两期的Blotto上校与累积投资在资源受限的可变资产上的竞争

Kjell Hausken
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引用次数: 0

摘要

两个资源受限的参与者通过投资两种资产来竞争,这两种资产的价值可能在两个时期内增加或减少。玩家在时期1的投资延续到时期2。如果一项资产在时期1很便宜,玩家在时期1投资更多,在时期2投资更少,而对另一项资产则相反。如果一项资产在时期2很便宜,玩家在时期2投资更多,在时期1投资更少,而对另一项资产则相反。如果一项资产的价值增加了,双方在这两个时期都投入了更多的资金,而对价值较低的资产的投资则减少了。处于有利地位的玩家可能会比处于不利地位的玩家在价值较低的资产上投入更多。如果一项资产价值增加,双方在第二阶段都投入更多,直到有利的一方最终停止对低增长资产的投资,转而专注于高增长资产。玩家如何在空间(两种资产)和时间(两段时间)之间取得平衡,这里展示了各种直观和非直观的效果。
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Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints
Abstract Two resource constrained players compete by investing in two assets which may increase or decrease in value over two periods. A player’s investment in period 1 carries over to period 2. If an asset is cheap in period 1, a player invests more in it in period 1, less in period 2, and does the opposite for the other asset. If an asset is cheap in period 2, a player invests more in it in period 2, less in period 1, and does the opposite for the other asset. If an asset increases in value, both players invest more in it in both periods, and less into the less valuable asset. An advantaged player may invest more into the less valuable asset than the least advantaged player. If an asset increases in value, both players invest more in it in period 2, until the advantaged player eventually ceases investment into the asset with low growth, to focus on the high-growth asset. Various intuitive and less intuitive effects are illustrated for how players strike balances across space (two assets) and time (two periods).
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