股权结构与代理成本:来自约旦保险业的证据

Mohammad Tayeh, Rafe’ Mustafa, Adel Bino
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目的研究保险公司股权结构对代理成本的影响。研究样本包括2010年至2019年在安曼证券交易所(ASE)上市的23家保险公司。面板回归用于解释公司和特定时间的不可观察变量,系统gmm估计用于解决内生性问题。结果表明,管理层所有权正(负)影响销售、一般和行政(SG&A)费用(资产周转率),这意味着不受监督的管理者从事的活动服务于他们自己的利益,而不是股东的利益。第一大股东的所有权对代理成本没有影响,这意味着第一大股东的所有权是不相关的。但是,随着第一大股东与管理者所持资本比例之间的楔子增大,SG&A费用(效率比)减小(增大),说明非管理层大股东的存在降低了代理成本。在考虑内生性问题后,所有权结构对以资产周转率衡量的代理成本的影响仍然强劲。据作者所知,本研究首次从中东和北非(MENA)的前沿市场(重点是保险业)为代理成本的决定因素提供了独特的证据和有用的见解。此外,本研究通过计算经理人和大股东所有权之间的楔子,使用了一种新的衡量所有权和控制权分离的方法。
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Ownership structure and agency costs: evidence from the insurance industry in Jordan
Purpose This study investigated the impact of corporate ownership structure on agency costs in the insurance industry. Design/methodology/approach The study sample included 23 insurance companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2010 to 2019. Panel regression was used to account for the firm- and time-specific unobservable variables and system-GMM estimation was used to address endogeneity concerns. Findings The results show that managerial ownership positively (negatively) affects selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (assets turnover), implying that unmonitored managers engage in activities that serve their own interests rather than those of shareholders. The largest shareholder's ownership has no impact on agency costs, implying that the ownership of the largest shareholder is irrelevant. However, as the wedge between the percentage of capital owned by the largest shareholders and managers increases, SG&A expenses (efficiency ratio) decrease (increases), indicating that the existence of large non-management shareholders reduces agency costs. After accounting for the endogeneity problem, the impact of ownership structure on agency costs measured by asset turnover remains robust. Originality/value To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to provide unique evidence and useful insights into the determinants of agency costs from a frontier market in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with a focus on the insurance sector. Additionally, this study uses a new measure of separation between ownership and control by calculating the wedge between managers' and large shareholders' ownership.
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来源期刊
Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science
Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
20.80%
发文量
23
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: The Universidad ESAN, with more than 50 years of experience in the higher education field and post graduate studies, desires to contribute to the academic community with the most outstanding pieces of research. We gratefully welcome suggestions and contributions from business areas such as operations, supply chain, economics, finance and administration. We publish twice a year, six articles for each issue.
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