与政府订立合约的专有资讯成本

Jiapeng He, Kevin Li, Ningzhong Li, Weining Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文认为,与联邦政府签订合同涉及重大的专有信息成本,因为法规要求承包商提供专有信息,这些信息可能会通过《信息自由法》(FOIA)的要求向外部提供。我们提供的证据表明,在最近最高法院对《信息自由法》(Food Marketing Institute诉Argus Leader Media)做出改善承包商信息保护的裁决后,企业更愿意竞标政府合同,而且当合同给承包商带来更高的专有信息成本时,这种效应会增强。数据可用性:数据可从文本中引用的公共来源获得。JEL分类:K4;M4。
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Proprietary Information Cost of Contracting with the Government
ABSTRACT We argue that contracting with the federal government involves significant proprietary information cost due to regulations requiring contractors to provide proprietary information, which may become available to outsiders via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We provide evidence by showing that firms become more willing to bid for government contracts after a recent Supreme Court ruling on FOIA (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media) that improved information protection for contractors and that this effect strengthens when the contracts entail higher proprietary information cost for contractors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K4; M4.
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