Looking up and down and round and round: a theoretical–empirical, individual-level analysis of income comparisons

Abstract Income comparisons imply that individuals care not only about the absolute value of their income but also about its relative value. Such comparisons likely have significant societal consequences while also challenging standard neoclassical economic theory. I argue that a better understanding of income comparisons requires a more systematic, theoretical engagement with three problems: (1) the problem of reference group selection, (2) the problem of orientation, and (3) the problem of functional form. Income comparisons are commonly attributed to interdependent preferences, in particular to envy. I propose an alternative theoretical approach in which comparisons are a rational means for individuals to improve upon imperfect information about their current earning potential. I test the empirical implications of both approaches for reference group selection, orientation, and functional form using individual-level data from the Netherlands. The evidence suggests that imperfect information drives comparisons, but interdependent preferences also play a role.