudgeon declare their outrage at the latest Strasbourg ruling, the erosion they facilitate to popular legitimacy may ultimately reduce overall respect for the European Convention. Ironically, we become the masks we wear.
{"title":"The Irony of British Human Rights Exceptionalism, 1948–1998","authors":"Jeffrey Kahn","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad037","url":null,"abstract":"Assessments of London’s relationship with Strasbourg tend to highlight recent discontent about perceived infringements of parliamentary sovereignty by the European Court of Human Rights. The British criticism is, in short, that this is not what we signed up for. But this complaint is not new. This Article argues against understanding this story as one in which this relationship only recently soured. A recurrent theme in the United Kingdom’s involvement with the institutions of the Council of Europe, especially its human rights commission and court, has been the dawning realization, again and again, that the treaties and institutions that the United Kingdom’s own lawyers and diplomats were so instrumental in devising for an emergent Council of Europe could and would be applied to its own foreign and domestic interests. It is ironic that the United Kingdom should have been so central to crafting human rights instruments from which it later sought to exempt itself. The irony is heightened by the frequency with which this founding member state realized, opposed, and then accepted the implications of its actions. An unexpected consequence of this ironic refrain of exceptionalism may be to reinforce the objective legitimacy of the system’s most challenged institutions. After all, it is hard to allege an infringement of parliamentary sovereignty if the state’s ministers repeatedly choose to abide by the (sometimes changing) treaty obligations they helped establish. On the other hand, when ministers in high dudgeon declare their outrage at the latest Strasbourg ruling, the erosion they facilitate to popular legitimacy may ultimately reduce overall respect for the European Convention. Ironically, we become the masks we wear.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"137 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139578714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political “attacks” on the judiciary are a well-known threat to constitutional democracy. Criticism of the judiciary by politicians is often said to constitute one form of attack when it is unfair in the sense that it is not relevant to the judiciary’s constitutional role and/or not respectful. Unfair criticism is frequently claimed to be unacceptable on the basis that it threatens judicial independence and impartiality and, therefore, the rule of law. The Article critically interrogates this claim, arguing that unfair criticism can have value as a form of public accountability of the judiciary. It can hold the judiciary to account for aspects of its decision making that should be subject to scrutiny and that other accountability mechanisms, such as the appeals procedure and the lawmaking process, do not. In particular, it is apt to hold the judiciary to account for the diffuse societal effects, values, and principles of its decision making. As a result, the justifiability of unfair criticism is contestable and context specific because it involves taking into consideration both its potential value and its potential threat. The Article evaluates the subject by drawing on the experiences with unfair criticism of the judiciary by members of the executive and legislature in Australia and the United Kingdom.
{"title":"Are Political “Attacks” on the Judiciary Ever Justifiable? The Relationship Between Unfair Criticism and Public Accountability","authors":"Scott Stephenson","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad034","url":null,"abstract":"Political “attacks” on the judiciary are a well-known threat to constitutional democracy. Criticism of the judiciary by politicians is often said to constitute one form of attack when it is unfair in the sense that it is not relevant to the judiciary’s constitutional role and/or not respectful. Unfair criticism is frequently claimed to be unacceptable on the basis that it threatens judicial independence and impartiality and, therefore, the rule of law. The Article critically interrogates this claim, arguing that unfair criticism can have value as a form of public accountability of the judiciary. It can hold the judiciary to account for aspects of its decision making that should be subject to scrutiny and that other accountability mechanisms, such as the appeals procedure and the lawmaking process, do not. In particular, it is apt to hold the judiciary to account for the diffuse societal effects, values, and principles of its decision making. As a result, the justifiability of unfair criticism is contestable and context specific because it involves taking into consideration both its potential value and its potential threat. The Article evaluates the subject by drawing on the experiences with unfair criticism of the judiciary by members of the executive and legislature in Australia and the United Kingdom.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138580817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This Article discusses critically and from a comparative perspective the idea of neutrality mentioned in the two recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on headscarves in the workplace. The decisions indicate a trend common in many European states that shows little willingness to accommodate for the manifestation of religion in the public sphere. This Article discusses the criteria posed in the decisions on the permissibility of limiting the wearing of headscarves in the workplace and compares them to those used by courts and equality commissions in the United States. It makes a normative argument on what the CJEU should have said in its decisions in order to provide more concrete guidance to national courts. The concept of neutrality, as understood in certain CJEU and European Court of Human Rights cases actually discriminates against some religious groups. It is impossible to be neutral in these issues because neutrality is culturally defined and has a disparate impact in its application upon minority religious groups. This is due to the dominant understanding of neutrality towards religion or secularism in Europe. This understanding should change due to the incoming waves of immigrants that should be integrated. For a number of social and historical reasons there is in the United States greater tolerance for religious expression in the workplace and in the public sphere more generally. The U.S. approach accommodates a spectrum of religious interests and operates to integrate minority religious groups rather than to exclude them. Understanding the philosophical ideas which underlie the differences in the law can inspire a normative reflection on the proper criteria to balance the employee’s freedom of religion and the employers’ rights to define their business. The American approach on headscarves in the workplace is preferable to the European on a deontological and a consequentialist basis as it provides a better accommodation of the relevant interests. It is furthering inclusion in the labor market through respect of differences that allows human flourishing.
{"title":"Is Neutrality Possible? A Critique of the CJEU on Headscarves in the Workplace from a Comparative Perspective","authors":"Ioanna Tourkochoriti","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This Article discusses critically and from a comparative perspective the idea of neutrality mentioned in the two recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on headscarves in the workplace. The decisions indicate a trend common in many European states that shows little willingness to accommodate for the manifestation of religion in the public sphere. This Article discusses the criteria posed in the decisions on the permissibility of limiting the wearing of headscarves in the workplace and compares them to those used by courts and equality commissions in the United States. It makes a normative argument on what the CJEU should have said in its decisions in order to provide more concrete guidance to national courts. The concept of neutrality, as understood in certain CJEU and European Court of Human Rights cases actually discriminates against some religious groups. It is impossible to be neutral in these issues because neutrality is culturally defined and has a disparate impact in its application upon minority religious groups. This is due to the dominant understanding of neutrality towards religion or secularism in Europe. This understanding should change due to the incoming waves of immigrants that should be integrated. For a number of social and historical reasons there is in the United States greater tolerance for religious expression in the workplace and in the public sphere more generally. The U.S. approach accommodates a spectrum of religious interests and operates to integrate minority religious groups rather than to exclude them. Understanding the philosophical ideas which underlie the differences in the law can inspire a normative reflection on the proper criteria to balance the employee’s freedom of religion and the employers’ rights to define their business. The American approach on headscarves in the workplace is preferable to the European on a deontological and a consequentialist basis as it provides a better accommodation of the relevant interests. It is furthering inclusion in the labor market through respect of differences that allows human flourishing.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"25 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135974997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this Article, we argue that the state supports different familial practices in urban and rural areas. Spatial laws and policies are affecting family members’ ability, availability, and commitment to care for one another based on their geographical location. We support the argument using a bottom-up approach that works with three case studies from three jurisdictions: China, Israel, and the United States to uncover and understand the phenomenon. In all these instances, state policies and laws effectively create gaps in familial practices between the city and the country. The analysis identifies and compares two categories of state involvement: differential treatment and spatially blind policies. Collectively, the case studies introduce to family law scholarship the rich, contextual phenomenon of state involvement in spatially shaping families.
{"title":"The Family of the City, the Family of the Country","authors":"Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Baoshi Wang","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad030","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, we argue that the state supports different familial practices in urban and rural areas. Spatial laws and policies are affecting family members’ ability, availability, and commitment to care for one another based on their geographical location. We support the argument using a bottom-up approach that works with three case studies from three jurisdictions: China, Israel, and the United States to uncover and understand the phenomenon. In all these instances, state policies and laws effectively create gaps in familial practices between the city and the country. The analysis identifies and compares two categories of state involvement: differential treatment and spatially blind policies. Collectively, the case studies introduce to family law scholarship the rich, contextual phenomenon of state involvement in spatially shaping families.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"3 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135935337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Over the last dozen years, Indian courts have formulated the idea that, inherent in the Indian Constitution, lies a type of morality referred to as constitutional morality (CM). CM acts as an interpretive device to help courts ascertain the meaning of the Constitution’s text in contested cases. Fundamental questions around CM, however, remain unaddressed: What are the methodological moves that courts have adopted to deploy CM in case law? What judicial premises and logics are at work in CM? And, given CM’s path dependence, what implications does CM have for Indian constitutional law and theory? This Article attempts to address these questions, using three levels of analysis. First, it explores the intellectual history of CM to ascertain how B.R. Ambedkar—the chief draftsperson of India’s Constitution—conceptualized it. Second, it develops a framework that situates CM as understood by Indian courts. Courts have given two distinct meanings to CM: (i) CM as a fiction that anchors the meaning of “morality” understood as a restriction to fundamental rights, and (ii) as an obligation on institutional actors to follow ethical political practices even when the law does not guide their conduct. This Article charts out both accounts and analyzes them on their own terms. Finally, it sketches two problems that the development of CM presents for Indian constitutional theory. As the Indian Supreme Court gears up to commence hearings on whether courts may continue to use CM as an interpretive device, the normative attractiveness of CM will be under the scanner. The framework and analyses I have developed can act as a foundation on which critiques and defenses of CM can take place.
{"title":"Constitutional Morality: An Indian Framework","authors":"Nakul Nayak","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the last dozen years, Indian courts have formulated the idea that, inherent in the Indian Constitution, lies a type of morality referred to as constitutional morality (CM). CM acts as an interpretive device to help courts ascertain the meaning of the Constitution’s text in contested cases. Fundamental questions around CM, however, remain unaddressed: What are the methodological moves that courts have adopted to deploy CM in case law? What judicial premises and logics are at work in CM? And, given CM’s path dependence, what implications does CM have for Indian constitutional law and theory? This Article attempts to address these questions, using three levels of analysis. First, it explores the intellectual history of CM to ascertain how B.R. Ambedkar—the chief draftsperson of India’s Constitution—conceptualized it. Second, it develops a framework that situates CM as understood by Indian courts. Courts have given two distinct meanings to CM: (i) CM as a fiction that anchors the meaning of “morality” understood as a restriction to fundamental rights, and (ii) as an obligation on institutional actors to follow ethical political practices even when the law does not guide their conduct. This Article charts out both accounts and analyzes them on their own terms. Finally, it sketches two problems that the development of CM presents for Indian constitutional theory. As the Indian Supreme Court gears up to commence hearings on whether courts may continue to use CM as an interpretive device, the normative attractiveness of CM will be under the scanner. The framework and analyses I have developed can act as a foundation on which critiques and defenses of CM can take place.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"20 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135463659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Pandemocracy in Europe: Power, Parliaments and People in Times of COVID-19 Get access Pandemocracy in Europe: Power, Parliaments and People in Times of COVID-19 ( Mattias C. Kettemann & Konrad Lachmayer eds., Hart Publishing, 2021) Yvette Lind Yvette Lind Professor of Law, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway E-mail: yvette.lind@bi.no Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Comparative Law, avad025, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad025 Published: 21 October 2023
期刊文章《欧洲泛民主:COVID-19时代的权力、议会和人民》(Mattias C. Kettemann & Konrad Lachmayer主编)。， Hart Publishing, 2021) Yvette Lind Yvette Lind法学教授，BI挪威商学院，挪威奥斯陆E-mail: yvette.lind@bi.no查找作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者美国比较法杂志，avad025, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad025出版:2023年10月21日
{"title":"Pandemocracy in Europe: Power, Parliaments and People in Times of COVID-19","authors":"Yvette Lind","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad025","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Pandemocracy in Europe: Power, Parliaments and People in Times of COVID-19 Get access Pandemocracy in Europe: Power, Parliaments and People in Times of COVID-19 ( Mattias C. Kettemann & Konrad Lachmayer eds., Hart Publishing, 2021) Yvette Lind Yvette Lind Professor of Law, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway E-mail: yvette.lind@bi.no Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Comparative Law, avad025, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad025 Published: 21 October 2023","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"107 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135511668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Private International Law Bibliography 2022: U.S. and Foreign Sources in English Get access Symeon C Symeonides Symeon C Symeonides symeon@willamette.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Comparative Law, avad026, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad026 Published: 06 October 2023
期刊文章国际私法参考书目2022:美国和外国英文来源获取访问Symeon C Symeonides Symeon C Symeonides symeon@willamette.edu搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者美国比较法杂志，avad026, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad026出版:2023年10月6日
{"title":"Private International Law Bibliography 2022: U.S. and Foreign Sources in English","authors":"Symeon C. Symeonides","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad026","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Private International Law Bibliography 2022: U.S. and Foreign Sources in English Get access Symeon C Symeonides Symeon C Symeonides symeon@willamette.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Comparative Law, avad026, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad026 Published: 06 October 2023","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135302150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Can a liberal commons emerge in an authoritarian regime? Based on an in-depth investigation of the ongoing self-governance movement among hundreds of millions of homeowners in China, this Article examines the tension between authoritarianism and liberal commons for the first time. Empirically, this Article reveals a striking contrast: in Shanghai, 94% of condominium complexes have established homeowners’ associations, a kind of liberal commons, compared with 41% in Shenzhen, and only 12% in Beijing. It is posited in this Article that the authoritarian commons (i.e., the dynamic interactions between the authoritarian state and homeowners’ efforts to create a liberal commons in their neighborhoods) features multiple equilibria that depend on the state capacity and the risks posed by the self-governance movement. A highly capable state facing an intermediate degree of risk can make the institutional reforms necessary to accommodate the grassroots democracy. This research of the authoritarian commons brings the state back to the economic theories of property rights, and brings property, and more specifically, space and territorial control to the study of authoritarianism. It also deepens our understanding of authoritarianism and development.
{"title":"The Authoritarian Commons: Divergent Paths of Neighborhood Democratization in Three Chinese Megacities","authors":"Shitong Qiao","doi":"10.1093/ajcl/avad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Can a liberal commons emerge in an authoritarian regime? Based on an in-depth investigation of the ongoing self-governance movement among hundreds of millions of homeowners in China, this Article examines the tension between authoritarianism and liberal commons for the first time. Empirically, this Article reveals a striking contrast: in Shanghai, 94% of condominium complexes have established homeowners’ associations, a kind of liberal commons, compared with 41% in Shenzhen, and only 12% in Beijing. It is posited in this Article that the authoritarian commons (i.e., the dynamic interactions between the authoritarian state and homeowners’ efforts to create a liberal commons in their neighborhoods) features multiple equilibria that depend on the state capacity and the risks posed by the self-governance movement. A highly capable state facing an intermediate degree of risk can make the institutional reforms necessary to accommodate the grassroots democracy. This research of the authoritarian commons brings the state back to the economic theories of property rights, and brings property, and more specifically, space and territorial control to the study of authoritarianism. It also deepens our understanding of authoritarianism and development.","PeriodicalId":51579,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"101 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135734899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：